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Foreword
By Dr Gerhard Wahlers, Deputy Secretary General, Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung (KAS) and Professor Dr Friedbert Pflüger, Director, EUCERS, 
King’s College London.
In 2015 the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), together with the European 
Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS) and the Nazarbayev 
University Astana, jointly organised a panel on “EU-Kazakh Relations” within 
the framework of the EUCERS/ISD/KAS Energy Talks on (Re-) Emerging Energy 
Superpowers. The discussion highlighted the importance for further research 
on the topic of Kazakhstan’s role between the two key energy demand centres: 
Europe and Asia. 
The Ukraine crisis has intensified discussions on possibilities of EU energy 
import diversification. Several options can be identified on the horizon: U.S. 
shale gas, Azerbaijani and other Caspian gas through the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP), gas from the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraqi-Kurdistan or Iran. 
Can Kazakhstan fit into this constellation? Could it be connected to TAP for gas 
exports, or could the country’s oil export capacities through the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline be increased? 
And it’s not just oil that plays an important role. Kazakhstan is also a key 
player for worldwide uranium exports and is increasingly focused on exploiting 
its huge potential of renewable energy sources. The EU would be a logical 
technology partner for expanding renewables. However, the EU, and particularly 
Germany, have much more to offer to Kazakhstan in regard to its policies, 
concepts, strategies and regulations. At the same time, does Europe constitute 
an interesting and viable alternative to Kazakhstan’s eastward looking energy 
policy, despite growing energy demand in China and Chinese pressure for more 
intense energy cooperation? What is Russia’s stance on this? Which role does 
the new Eurasian Economic Union play? Would a stronger cooperation between 
Kazakhstan and the EU in the field of energy resources underline the `multi-
vectored´ foreign policy of Kazakhstan and push the declared will of a deeper 
relation between the partners?  How would Kazakhstan be affected by Western 
sanctions against Russia, which is the most important transit country for 
Kazakh oil? The following study aims to answer these key questions.
We are delighted to present the joint EUCERS/KAS Study on “Strategic 
Perspectives for Bilateral Energy Cooperation between the EU and Kazakhstan 
- Geo-economic and Geopolitical Dimensions in Competition with Russia 
and China’s Central Asia Policies”. The study is to support the discussion 
with political and economic decision-makers as well as representatives from 
academia, media and the general interested public. 
EUCERS and KAS would like to take the opportunity to thank Dr Frank Umbach, 
Research Director of the European Centre for Energy and Resource Security 
(EUCERS), King’s College London for writing this timely and important study. 
We would also like to thank the co-author Dr Slawomir Raszewski for his 
contribution. Last, but not least, we would also like to thank Thomas Helm, 
Head of the Office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Astana, for his support in 
realizing this project.
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Summary 
Alongside its integrated energy and climate policy of 2007, the EU has adopted a 
Central Asia strategy in 2007, to enhance the energy and general political-economic 
cooperation with Central Asia. But the EU has had to compete mostly with Russia 
and China, the two major powers and potential rivals in Central Asia and the Caspian 
Region (CACR). While Azerbaijan has become the most important gas partner 
of the EU, due to the planned Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) pipeline network of the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor project, 
Kazakhstan is the most important oil partner in CACR. For Europe, Kazakhstan has 
become a crucial energy and raw material partner country in its energy foreign 
policy since 2007. Kazakhstan is a vital partner for the EU due to its wellbalanced 
multivector foreign and energy policy, which has strengthened its role in the region 
as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Asia, as well as beyond. Kazakhstan is also a key 
player for worldwide uranium exports and many other critical raw material supplies 
to Europe, which are needed for renewable energy resources (RES), batteries (for 
electricity storage) and many other ‘green technologies’. 
Similarly, the EU has become Kazakhstan’s most important trading partner, 
representing more than 50 per cent of total Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in 
Kazakhstan, amounting to nearly US$100bn in 2013. The EU imports around 5-6 per 
cent of its oil consumption and 21 per cent of its uranium demand. In 2013, the EU’s 
share of Central Asia’s total trade (26.9%) was also bigger than Russia’s (14.4%), 
but has already been surpassed by China (31%). For Kazakhstan, the EU - with its 
unique integration experiences enhancing its intraregional energy policies - has 
been perceived as a model seeking to increase its regional energy cooperation and 
integration.
For the EU as well as Russia and China, the overall regional economic and strategic 
importance of Kazakhstan has grown beyond its geographic location and oil exports: 
its GDP meanwhile exceeds those of the other four central Asian states combined. 
Its business environment is the best in Central Asia, and will also play a fundamental 
role in new transcontinental transport routes such as the ‘Western-Europe-Western 
China Transport Corridor’, the EU’s Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central 
Asia (TRACECA), and China’s new Silk Road concept of ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR). 
However, the Kremlin has always viewed CACR as its geopolitical ‘hinterhof’ and 
‘special sphere of influence’. It has intensified its regional energy cooperation and 
pipeline projects with individual CACR states after the EU’s declaration of its Central 
Asia strategy in 2007. China has also enhanced its energy foreign policies as the 
result of a rapidly growing energy demand, deteriorating prospects for major new 
energy discoveries in its own country, and rising oil as well as gas imports.
Furthermore, the regional states of CACR have not only widened and deepened their 
energy ties to Russia during the last decade, but have also diversified their energy 
exports and energy foreign policies to China, the EU and other energy partners. But 
CACR has also become increasingly fractured as the regional states have developed 
their national energy, economic and foreign policies with contrasting as well as often 
competing perspectives. 
Under these circumstances, the EU and Kazakhstan agreed in January 2015 to 
initiate a new ‘Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’. But the energy 
field has not explicitly been defined as one of the ‘main areas of cooperation’ despite 
Kazakhstan being the third largest non-OPEC supplier to the EU. Notwithstanding 
this, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev views the bilateral energy 
cooperation as becoming even more important as European companies participate 
in the exploration of its huge Kashagan oil field and are supporting Kazakhstan’s 
efforts to adopt ambitious ‘green policies’ by expanding RES.
Moreover, the accession of Kazakhstan as the 162nd member of WTO on 30th 
November 2015 offers new positive perspectives for enhanced cooperation with 
the EU and other foreign investors. While the EU has welcomed the accession, the 
dramatic fall of oil prices, international sanctions against Russia, and technical 
problems in its Kashagan oil field have threatened Kazakhstan’s economic growth, 
and could even undermine its political stability. As the country holds the eleventh 
global largest energy reserves, and its mineral reserves belong to some of the 
world’s largest, any larger instability could have wider impacts on its regional CACR 
neighbours and even internationally as Kazakhstan may become the second largest 
non-OPEC supplier to global oil markets by 2020.
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Kazakhstan’s Energy Policies until 2010
Since the nation’s independence, Kazakhstan has emerged as the economic 
and political leader of post-Soviet Central Asia, and energy has been the main 
determining factor for Kazakhstan’s internal and external policies. On this path, the 
2003 Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC and the 2006 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil 
pipelines opened up the oil potential of the greater Caspian Sea region to the world 
markets. The relationship with the EU and the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (TACIS) programme allowed the transfer of normative and 
administrative capacity-building tools, which further strengthened Kazakhstan’s 
international standing. Kazakhstan became the first signatory to the European 
Energy Charter on 17th December 1991 and later to the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) on 17th December 1994. Kazakhstan has also been part of the Interstate Oil 
and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE) platform since its inception in 1996, 
benefiting from 41 of the programme’s 69 projects. Geopolitically, Kazakhstan’s 
status in Eurasia is being defined as a transit country for the Omsk (Russia)–
Pavlodar (Kazakhstan)–Shymkent–Turkmenabat (Turkmenistan) oil pipeline, the 
Central Asia-Center gas pipeline system, the Bukhara-Urals gas pipelines, and the 
Orenburg-Novopskov and Soyuz gas pipelines from Orenburg processing plant to 
Europe. 
The Caspian Sea has received enormous attention from International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) since the break-up of the Soviet Union due to the Tengiz and Kashagan, and 
later Karachaganak, fields. Exploration and production of oil from the fields has 
required international cooperation and new export outlets to deliver the oil to global 
oil markets. Since the early 1990s, Central Asian states have attracted considerable 
attention from the east. In 2004, the construction of the 2,798km Kazakh-China Oil 
Pipeline (KCOP) started by linking the two countries from Atasu in Kazakhstan to 
China’s border town of Alashankou in Xinjiang. 
In the 2000s, Kazakhstan’s energy policy was increasingly determined by 
Astana’s efforts to strengthen its control over its oil and gas sectors, as well as 
national resources, in times of rising oil prices. But its pressure on IOCs has been 
detrimental to this effort, and has led to delays of international projects. But some 
of its reforms in energy policy, new laws, and improved investment conditions have 
also helped diversify its energy exports towards China. 
Kazakhstan has welcomed Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) project, with 
its leadership emphasizing its economic importance and benefits for its members. 
But it has been reluctant to pursue further political and security integration, and 
transforming the EEU into a political-economic-military Eurasian Union counter-
bloc to the EU, in order to ensure Russian domination and control. Beyond regional 
security cooperation, Russia’s EEU has been rather unpopular in CACR, as China 
and the EU have economically and financially much more to offer. Only Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have become members, who have openly been 
pressured by Russia and/or have felt to have no other choice for the time being.
Impacts of the Ukraine Conflict
The Ukraine conflict since 2014 has created new security dilemmas for Kazakhstan 
and other CACR countries. In the EU, discussions and plans of new supply options 
for its energy import diversification have intensified – including gas from other 
Caspian countries through TANAP and TAP. This could  involve Kazakhstan in the 
light of an enhanced trilateral energy cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan since 2014 and renewed bilateral discussions between the EU 
and Turkmenistan to build a Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) for gas supplies from 
Turkmenistan starting as early as 2019. But the EU’s energy security policy and its 
Central Asia strategy have adopted conflicting goals since its declaration in 2007, 
with the consequence that the EU could be torn between Russia and CACR. Against 
this background, many geo-economic and geopolitical parameters have rapidly 
changed, both in Europe and CACR. They provide a very dynamic and challenging 
environment for the EU, but also for Russia, China, the U.S., India and others in the 
years and decades to come.
Russia’s Assertive Energy Foreign Policies and Pipeline Diplomacies 
The strategic importance of hydrocarbons for Russia’s wider national security, 
its state budget, economic growth, social-political stability, and its foreign and 
security policies, has been confirmed in Russia’s ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the 
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Russian Federation’ of February 2013 and other state documents. They focus 
on the importance of access to energy resources globally and the potential for 
military conflicts as worldwide competition for scarce energy resources increases. 
The Kremlin has used Gazprom as its arm for spreading its geo-economic and 
geopolitical interests in Europe and Eurasia, ranging far into many businesses and 
banks in these regions. Holding the world’s second largest remaining conventional 
gas resources, Russia does not lack gas reserves, but presently struggles with the 
availability of gas markets and the future competitiveness of its gas exports. This 
is due to higher production and transport costs of its new, more remote and much 
more expensive gas fields, at a time of fundamental changes in the international gas 
markets. The U.S. shale gas revolution has led to a worldwide gas glut, coinciding 
with presently stagnating or even shrinking markets, such as in Europe. It has 
changed the power relationship between producers and consumers by strengthening 
the latter and creating a ‘buyers’ market. 
But maximizing its geopolitical clout, using pipeline dependencies and Gazprom as 
its tool for its foreign policy, has become much more difficult for Russia, as the EU 
is trying to diversify its energy mix and gas imports. Confronted with losing market 
shares and geopolitical influence, the Kremlin has clearly recognized the arising 
challenges that the EU energy policies pose for its own future gas exports. The 
EU’s Southern Gas Corridor project and the TANAP-TAP pipeline network would end 
Russia’s monopoly in exporting Caspian gas exclusively to Europe through Russian-
controlled gas pipelines. Hence, the Kremlin has sought to strengthen its gas 
footprint in Europe through its own mega-pipeline-projects such as South Stream 
(cancelled by President Putin in December 2014), and its successor Turkish Stream 
(recently suspended). Both pipelines had a planned capacity of 63bcm per year. In 
Southeastern Europe, after the TAP project succeeded over the Nabucco pipeline in 
the summer of 2013, the geopolitical rivalry between Nabucco and South Stream has 
been replaced by a similar geopolitical competition between the TANAP-TAP network 
and Turkish-Stream.
The present Ukraine conflict has increased the strategic importance of CACR for 
Russia. Turkey is already Russia’s second largest gas export market after Germany. 
The recent escalating Russian-Turkish conflict, after the shooting down of a Russian 
air-fighter last November, limits Russia’s energy foreign policy and geopolitical 
ambitions. Russia is confronted with the increasing dilemma of finding alternative oil 
and gas markets, at a time when its most lucrative commercial market of Europe for 
natural gas is already declining and Russia itself having an overproduction capacity 
of almost 100bcm, which it cannot sell on European or Asian gas markets. In this 
regard, it is hardly surprising that Russia is opposing a TCP and not allowing other 
CACR countries like Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan to become new suppliers for the 
shrinking European gas market. Despite Russia perceiving the EU’s Central Asia 
strategy as a major threat to its influence in CACR, it was China that broke Russia’s 
oil and gas export monopoly in Central Asia. China - much more so than the EU or 
the U.S. - is challenging Russia’s traditional geopolitical influence and economic 
interests in CACR.
China’s CACR-Policy and its new Silk Road-Concept ‘One Belt, One Road (OBOR)’
As the most globally populous country with a fast-growing economy, China has 
become the largest energy producer, consumer, and oil importer in the world. 
China has to cope with a dual challenge: an energy demand projected to rise by 
another 44 per cent by 2040 and, at the same time, shifting its energy mix from 
coal to gas and non-fossil fuels. Given the global energy demand and the potential 
vulnerability of shipping routes through the Indian Ocean to the U.S. Navy, CACR 
has gained particular importance for Beijing as a more secure, strategic land 
bridge between the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and China for its energy imports. 
China’s energy and foreign policy ties to Central Asia, particularly Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan, have steadily increased during the last decade. China has quietly 
managed about half of the Kazakh energy market, secured a 49 per cent stake in 
the Kazakh MangistauMunaiGaz company, controls around 24 per cent of Kazakh’s 
present oil production, and has covered more than a quarter of Kazakh exports in 
less than a decade. China has also negotiated uranium imports from Kazakhstan 
and has exploited its hydroelectric potential. At the same time, Turkmenistan has 
become the most important gas partner for China. The world’s longest (2,238km) 
gas pipeline is starting in Turkmenistan, crossing Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and 
extending to Xinjiang. Its initial capacity of 10bcm annually at the end of 2009 
has been expanded to 55bcm and will become operable in 2016. China’s costly 
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investments and projects in CACR have not been based just on short-term economic 
calculations, but more on long-terms strategic and geopolitical objectives.
China’s new Silk Road foreign policy concept OBOR has strong geo-economic 
dimensions and geopolitical implications, and continental and maritime dimensions. 
Like centuries ago, China views itself as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ geographically and 
geopolitically. Its pro-active engagement strategy envisages developing China’s 
bilateral relations with its neighbors to create a regional bloc. It is underpinned 
and bolstered by multiple strategic initiatives, covering some 65 countries and 
more than four billion people. For decades to come, it will make Eurasia, including 
South Asia and Southeast Asia, the top focus of its energy, foreign and security 
policies as well as its foreign direct investments. It should help to solve its growing 
structural economic problems and ensure political stability both at home and in its 
regional neighborhood. For these reasons, China will expand its Overseas Direct 
Investments (ODI) and use its newly created Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), the New Development Bank (NDB) of the BRIC countries, and its Silk Road 
Fund to finance future infrastructures and transportation networks. But the OBOR 
initiative and future Chinese investments in CACR are highly dependent on a stable 
and politically safe neighborhood. However, neither CACR nor South Asia and China’s 
own bordering province of Xinjiang in its western region or Tibet in south-west are 
politically stable regions. 
The EU has not really recognized the overall geo-economic and geopolitical 
implications of China’s OBOR grand design initiative, and the prospects for common 
enhanced political and economic cooperation. Nor has it debated to what extent its 
future CACR energy foreign policy might be complicated, or what new perspectives 
may arise, because of China’s OBOR initiative. But in contrast to Russia’s energy 
foreign policies in CACR, China’s OBOR initiative offers more opportunities for 
mutual bilateral or trilateral energy cooperation between the EU, CACR countries 
and China. However, it equally cannot be excluded that the EU’s and China’s energy 
foreign policies may increasingly compete against each other.
Perspectives of the EU Transformation to an Energy Union
Despite expanded and deepened ties for energy cooperation between the EU and 
CACR, and particularly Kazakhstan, the EU policies towards CACR have remained 
contradictory as its energy security and energy foreign policies are torn between its 
diversification efforts of gas imports and its interests to maintain a stable energy 
partnership with Russia. Despite slow progress, the EU is on the way to establish an 
Energy Union based on enhanced cooperation in 28 different energy policies and a 
fully integrated common energy market. 
Increasing Role and Status of Turkey in Eurasia 
Turkey is a key player in Eurasia’s energy policies; worldwide it is one of the most 
rapidly growing gas markets, and is the only one in wider Europe that has significant 
future gas consumption growth. Turkey has become Europe’s most important transit 
state for Caspian and other potential future gas supplies from Iraq (Kurdistan), 
Turkmenistan and theoretically Iran (though Tehran currently seems to prefer LNG 
exports to Europe). Its bilateral Azeri gas pipeline project TANAP and the connected 
TAP gas pipeline will supply Caspian gas to Albania, Italy, Bulgaria and other 
prospective South-East European countries of the EU’s larger Southern Gas Corridor 
(SGC)-project. The recent eroding of the Russian-Turkey energy relationship since 
the end of November 2015 may have further far-reaching geopolitical implications, 
as Turkey is forced to find alternative oil and gas suppliers. This situation, however, 
offers other suppliers such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraqi-Kurdistan, 
Israel, and the U.S. new opportunities of access to the Turkish gas and oil market. 
The EU’s ‘Southern Gas Corridor (SGC)’-Project is Entering a Critical Time
The regional bilateral pipeline competition in South-eastern Europe between the EU 
and Russia may further increase as the result of a shrinking European gas market 
and new forecasts of decreasing gas consumption and imports, newly built EU 
gas interconnectors (with reverse-flow capabilities) and regional pipelines. Those 
increasing market rivalries are also the result of Russia’s efforts to circumvent 
Ukraine by its newly planned mega-pipelines of Nord Stream-2 and Turkish Stream. 
Both are being opposed by the U.S. and the European Commission, at least as long 
as Russia is not accepting and following EU regulations such as the Third Party-
Package and its Third Party Access rule. While the overall relationship between the 
West and Russia has deteriorated after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and offers 
7 | KAZAKHSTAN ENERGY STUDY
hardly any prospects for rapidly improving, Russia still tries to divide the individual 
EU member states through its bilateral energy foreign policies and pipeline politics. 
However, if the EU’s SGC infrastructure plans and regulations are implemented and 
competing intraregional ambitions and interests are overcome, Russia’s regional 
market shares may decline over time – and, therewith, its geopolitical influence in 
Central and South Eastern Europe.
Increasing Cooperation between the EU, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
Since 2014, the EU, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Azerbaijan have enhanced their 
cooperation as the result of the Ukraine conflict, and their common strategic 
interests in reducing their energy dependence on Russia and diversifying their gas 
export and import supplies. While the project of a TCP has already been negotiated 
alongside the original Nabucco pipeline, the new negotiations highlight changing 
dynamics and geopolitical patterns in Central Asia through the opening of new 
prospects for Turkmen gas exports to Europe. Even though the status of the Caspian 
Sea as a sea or lake has no agreed definition between the littoral states, bilateral 
understandings on Caspian maritime borders have progressed as the Turkmen-
Kazakh agreement of May 2015 highlighted. If Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan can 
solve their bilateral conflict over an oil field in the Caspian Sea, it would also greatly 
increase the prospects for the TCP. However, despite Russia’s overall declining 
influence in the region, its spoiler function should not be underestimated. Equally, 
Turkmenistan has still not declared that the agreed trilateral energy cooperation will 
lead to the construction of the TCP against Russia’s will. Furthermore, it remains 
unclear what kind of risks and security obligations the EU is ready to provide for 
building a TCP in the light of the Ukraine conflict. 
Strategic Implications of the TAPI-Pipeline for Turkmenistan and CACR
TAPI may not just diversify Turkmenistan’s gas exports, but it could also 
permanently alter the overall geopolitical patterns of Central Asia as a resource 
basis for Eurasia, South and East Asia, as the region becomes more independent 
from Russia. TAPI may also fuel the efforts for new transnational and interregional 
road and rail transportation connectivity between Central and South Asia, creating 
new economic and political alliances. This would prevent Central Asia from becoming 
a hostage of some form of a Sino-Russian joint hegemony and condominium.
Prospects for Future EU-Kazakhstan Energy Cooperation
While Kazakhstan’s accession to the World Trade Organisation last November offers 
new positive perspectives for an enhanced cooperation with the EU and other foreign 
investors, the dramatic fall of oil prices, international sanctions against Russia and 
technical problems at its Kashagan oil field have threatened Kazakhstan’s economic 
growth and its currency stability. While Kazakhstan enjoyed robust macroeconomic 
stability until 2014, it went down 21 positions in the last international ‘2015 Energy 
Trilemma Index’ of the World Energy Council, falling from the rank 56 to 77, due 
to the deteriorating conditions of its traditional political, societal and economic 
strength. 
During the last decade, Kazakhstan made substantial progress in developing a 
relatively strong and robust national energy security system, as it has reduced 
transmission and distribution losses, enhanced energy efficiency in the power sector, 
reduced energy and emission intensity, and diversified its electricity generation 
portfolio away from fossil fuels to include more hydropower and RES, which also 
decreased CO2-emissions. Its inclusion of RES in electricity generation may 
have reached 1bn kWh in 2014 – almost three times 2009 levels. But Kazakhstan 
performs poorly in environmental sustainability compared with many other 
countries. It still needs to introduce cutting-edge technologies to enhance domestic 
supply security, and a modern grid system enabling the export of electricity to 
markets of its neighbouring countries. The positive achievements of stabilizing 
its energy security system, increasing its diversification of oil and gas exports 
as well as energy mix by expanding RES, but also the rather comparatively poor 
progress of its environmental sustainability all offer numerous new opportunities 
for an enhanced and deeper energy cooperation between the EU and Kazakhstan, 
benefitting both sides.
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Political Recommendations for Deepening and Expanding Energy 
Cooperation between EU and Kazakhstan
• The lack of solidarity in the EU’s common energy foreign policy towards Russia 
and CACR is often the result of shortsighted, defined national interests, 
preferences and failing long-term strategic visions, overlooking future 
challenges and the insufficiency of national responses. In this light, it does 
not make any sense that national governments spend state subsidies on 
individual energy resources with hardly any cooperation between EU member 
states and not taking adequate conditions into account. If member states wish 
to strengthen their national energy security and maintain their international 
leverage, then they have no real alternative than to create a robust ‘Energy 
Union’.
• Despite Russia’s commercial and geopolitical interests, and its traditional 
perception to see the CACR as its ‘hinterhof’, the EU cannot afford to overlook 
CACR – neither for its security policy nor for its regional and global energy 
cooperation. Although these regional oil and gas resources cannot replace 
the Persian Gulf, the CACR oil and gas reserves have become a strategically 
important fossil fuel supply base for global energy security.
• The EU must decide whether they want to be a part of and influence China’s 
OBOR initiative, or whether to stand at the sidelines and lose numerous 
opportunities for business projects and influence of China’s future foreign, 
security, economic and energy policies. If the U.S. and Europe do not become 
more actively involved in China’s OBOR initiative, they do not only risk to lose 
business and investment opportunities in the economically most dynamic 
region worldwide, but they also risk undermining their own wider geo-economic 
influence, which could have vast geopolitical implications for the EU.
• While the Ukraine conflict since 2014 has intensified discussions on new options 
of EU energy import diversification, a TCP with a capacity of at least 30bcm 
could also connect Kazakhstan to the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor. But a TCP, 
which the EU, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan want to implement by 2019, 
appears only realistic either with the agreement of Russia – which is unlikely 
due to strong opposition from Moscow - or if the EU becomes more involved 
in TCP’s financing, and addressing its accompanied hard security questions. 
The EU’s TCP discussions are also just one example of its energy foreign policy 
ambitions, declared long-term strategic interests and inherent contradictions: 
the EU raises expectations of its targeted energy partners, but does not think 
through or live up to its realization or the consequences these expectations 
create – with the result of undermining its own long-term international 
credibility and reputation.
• While an enhanced EU energy cooperation through the inclusion of future 
Kazakh gas supplies to Europe appears complicated given Russia’s objections, 
Kazakhstan’s ‘green energy concept’ for the expansion of RES, and increasing 
energy efficiency, have not been considered as controversial by Russia. 
Furthermore, it offers numerous opportunities for the EU to engage in CACR 
and to support Kazakhstan’s energy transformation and decarbonization 
efforts on its path to a sustainable future. However, European and German 
views often overlook the most recent experiences with Russia and Gazprom 
they have encountered with the shrinking European gas market and the 
German ‘Energiewende’: by diversifying the energy mix away from fossil fuels, 
enhancing energy efficiency and reducing the overall energy consumption, all 
the previous forecasts of the European gas demand and imports have proved 
wrong and too optimistic. Thus, even in the short-term, an enhanced EU energy 
cooperation focusing on RES and energy efficiency with Kazakhstan and other 
CACR countries is not in Russia’s strategic and geopolitical interest. This is 
because it would free more gas resources of the CACR countries for exports on 
the shrinking or stagnating European and Asian (Chinese) gas markets, further 
decrease the energy dependence of CACR countries on Russia, and hinder its 
own energy cooperation with the region. But ultimately, the EU cannot avoid 
clearly defining its strategic and geopolitical interests and needed instruments 
in CACR, nor to address the hard security questions with all relevant actors - 
including Russia and China. 
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1. Introduction: EU-Kazakhstan 
Energy Relations at the Crossroads
Since the adoption of a common integrated energy and climate policy in 2007, the 
EU’s dependence on the import of natural gas has widely been seen as the ‘Achilles 
heel’ of Europe’s energy security due to the Russian-Ukrainian gas supply crisis 
in 2006 and 2009.1 Indeed, the gas import profile of the EU-28 is still not very 
diversified: in 2013, more than 81 per cent of the EU’s gas import demand had 
been imported from three countries: Russia (39%), Norway (29.5%), and Algeria 
(14%). Russia also accounted for no less than 27 per cent of the EU’s total gas 
consumption.2
In June 2007, the EU has also adopted a Central Asia strategy to enhance the energy 
and political-economic cooperation with Central Asia.3 The EU’s main competitors are 
Russia and China, and to a lesser extent Turkey, Iran, and India. The U.S. presents 
competition with the EU at the company level in Central Asia and the Caspian Region 
(CACR). While Azerbaijan has become the most important gas partner of the EU, 
Kazakhstan is the most important oil partner in CACR. Kazakhstan is the world’s 
ninth largest country in territorial size (some 2.7 million km2), but has a modest 
population of less than eighteen million people. Its well-balanced multi-vector 
foreign policy has strengthened its role in CACR, as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and 
Asia, as well as beyond.4
The implementation of the bilateral EU-Kazakhstan Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) of 1999 has been viewed as successful on both sides: they have 
established an effective bilateral political dialogue, including on human rights, and 
bilateral trade has significantly increased. A new ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ 
had been signed in December 2006 for a deeper cooperation between both sides, 
which was completed by a bilateral cooperation agreement to develop nuclear 
trade.5 But the nuclear agreement of 2006 was never signed in the following years. 
In 2009, both sides agreed to review the 1999 PCA with the aim to strengthen the 
relationship, to enhance their cooperation particularly in the energy field “in order to 
promote diversification of supplies and export routes towards the EU”, as well as to 
develop cooperation on other economic issues and investments.6
The EU has become Kazakhstan’s most important trading partner, representing 
more than 50 per cent of total Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Kazakhstan, 
amounting to nearly US$100bn in 2013.7 Bilateral trade amounted to above €31bn 
(US$53bn) in 2013, accounting for 32.8 per cent of Kazakhstan’s total external 
trade: €24bn are the result of Kazakhstan’s exports (i.e.oil), whereas EU exports 
to Kazakhstan amounted to €7.5bn of mainly manufactured goods, machinery and 
equipment.8 The EU imports 5-6 per cent of its oil consumption and 21 per cent of 
its uranium demand.9 In 2013, the EU’s share of Central Asia’s total trade (26.9%) 
was also bigger than Russia’s (14.4%), but has already been surpassed by China 
(31%).
For the EU, Russia and China, the regional economic and strategic importance 
of Kazakhstan has grown beyond its geographic location: Kazakhstan’s GDP 
meanwhile exceeds those of the other four central Asian states combined.10 Its 
business environment is also the best in Central Asia: in the World Bank’s ‘Doing 
Business’ ranking, Kazakhstan has climbed up twelve ranking positions up from 
53rd in 2015 to 41st in 2016.11 Kazakhstan will also play a fundamental role in 
new transcontinental transport routes such as the ‘Western-Europe-Western 
China Transport Corridor’, which will cut delivery time by half compared with 
seaborne transport, and the EU’s Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central 
Asia (TRACECA). For Kazakhstan, the EU - with its unique integration experiences 
enhancing its intra-regional energy policies - has been perceived as a model seeking 
to increase their regional energy cooperation and integration.
In this light, the EU and Kazakhstan have agreed in January 2015 to initiate a new 
‘Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’.12 But the ‘energy field’ has not 
explicitly been defined as one of the ‘main areas of cooperation’13 in this document, 
albeit Kazakhstan is the third-largest non-OPEC-supplier of energy to the EU (behind 
Russia and Norway). By contrast, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
sees bilateral energy cooperation becoming even more important, as European 
companies will participate in the exploration of its huge Kashagan oil field (the 
largest in the Caspian Sea), and supporting Kazakhstan’s efforts to adopt new ‘green 
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policies’ by expanding renewable energies (RES).14
The Ukraine conflict since 2014 has created new security dilemmas for Kazakhstan 
and the other CACR countries. In the EU, it has intensified discussions of new 
supply options for EU energy import diversification. These options include U.S. 
shale gas, Azerbaijani and other Caspian gas through the Trans-Anatolian Gas 
Pipeline (TANAP), and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and gas from the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Kurdistan or Iran. Can Kazakhstan fit into this picture after the 
EU and Turkmenistan bilaterally, as well as Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
trilaterally, have already enhanced their energy co ope ra tion since 2014 and are 
planning Turkmen gas supplies for 2019?15 Could Kazakhstan be connected to the 
TANAP-TAP network for gas exports, and/or could the country’s oil export ca pacities 
through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline be increased?
Kazakhstan is also a key player for worldwide uranium exports and many other 
critical raw material supplies to Europe, which are most needed for RES, batteries 
for electricity storage, and many other ‘green technologies’. Germany, for instance, 
signed in 2012 a ‘landmark deal’16 on exploration of rare earths and other critical 
raw materials.17 For Europe, Kazakhstan has become an important energy and raw 
material partner in its energy foreign policies during the last years.
During the last few years, Astana has also shown interest in using its huge 
potential for RES. The EU would be a logical technology partner for expanding 
RES. In addition, the EU and in particular Germany, could share its experiences 
with Kazakhstan in regard to its concepts, strategies and regulations of its energy 
systems’ transformation (i.e. ‘Energiewende’). Such an increase of bilateral and 
interregional energy cooperation between the EU and Kazakhstan would benefit both 
sides and could also help to diversify their energy mix, and strengthen their energy 
foreign policies as well as intra- and interregional cooperation.
Europe could further constitute a viable balancing factor to Kazakh stan’s eastward 
looking energy policy. Despite the growing energy demand in China and Beijing’s 
pressure for more intense energy cooperation, Kazakhstan is conscious of not 
becoming over-dependent on Chinese energy demand.
At the same time, Russia’s energy foreign policies in CACR need to be considered 
and taken into account on the EU side, particularly the future evolution of its 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). From the beginning of the evolving EU Central Asia 
strategy in 2007, it became clear that the EU is confronted with the challenges of 
(1) a lack of a common view and political will to establish a more congruent energy 
foreign policy towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia, (2) the same lack of a common 
(energy) foreign policy towards Russia, which plays the Kremlin into its hands to 
enforce a ‘bilateralizaton’ of its energy and energy foreign policies towards the EU-
27/28, and (3) the growing political and economic ties that will complicate the future 
EU-Russian relations. Notably the EU’s strategic interest to diversify and increase 
its energy imports from CACR threatens Moscow’s commercial and geopolitical 
influence in the European and CACR energy markets. The Kremlin has viewed CACR 
as its geopolitical ‘hinterhof’ and ‘special sphere of influence’, and has tried to 
intensify its regional energy cooperation and pipeline projects with individual CACR 
states after the EU’s 2007 March summit.18 China has also intensified its energy 
foreign policies as the result of a rapidly growing demand for energy, deteriorating 
prospects for major new energy discoveries in their own country, and rising oil 
and gas imports. For Beijing, CACR has played an increasing role for economic and 
security reasons since 1996. Both interests are closely interlinked in China’s energy 
security nexus.19 The overarching problem is that the EU’s energy security policy 
has adopted conflicting goals, with the consequence that it could be torn between 
Russia and CACR.20 Furthermore, the regional states of CACR have not only widened 
and deepened their energy ties to Russia during the last decade, but have also 
diversified their energy exports and energy foreign policies to China, the EU and 
other energy partners. CACR has become increasingly fractured as the regional 
states have developed their national energy, econo mic and foreign policies, with 
contrasting as well as often competing per spec tives.21 These developments have 
created new challenges and problems to cope with the diverging interests on all 
sides in an ever more competitive international arena.22
But the EU can neither geo-economically nor geopolitically afford to overlook 
CACR in its long-term security and energy policy. CACR with its regional oil and 
gas reserves has become increasingly important for global energy security and 
worldwide oil and gas supply. Although these regional oil and gas resources cannot 
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replace the Persian Gulf, it has become a strategically important fossil fuel supply 
base for global energy supply.
Whilst the accession of Kazakhstan as the 162nd member of WTO on 30th November 
2015 offers new optimistic perspectives for an enhanced cooperation with the EU 
and other foreign investors23, the dramatic fall of oil prices, international sanctions 
against Russia, and technical problems at its Kashagan oil field have threatened 
Kazakhstan’s economic growth and could even undermine its political stability.24 The 
country holds the worldwide eleventh largest energy reserves, has mineral reserves 
belonging to some of the world’s largest, and it may become the second-largest 
non-OPEC supplier to global oil markets by 2020.25  Any larger instability could 
have even wider impacts on its regional CACR neighbours, and could even resonate 
internationally.
Meanwhile, the EU has become more engaged with neighbouring countries and other 
re gi ons, including Russia, China and CACR, in order to widen and deepen its energy 
dialo gues.26 In July 2015, the European Council adopted an ‘Energy Diplomacy 
Action Plan’27 to support a more coherent foreign and energy policy and its energy 
diversification efforts, with a “focus on the Southern Gas Corridor, the Southern 
Caucasus and Central Asia”.28
Against this background of a proclaimed more pro-active EU energy foreign policy 
towards CACR, this study will review the EU-Kazakhstan energy cooperation in 
the context of a rising geo political rivalry with Russia and China, and analyse the 
strategic perspectives for an en hanced EU-Kazakhstan energy partnership by taking 
the Kremlin’s and Beijing’s increasingly assertive energy foreign policies, as well as 
their geopolitical interests, into account.
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2. Eurasia’s Energy Dimensions and 
Competing Geopolitical Interests
     2.1 Russia’s Gas Strategy and Pipeline Diplomacy in Europe
The EU and Russia has often been described as having a mutually dependent gas 
and energy partnership. Whereas Europe benefits from Russia’s stable gas supplies 
for its energy security, Russia profits from European investments, technology 
transfers, and its energy demand. However, it is often overlooked that their mutual 
dependency has been asymmetric, due to Russia often being the stronger actor. 
Russia has steadily tested Europe’s willingness to co ope rate with Moscow by only 
taking its own geopolitical interests into account at the expense of those of other 
smaller states. In the words of a Russian de fen der of the Kremlin: “To put it bluntly, 
the Russian budget can survive without gas income, but can the fragile European 
economy survive a year without the supply of 25 per cent of its gas consump tion?”29
The strategic importance of hydrocarbons for Russia’s wider national security, 
its state budget, economic growth, social-political stability as well as its foreign 
and security policies has been confirmed in Russia’s ‘Foreign Policy Concept of 
the Russian Federation’ of February 2013. It has focused on the importance of 
access to energy resources globally, and the potential for military conflicts as 
worldwide competition for scarce energy resources increases, particularly in CACR.30 
The Kremlin has used Gazprom as its arm for spreading its geo-economic and 
geopolitical inter ests in Europe and Eurasia, ranging far into many businesses and 
banks in these regions as well as beyond.31
Holding the world’s second largest remaining conventional gas resources (after 
Iran), Russia has presently no problems with a lack of gas reserves, but rather with 
the availability of gas markets and the future competitiveness of its gas exports due 
to the much higher production and transport costs of its new, much more remote 
gas fields.32 
Whilst the EU is trying to diversify its energy mix and gas imports, Russia has 
clearly recognized the arising challenges that the EU energy policies will pose for its 
own future gas exports.33 The EU’s Southern Gas Corridor project and the TANAP-
TAP pipeline-network would end Russia’s monopoly position of exporting Caspian gas 
exclusively through Rus sian-controlled pipelines.34 Hence, the Kremlin has sought to 
strengthen its gas footprint in Europe through the originally planned South Stream 
Pipeline, with a capacity of 63bcm in 2018 and an initial supply of 15.75bcm by late 
2015.
In South Eastern Europe, after the TAP project succeeded over the Nabucco-
gas pipeline in the summer of 2013, the geopolitical rivalry between the original 
Nabucco-pipeline and South Stream has been replaced by a similar geopolitical 
rivalry between an expanded TANAP-TAP network and South Stream.35 Although 
South Stream could not economically compete with the TANAP-TAP network due to 
its much higher total costs of up to €60bn36, most Russian experts did believe that 
the pipeline circumventing Ukraine would be built due to the overall geopolitical 
importance of the project. But even before the cancela ti on of South Stream in 
December 2014, only two of the original four pipelines appeared realistic.37
At the same time, Moscow has pushed a third and fourth Nord Stream pipeline (also 
called ‘Nord Stream 2’) and even expressed interest in building a second branch 
of the 4,000km long Yamal-Europe gas pipeline in 2013.38 It would have increased 
the already redundant gas pipeline export capacities of Russia and, therewith, 
questioned the commercial profitability of any new gas pipeline projects at a time 
when the European gas import demand has not returned to the pre-crisis level of 
2008. The prospect of a significantly reduced European dependence on Russian 
gas supplies has not just a significant impact on Gazprom’s future businesses and 
market position in Europe. It also directly affects Russia’s state budget and entire 
economy. Since 2010, all previous forecasts of Europe’s gas demand have been 
reduced. Together with the EU’s liberalization efforts of its gas sector through its 
Third-Energy Package regulation, which involves unbundling, third-party access to 
pipelines, and other infrastructures, it has forced Gazprom to look for alternative 
markets and to sign a record-breaking deal for exporting gas via a new ‘Power of 
Siberia’ gas pipeline to China in May 2014. But its price compromise has raised 
serious doubts about the profitability of that bi lateral deal at the expense of 
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Gazprom and Russia.39
Russia’s future gas exports, based on even more remote and expensive new gas 
fields, as well as longer and more costly pipelines, could become the most expensive 
option for Eu rope’s future gas imports (when all higher development and transport 
costs are really been taking into account), in comparison with indigenous unconven-
tio nal gas production and many future LNG-imports. Future gas exports will be 
based increasingly on spot-market prices, and even Russia’s Ministry of Economic 
Development warned Gazprom in August 2012 of in creased competition from North 
American exports of LNG, which would force Gazprom to lower its export prices 
by 2016 at the latest.40 The Ministry called Gazprom’s export prices to ‘far abroad’ 
outside the former Soviet Union as ‘inadequate’, with further rising price pres sures 
on the company. It expected that after 2015 production costs of unconventional gas 
in the U.S. and in other countries will further decrease, and that production volumes 
will in crease globally, leading to even more worldwide competition and lower gas 
prices.41 The Minis try anticipated declining gas prices in Europe from the peak of 
US$411 per 1,000cm in 2014 to US$329 in 2016. In 2015, they had actually fallen 
to around US$220 per 1,000cm. In addition, Gazprom’s imports from Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had already de clined from 38bcm in 2010 to 27bcm 
in 201142, which further decreased revenues and pro fits. At the same time, Russia’s 
ageing energy sector needs a huge investment of US$2.4-2.8tn until 2030.43 Russian 
gas producers must invest alone US$730bn by 2035 merely to replace most of their 
current production of more than 600bcm a year from its old gas fields.
On 1st December 2014, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin surprised the EU and 
the South Stream consortium by announcing at his Ankara meeting with Turkish 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that the construction of the South Stream gas 
pipeline had been cancelled. He cited the Commission’s non-constructive approach 
and Bulgaria’s unwillingness to continue the construction. As the Gazprom’s CEO 
Aleksey Miller made clear in January 2015: “South Stream is dead. For Europe there 
will be no other gas transit options to risky Ukraine other than the new ‘Turkish 
Stream pipeline’”.44
The European Commission had refused to give Gazprom an exemption for operating 
the pipeline at full capacity, in favour of the EU’s Third-Energy Package rule of 
allowing Third-Party Access of up to 50 per cent. In addition to the lack of approval 
by Brussels and that the new interim government in Bulgaria had frozen the pipeline 
construction in its country in the summer 2014 under the pressure of the European 
Commission, the project had also struggled to raise the €14bn offshore pipeline 
section, due to Western sanctions that made European banks much more cautious 
about lending to a Gazprom-led consortium.45
By agreeing to build the new Turkish Stream pipeline, Russia hoped that the first 
pipeline and gas supplies to Turkey would start delivering by December 2016. 
It had been projected to deliver 16bcm gas to Turkey, and up to 49bcm to the 
Greece Black-Sea coast, where the EU would need to build itself a pipeline as 
soon as possible to supply this Russian gas circumventing Ukraine to its European 
customers. As Moscow warned, the EU needs to build this pipeline as soon as 
possible, as time is running out. As Russia announced in January 2015, it wants to 
stop all Russian gas supplies transiting Ukraine by 2019 due to the remain ing high 
transit risks for Russian gas to European customers, when its gas transit contract 
with Ukraine expires.46 But the Commission declared that the Turkish pipeline 
transporting Russian gas to Europe via Greece is not a sound economic project and 
it does not see any need on its side to build this pipeline. It warned that the change 
would harm Gazprom’s reputation as a reliable supplier and made clear that it will 
”not accept any black mail ing” (Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker).47  The 
Commission has also questioned the economic, legal and technical viability of the 
Turkish Stream project.48
In June 2015, Russia took advantage of growing tension between Greece and the 
EU by signing a bilateral deal with Athens to extend the Turkish Stream pipeline 
through Greek territory.49 The so-called South European Gas Pipeline would be 
controlled by the two countries, but its costs of €2bn would be financed by Russia. 
Its construction should begin in 2016, completed by the end of 2018 and begin to 
operate in 2019.
While Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy and Austria have also been in favour of the Turkish 
Stream, the European Commission and the U.S. have voiced major objections.50 
After President Putin’s visited Budapest in February 2015, the Hungarian 
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government had already organized a meeting with Serbia, Macedonia, Greece and 
Turkey (notably Bulgaria, Romania and Croa tia were not invited) in April. They 
proposed an extension pipeline (‘Tesla’) for Turkish Stream from Greece through 
Macedonia and Serbia to Hungary and Baumgarten in Aus tria.51 Its northern route 
coincides with the northern route of the original South Stream pipe line, only 
Bulgaria would be replaced by Macedonia. The invited countries have promised to 
respect EU regulation and expressed their hope of receiving financial support from 
the EU.
The project will compete with another pipeline plan of the state-owned Slovak 
energy com pany Eustream. It already proposed the Eastring pipeline project in 
November 2014 to linking Central with South Eastern Europe (CSEE). It has a 
planned capacity of 20-40bcm and is based on two variants: it would either run 
832km through Slovakia, Hungary or Ukraine, and Romania, and the second option 
additionally through Bulgaria (1,274km long).52
For the Commission, building Turkish Stream would by no means decrease the EU’s 
import dependence on Russia and Gazprom. Turkish Stream – like South Stream – 
would only offer a route diversification, but not a real diversification of gas supplies, 
which is the major stra te gic rationale for the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor project. It 
would also undermine the EU’s agreed energy and gas supply cooperation with Kiev 
of March 2014. Ukraine’s close energy co ope ration has become increasingly crucial 
for enhancing Europe’s energy security by using its free huge gas storage capacities 
and gas pipeline networks, with its new reverse-flowing options.53
Forcing European countries to buy Russian gas at the Turkey-Greece border instead 
of using Ukraine’s existing large pipeline network would also abandon a well-
functioning system in favour of investing billions of Euros into a new, expensive and 
redundant infra structure. Like South Stream, Turkish Stream would have to comply 
with the EU’s internal market rules that require Gazprom to relinquish its control 
of the pipelines beyond Russia’s border. The Commission has started the official 
anti-trust case against the Russian company, focusing on Gazprom’s attempts to 
foreclose markets, denial of access to competitors to competing pipelines, and other 
gas infrastructures, as well as overcharging gas prices. It is presently very uncertain 
whether the bilateral conflict can be “amicably settled” in the near future.
Despite the similar route between the original South Stream pipeline and Turkish 
Stream, the latter would completely redesign the energy route to Turkey and the 
EU by circumventing and isolating Ukraine. While Russian gas to Romania, Bulgaria 
and Turkey has been supplied via Russia’s Trans-Balkan pipeline, in this case Turkey 
would benefit, as it would become the first and not the last importer of Russian gas 
in its supply chain to CSEE.
As Russia wants to end all gas exports via Ukraine, it also means giving up the 
Trans-Balkan Pipeline, which is feeding Turkey’s most populous Istanbul and 
Marmara region, with 20 per cent of Russian total gas exports to Turkey. Russian gas 
flows via the Trans-Balkan-pipeline already decreased 20 per cent towards between 
May 2014 and May 2013.54
Figure 2: Turkish Stream and TANAP-TAP Pipeline Network
Figure 1: Russia’s Turkish 
Stream Gas Pipeline Project
• Capacity: four strings x 15.75bcm 
per year = 63bcm per year
• Transport length: >1,100 km 
(930 km offshore section and 
265 km onshore section);
• Official Costs: 
• Total Costs: €11.4bn 
(US$12.1bn), excluding VAT; 
• Estimated Real Costs: > 
€14bn (excluding costs 
of Russia’s own Southern 
Corridor);
• First line to Turkey: €4.3bn. 
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Source: John Roberts, ‘The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security 
and the Southern Gas Corridor’, Atlantic Council of the U.S. (ACUS)/Global Energy 
Center, Washington D.C. 2015, p. 9.
In the early summer of 2015, Turkey’s evaluation of Russia’s Turkish Stream project 
became more sceptical and critical.55 Shortly before launching the Turkish Stream 
project in Decem ber 2014, Russia decreased its gas exports to Turkey via the 
Trans-Balkan Pipeline. It caused confusion and mistrust in the Turkish government, 
making Turkey fear blackouts in the winter because the region demands two-thirds 
of the country’s energy consumption. Alter na tive gas supplies from Azerbaijan and 
Russia via the Blue Stream pipeline lack the natio nal gas infrastructure to transport 
those gas supplies from East to West, therefore not present ing Turkey with a viable 
alternative. Only when both sides agreed on Turkish Stream, Rus sian gas exports 
increased again via the Trans-Balkan-Pipeline without giving any official ex planation 
for the two-month gas export decline.56 Hence Turkish concerns have increased, 
particularly in regard to its 265km long onshore section of Turkish Stream, as Russia 
may gain access to Turkey’s critical gas infrastructure in its most populous region. 
Furthermore, Gaz prom already expressed its interest in acquiring Istanbul’s gas 
distribution network.57
Until autumn 2015, Russia had not received a draft agreement for the Turkish 
Stream project from Turkey’s government, after Moscow offered two proposals 
to Ankara in July for just one pipeline and another one for all four strings, but 
explained to be interested in a “phased implementation”.58 Both sides could also not 
solve the price dispute. Russia wanted to grant a discount only after Ankara signed 
off on all four pipelines of Turkish Stream. Turkey, however, wanted just one pipeline 
and intended for Gazprom to find European customers for the other three pipelines, 
as otherwise they would directly compete with TANAP and TAP.
In this light, the project has faced increasing challenges and problems:
1.   Close advisers of Gazprom have warned that by re-routing Russian gas 
supplies to Europe to bypass Ukraine, Russia may not fulfil its gas contracts with 
European gas partners because the gas delivery is agreed in the contracts to a 
certain border in specific volumes, such as the transit contract with Slovakia.59 It 
is binding until 2028. Many other con tracts between Gazprom and its European gas 
partners have specified as delivery points either the Slovak-Austrian border and the 
Central European Gas Hub at Baumgar ten, or Velke Kapusany between Ukraine and 
Slovakia.60 As a result, difficult and lengthy re-negotiations would be needed, which 
would involve the European Com mission.
2.   Even in the best-case scenario for building Turkish Stream, Russia might be 
forced to use Ukraine’s gas transit network, as the timetable of 2019 for stopping all 
gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine is unrealistic. At the end of June 2015, Gazprom 
already an nounced to discuss with Ukraine future gas transit supplies via its 
territory after 2019.61
3.   At the same time, Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Intent with the European 
com panies E.ON, Shell and OMV, to build two additional Nord Stream gas pipelines, 
with costs of around €10bn in June 2015.62 It would increase Nord Stream’s total 
capacity to 110bcm, albeit Russia’s total pipeline capacity to the EU is presently 
used at only around 57 per cent. It questions the need of Turkish Stream in the 
light of much lower EU gas con sumption and import forecasts, as well as its 
diversification efforts.
4.   Neither Gazprom and Russia themselves have the financial clout to finance 
Turkish Stream, Nordstream-2 and two LNG terminals in the Baltic Sea, nor have 
the regional states of CSEE countries the funds alone to build the projected Tesla 
pipeline.63
5.   Gazprom itself is facing major problems; its gas production in 2015 has been 
expected to decrease to a historical low of 414bcm.64 Although it could defend 
its market share in Europe with around 30 per cent of the European gas demand 
and around 40 per cent of Europe’s gas imports during the last years, Russia has 
presently a production over supp ly of up to 100bcm per year, which it can neither 
sell on the shrinking European gas mar ket, nor in Asia, which lacks regional 
infrastructure. Moreover, Russia’s ‘pivot to China’ is facing major setbacks: the 
construction of the ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline by May 2019 is no longer realistic 
and might be postponed for two years to May 2021 due to numerous problems. In 
addition, China suspended in late July 2015 its second pipeline project to supply 
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30bcm from its Western Siberia gas fields to China’s northern-western region 
of Xinjiang.65 President Putin had originally introduced this option last spring as 
Russia’s geopolitical alternative, as the Western Siberia fields normally exports gas 
to Europe.
6.   Declining European gas consumption, TANAP/TAP, Nord Stream 3-4 and Turkish 
Stream (in particular with four pipelines and a total capacity of 63bcm), cannot 
all econo mi cal ly coexist. At the beginning of July, Russia unexpectedly terminated 
the €2.4bn con struction contract with the Italian company Saipem (providing two 
pipeline laying vessels, anchoring near the Russian city Anapa), who was meant 
to build the first line of the offshore section of the Turkish Stream pipeline. But 
it reassured its project partners that it would not threaten the project itself.66 
In August 2015 Russia proposed to Turkey two options: either to build just one 
gas pipeline instead of four, or all four planned strings. The Turkish government, 
however, failed to respond to the new proposal.67
The Kremlin has certainly hoped not just to expand its gas supplies to Turkey, but 
also to ac quire more influence in Turkey’s energy policy direction and Azerbaijan’s 
gas supplies via Tur key to Europe.68 But before the recent escalation of the Russian-
Turkish relations at the end of last November, Ankara appeared to have become less 
enthusiastic about the Turkish Stream project.69 The Turkish government reassured 
its Western partners by making clear that its newly agreed gas supply contracts 
and planned projects with Russia will not take place at the expense of TANAP and 
TAP. TANAP has been considered as the central strate gic link between the Caspian 
and European gas markets, and having overall strategic impor tance for the EU’s and 
Turkey’s energy supply security and for the realization of the Southern Gas Corridor. 
Turkey is currently considering acquiring a share in the TAP project.70
The arrival of 16bcm of Azerbaijani gas by 2018 via TANAP and TAP to European gas 
mar kets is already significantly reducing Gazprom’s prospects of building expensive 
rival pipelines and concluding new long-term gas contracts. Russia’s intention 
of constructing two additional Nord Stream pipelines has further questioned the 
economic rationale for the Turkish Stream project. But Russia still maintains plans 
for new additional pipelines and two LNG-export terminal projects at the Baltic 
Sea, with investments costs of US$150-200bn, which are not economically realistic. 
Moreover, by transporting 47bcm at the Turkey-Greece border, Russia threatens 
Turkey’s own energy hub ambitions. It may create significant bottle necks inside 
the Turkey-Greece gas infrastructure system, as the 10bcm Azeri gas for Europe is 
being transported through the same regional gas infrastructure to Albania.
In June 2015, Russia stopped the construction of its 1,625km onshore Pochinki-
Anapa pipe line in its own Southern Corridor region due to the unclear bilateral 
price negotiations with Tur key and the uncertain future of the other three planned 
pipelines of Turkish Stream.71 As a result, the overall future capacity of Turkish 
Stream may have been halved to 32bcm to a local Russia-Turkish project, rather 
than a regional Russia-Turkey-Europe one.72
Even in the most optimistic scenario for Russia, its Turkish Stream project and the 
discussed extension pipelines through Greece and CSEE would need many more 
years from initiation to completion - whereas TANAP-TAP with an expanded SCP are 
already constructed as alternative non-Russian pipeline projects. Around 30 per cent 
of the TANAP-TAP network has already been implemented.
In the late summer of 2015, it became clear that the Turkish Stream project had 
been frozen until November after Turkey’s parliamentary elections, as both sides 
could not agree on construction details and discounts for Russian gas.73 After the 
shooting down of a Russian air-fighter by Turkey on November 24th, Moscow’s 
following suspension of the Turkish Stream pipeline project and the following 
deterioration in bilateral Russia-Turkish relations, the future of Turkish Stream 
appears more uncertain than ever, albeit Russia has already invested US$1.95bn in 
gas pipelines for the project.74 Turkey is actively looking for alternative gas supply 
options and is fastening both the TANAP project with Azerbaijan to be completed 
by 2018, and its previous plan to build an underwater gas pipeline to Israel’s new 
offshore gas fields.
At the same time, Gazprom and Russia are losing strategically important market 
shares in the region of the post-former Soviet Union. Ukraine has reduced its gas 
imports from 42bcm in 2010 to just 18bcm in 2014, whilst Moldova (via a new 
pipeline to Romania) and the Baltic states (with their new floating LNG–terminal 
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in Lithuania) have new import options available, which will reduce their future gas 
imports from Russia.75 In this light, Russia’s gas exports in 2014 had already been 
the lowest in the last decade.76 Its forecasted gas production in 2015 may even hit 
the lowest level in the company’s history.77
2.2 Post-South Stream: New Perspectives for the EU’s Southern Gas 
Corridor and the TANAP-TAP Gas Import Diversification
South Eastern Europe (SEE) and the Balkan countries are the region which are 
the least diversified and most threatened by a possible gas supply crisis. Over 
the last years, debates of gas strategies in the EU-28 and CSEE-countries have 
often overlooked, marginalized, and underestimated the chang ing parameters of 
the global and European gas markets, and the potential for new supply options 
to enhance the member countries’ energy security. These new diversi fi ca tion and 
import options are partly the result of the new EU gas strategy and partly because 
of new supply options - particularly from CACR, Romanian and Bulgarian offshore 
gas fields in the Black Sea, the East Mediterranean Sea (Israel, Cyprus, Lebanon, 
Egypt), and the Adriatic Sea (Croatia).78
Confronted with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and a new Russian gas supply cut, 
the EU Council on 21st March 2014 decided to diversify further its gas imports 
and reduce its gas supply dependence on Russia.79 The EU’s new energy and gas 
strategy, based on the in-depth study concluded at the end of May 201480, was 
approved and confirmed at the European Council summit next June 26th-27th, 
2014.81
The EU’s 3,500km Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project, a system of interconnecting 
pipelines running from the Caspian region through Turkey to CSEE, is the most 
complex and strategic element aimed at expanding the regional liquidity and 
enhancing Europe’s future energy supply security. It can supply at least 20-50bcm 
of gas supplied by Azerbaijan, but also by Turkmenistan, Iraq (Kurdistan) and Iran.82
Whilst the implementation of the first section of this pipeline network with the 
expanded South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) – running from Azerbaijan through Georgia 
to Turkey - and the newly built TANAP (from Turkey’s east to its Greece border), 
and TAP (from Greece through Albania to Southern Italy) – has made important 
progress, the connecting pipeline net work in CSEE has been developed at a much 
slower pace. At the beginning of 2015, the Euro pean Commission created the Central 
East-South Europe Gas Connectivity (CESEC) High Level Working Group. It promotes 
the implementation of the EU’s SGC and other gas in fra struc ture plans, aiming to 
ensure regional energy cooperation and integration.83
After Putin’s cancellation of South Stream, Bulgaria and other regional countries 
have become interested in the Nabucco-West pipeline project (a shorter version of 
the shelved Nabucco project), and becoming a gas hub in South-Eastern Europe.84 
The EU has also wel comed the plan of a ‘Vertical Gas Corridor’ (VGC) between 
Greece, Bulgaria and Romania by building a two-way gas pipeline with a capacity 
of 3-5bcm per year, and has offered the possi bility of funding it through the 
‘Connecting Europe Facility’ programme, with its invest ment package of €315bn 
announced last November.85
But the situation for the EU, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, building the TANAP-TAP gas 
pipeline network has become more geopolitically complicated because of the 
collapse of the Greek economy and the future energy and foreign policies of the 
new left-wing coalition Greece government. It has used its close Russian ties as a 
bargaining chip towards the EU.86 It has signed with Russia a €2bn landmark deal 
for an extension of Gazprom’s planned Turkish Stream gas pipeline through Greek 
territory (called ‘South European Pipeline’ with a capacity of 47bcm per year) last 
June, against objections of the European Commission and the U.S.87 Greece hoped to 
benefit from transit fees and the creation of 20,000 new jobs during the time of the 
pipeline’s construction, but remains dependent on Turkey’s final support of Russia’s 
Turkish Stream project and EU support for its plans to build new LNG-terminals.88
At the same time, the left-wing energy minister Panayotis Lafazanis also demanded 
from the TAP-consortium new efforts for compensation for farmers affected by the 
pipelines, and called for additional benefits for communities nearby. He also opposed 
the DESFA sale to SOCAR and tried to review its TAP contract, which also increased 
concerns in Azerbaijan about the future course of the Syriza Party-led coalition 
government in Athens.89
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The European Commission warned the Greek government that its energy sector 
would suffer if the country leaves the single currency. Having only scarce oil and gas 
reserves, Greece would have to pay more for its energy imports. A ‘Grexit’ would 
also undermine its invest ment climate, raise security supply concerns both in the 
short and in the long-term future, and force the Greek government to reconfigure 
its entire energy policies and system. The EU feared that its key gas infrastructure 
projects connected with Greece such as TANAP, TAP, and the IGB gas interconnector 
to Bulgaria as part of the VGC, would be threatened.90
Since the beginning of 2015, the Greek government demanded cheaper gas prices 
from SOCAR and wanted to reduce SOCAR’s DESFA share of 66 per cent to just 49 
per cent. Greece’s huge debts jeopardize both Azerbaijan’s investments in Greece 
as well as the EU’s SGC project. Until the break-up of the Syriza-government, 
its energy policies have been highly contradicto ry and have resulted in a further 
loss of Greece’s reputation, credibility and trustworthiness in the view of foreign 
investors.91 SOCAR and the Azerbaijani government have resisted all demands and 
requests by Athens.92 But SOCAR’s high expectations in investments in Greece 
and neighbouring countries have been disappointing, as the revenues have shrunk 
alongside the declining oil and gas prices.
The building of TANAP with an initial capacity of 16bcm (6bcm to Turkey and 
10bcm to Europe) is already underway as well as the expansion of the SCP from 
Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas fields through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey (also 
known as the ‘Baku-Erzurum’ gas pipeline). However, the contracted 10bcm of 
Shah Deniz II gas supplies to Europe via TANAP and TAP will be exported to Greek, 
Bulgarian and Italian markets, but not to other countries in SEE, who need to 
diversify their gas imports.
Given TAP’s small capacities of gas for Greece, the TAP consortium has also 
proposed to create natural gas markets from scratch in Albania, Kosovo, and 
Montenegro. In addition, Croatia is only 61 per cent self-sufficient of natural gas 
and has to cope like all other CSEE countries with high energy and gas prices. TAP 
and the regional states are also considering new sub-regional pipelines such as the 
planned Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) with an annual capacity of 3-5bcm traversing 
Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia. Albania and Azerbaijan 
have also agreed to develop a general plan for gas supplies to Balkan nations in 
December 2014. Another plan would be to use and expand the Western Balkan Ring 
(WBR), which would allow Caspian gas supplies to Macedonia and Serbia.93 But not 
all planned cross-border pipelines are being implemented with the needed support 
of governments and energy companies, which still try to balance their EU energy 
policies with those of Russia and Gazprom.94
The European Commission and the regional states in CSEE have responded to 
the Ukraine conflict by quickening the building of already planned bilateral and 
sub-regional gas infra struc ture projects within its SGC. The technical, regulative 
and financial support of these projects has been strengthened by the European 
Commission, through its ‘Connecting Europe Facility’ programme (with 107 gas 
projects with investment costs of €53bn), its newly established ‘European Fund for 
Strategic Investments’, and the implementation of its EU acquis communautaire in 
their energy sectors.95 Furthermore, the expansion of reverse-flow capacities has 
also been increased since 2015.
The regional energy supply security and diversification of imports can also be 
enhanced by building additional bilateral gas interconnectors as part of the EU’s sub-
regional North-South Corridor (NSC) project. It will create a web of reverse flow gas 
interconnections in CSEE as a physical pre-condition for a single, united gas market. 
In this context, LNG-import terminals in Lithu ania (already operating since January 
2015), and Poland (starting its operation in few months), will be connected by new 
two-way cross border gas interconnectors (Poland-Lithu an ia), expanding national 
gas networks, alongside the additional planned LNG-import ter mi nal in Cro atia (at 
the island of Krk). The overall costs of the energy projects of the NSC have been 
esti mated at around €27bn.96 The small national gas markets will be transformed 
into a much larger and more competitive regional gas market with almost the same 
EU regula ti ons, creating much more attractive investment conditions.
Figure 3: Overview of Bilateral 
Gas Interconnectors in CSEE
• Poland-Lithuania: 500km long 
bilateral gas interconnector with 
a capacity of 2.3bcm per year, 
estimated to cost €558 million. It 
has received the highest priority 
by both sides and the European 
Commission to be implemented as 
part of the NSGC.
• Poland-Slovakia: design work 
has started for the bilateral gas 
interconnector as part of the NSGC 
with an initial capacity of 4.7bcm 
per year on the Slovak border and 
5.7bcm per year on the Polish side. 
• Bosnia-Herzegovina: both are 
planning a joint 200km gas 
interconnector, for which the Eu-
ropean Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (ERBD) has 
already expressed its willingness 
to finance the pipeline project. 
Bosnia has presently a modest 
and inconsistent annual gas 
consumption of just up to 400 
million cubic meters (mcm) during 
the last few years. But Gazprom 
is the only source of supply for 
Bosnia’s gas demand, which was in 
2012 just 260mcm.
• Serbia-Bulgaria: bilateral 
agreement signed on the 
construction of a 150km gas 
interconnection with a capacity 
of 1.8bcm last June to begin it 
in 2018, for a gas flow starting 
in 2019. It will allow gas imports 
from TANAP and TAP as well as 
from the LNG-import terminal 
in Alexandroupolis (Greece). 
The European Commission is 
considering giving financial 
support to the project.
• Slovakia-Hungary: transmission 
capacity has been tested last 
March.
• Romania-Moldova (‘Iasi-Ungheni’): 
inaugurated in August 2014 with 
small Romanian gas exports to 
Moldova, with the plan to expand 
it to 1bcm per year with a very 
competitive price comparative to 
Gazprom.
• Bulgaria-Romania: the bilateral 
gas interconnector becomes 
operational in early 2016. By 
2020, it may transport Caspian 
gas further via the existing 
Romanian-Hungarian gas inter-
connector (capacity up to 4.4bcm) 
to Hungary. The required reverse-
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Figure 4: The EU’s Southern Gas Corridor and Newly Planned or Proposed 
Gas Pipelines
Source: John Roberts, ‘The Impact of Turkish Stream on European Energy Security 
and the Southern Gas Corridor’, Atlantic Council of the U.S. (ACUS)/Global Energy 
Center, Washington D.C. 2015, p. 10.
In July 2015, the CSEE countries agreed to strengthen their joint efforts to 
accelerate the building of missing gas infrastructure links and to solve remaining 
technical and regulatory problems.97 While the past slow progress of building 
bilateral gas interconnectors in CSEE, particularly in the Balkans, had often reflected 
the lack of political will and vested interests of state-owned energy companies with 
close ties to Gazprom, the present problems are in creasingly a consequence of 
rapidly falling oil and gas prices, making invest ment in expensive gas infrastructure 
projects commercially risky or even unviable.
2.3 The Energy Potential of Central Asia and the Caspian Region (CACR)
The proven oil and gas reserves in CACR have been estimated at 3.4 per cent of the 
world’s total oil reserves (more than Libya - see next figure), and 11.3 per cent of 
proven global gas reserve (almost comparable with Qatar). Regional oil production 
of 2014 exceeded Venezuela’s 2005 capacity, South America’s largest oil producer.98 
Although the Caspian countries with a combined population of just 76 million 
account for only 1.4 per cent of global primary energy use and have even reduced 
their energy demand by 15 per cent between the early 1990s and 2008, the Caspian 
region cannot replace the Persian Gulf for satisfying the world’s total crude oil 
demand. But Kazakhstan’s proven oil reserves have been anticipated to triple from 
38.8 billion barrels in 2008 to 100-110 billion barrels in the next decade. It could 
make the country the fourth largest producer behind Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, 
and ahead of Kuwait, Russia and Venezuela.99
flow capability needs additional 
investments for its capacity 
expansion. 
• Greece-Bulgaria: the planned Greece-
Bulgaria gas interconnector (IGB with 
a capacity of 1-3bcm) can supply 
Caspian gas in addition to the already 
existing Kula-Sidirokastro pipeline 
with a capacity of 4.3bcm (presently 
exporting Russian gas from Bulgaria 
into Greece) by including a reverse-
flow capability. A final investment 
agreement has been signed at the 
beginning of December 2015.
Source: Dr. F.Umbach based on various 
sources.
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Figure 5: Proven and Oil and Natural Gas Reserves in CACR in Comparison 
with the EU-28, US and the Middle East (2008 and 2014)
Country/Region
Proven Oil Reserves 
(Thousand million barrels)/
Share of Global Reserves (in 
Percentage)
Proven Natural Gas 
Reserves (tcm)/Share 
of Gobal Reserves (in 
Percentage)
Years 2008 2014 2008 2014
CACR
Azerbaijan 7.0 (0.6%) 7.0 (0.4%) 1.20 (0.6%) 1.2 (0.6%)
Kazakhstan 39.8 (3.2%) 30.0 (1.8%) 1.82 (1.0%) 1.5 (0.8%)
Turkmenistan 0.6 (>0.05%) 0.6 (>0.05%) 7.94 (4.3%) 17.5 (9.3%)
Uzbekistan 0.6 (>0.05%) 0.6 (>0.05%) 1.58 (0.9%) 1.1 (0.6%)
Total 48.0 (>3.82%) 38.2 (>3.4%) 12.54 (6.8%) 21.3 (11.3%)
Iran 137.6 (10.9%) 157.8 (9.3%) 29.6 (16.0%) 34.0 (18.2%)
Russia  79.0 (6.3%) 103.2 (6.1%) 43.3 (23.4%) 32.6 (17.4%)
EU-28    6.3 (0.5%) 5.8 (0.3%) 2.8 (1.6%) 1.5 (0.8%)
US   30.5 (2.4%) 48.5 (2.9%) 6.7 (3.6%) 9.8 (5.2%)
Total Middle East 





Source: Dr .F.Umbach based on British Petroleum, ‘BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2009’, June 2009 and June 2015.
The global gas reserves are more concentrated than the oil reserves. Russia, Iran 
and Qatar as a potential ‘gas cartel’ control almost 49 per cent of the global gas 
reserves. The CACR’s proven gas reserves (even by excluding Iran and Russia) are 
more important, estimated at 21.3 trillion cubic meter (tcm), which have significantly 
increased since 2008.
In 2014, the region’s natural gas production amounted to 162.8bcm (4.7% of the 
world gas production), almost comparable to the combined production of South and 
Central America. In this context, it is interesting that not only Kazakhstan’s proven 
oil reserves and present annual oil production, but also its proven gas reserves 
and annual gas production rate are both higher than those of Azerbaijan – the 
EU’s main gas partner in CACR.100 However, in contrast to other CACR countries, 
Kazakhstan’s gas production results almost entirely from its oil production. Around 
50 per cent of its extracted gas is being used for re-injection. Roughly 70 per cent 
of its marketable gas production is coming from its Tengiz and Karachanak oil fields. 
While its gas production is expected to increase further, it remains uncertain after 
re-injection how many volumes can be provided for commercial use.101
In 2010, the regional energy demand was expected to rise 1.4-1.7 per cent per year, 
and might be up to 46 per cent higher in 2035 than today. Regional oil production 
was forecasted to grow from 2.9mb/d in 2009 to a peak of around 5.4mb/d between 
2025-2030, before declining to 5.2mb/d in 2035. Caspian gas production is expected 
to jump from 159bcm in 2009 to almost 260bcm by 2020 and more than 310bcm in 
2035 (IEA-New Policy Scenario). Exports of oil would double to a peak of 4.6mb/d 
in 2025, whereas gas exports are estimated to increase from 63bcm in 2008 to 
100bcm in 2020, and 130bcm in 2035.102
While Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are leading in oil production (together accounting 
for 92% of the region’s total proven oil reserves), Turkmenistan (with 40% of the 
region’s proven natural gas reserves) and Uzbekistan (27% of those) are the major 
natural gas producers in the region. But Uzbekistan consumes 80 per cent of its 
production, whereas Turkmenistan’s gas reserves have been significantly increased 
between 2008 and 2014. During this timeframe, Turkmenistan climbed up from the 
twelfth largest gas producer in the world to the fourth largest producer and the 
second largest in the former Soviet Union (behind Russia). Presently it owns 17.5tcm 
of proven gas reserves, accounting for 9.3 per cent of the world’s gas reserves. Its 
gas exports have grown from 20bcm in 2009 to 67.5bcm in 2014, and will further 
CACR: Total Proven Oil Reserves 
(in 1 Billion Barrels) in 2014
Figure 6: CACR-Proven Oil Reserves, 



















































































CACAR-Countries: Oil Production and 
Consumption Level (in 1,000 b/d) in 
2014(in 1 Billion Barrels) in 2014
Source: Dr. F. Umbach based on BP, 
‘Statistical Review of World Energy’, June 
2015.
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increase to around 85bcm in 2020, and more than 100bcm by 2030.
Although for Europe, CACR cannot replace Russia as its most important gas and 
energy partner, it could be an important supplementary supplier and an alternative 
diversification source for oil and especially gas to the EU.103
Despite some positive developments during the last decade, the full expansion of 
the CACR’s oil and in particular gas reserves is still hampered by an inadequate 
export infrastructure, disagreements over new export routes (mainly with 
Russia), and unresolved border disputes between the littoral states, as well as 
regional instabilities. The five Caspian littoral states have not been able to agree 
on the division of Caspian Sea resources, albeit three have (Russia, Azerbaijan, 
and Kazakhstan) reached a trilateral agreement on sub-surface bound ar ies and 
collective administration in May 2003.
Given the competing vital interests within the region between major powers – such 
as Rus sia, China, India, Iran and the U.S., as well as the CACR countries themselves 
- the declining regional oil and gas import demand of Europe and Asia, as well as the 
low gas prices, have increased the geo-economic competition between Russian and 
CACR countries. They all seek to increase and diversify their oil and gas exports to 
Europe as well as Asia.
CACR-Countries: Total Proven Gas 
Reserves (in Trillion Cubic Meters/
TCM) in 2014
Figure 7: CACR-Countries: Total 






















































































CACR-Countries: Natural Gas 
Production and Consumption (in Billion 
Cubic Meters/CBM) in 2014
Source: Dr. F. Umbach based on BP, ‘Statistical 
Review of World Energy’, June 2015.
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3. Kazakhstan’s Energy Policies 
from 1990s - 2010
Energy is the main factor that shapes Kazakhstan’s internal and external policies.104 
Nearly 25 years since the nation proclaimed its independence, Kazakhstan has 
emerged as the eco nomic and political leader of post-Soviet Central Asia, having 
skilfully crafted its energy and foreign policy prerogatives. Determined to ensure 
its international standing in the turbulent early days of the Republic, the country’s 
political elite steered a resource-led development through a ‘multi-vector’ foreign 
policy, aimed at ensuring good relations within the region while looking beyond it 
for economic opportunities. Following the 1990s US-Russia nego tia ti ons, in 1996 
Kazakhstan witnessed the removal of the Soviet-legacy nuclear arsenal from its 
ter ri tory. In the backdrop of the great powers nuclear arrangements, Kazakhstan’s 
new foreign policy prospects were facilitated by the US foreign and energy policy 
involvement in the region. The focus of US policy in CACR was on large-scale oil 
and gas infrastructure projects that would help to ensure the region’s stability and 
viability.105
Figure 8: Major Caspian Oil and Gas Pipelines
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Washington D.C. 2015 (https://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Kazakhstan/
kazakhstan.pdf).
Two key regional projects approved by Moscow and Washington – the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) oil pipelines - opened up 
the oil and gas potential of the greater Caspian Sea region to the world markets. 
These developments in the 1990s shaped Kazakhstan’s multi-vector choices and 
continued to include its early partnership and association agreements with Europe. 
The relationship with the European bloc allowed the transfer of normative and 
administrative capacity-building tools, which further strengthened Kazakhstan’s 
international standing. In the 2000s, Kazakhstan’s energy policies had been 
increasingly determined by the impacts of oil and gas investments and rising oil 
prices. In this period, Kazakhstan strengthened its role in the oil and gas sector, 
and solidified its international political profile through participation in some of the 
key international organisations.106 The rise of the petro-state initiated reforms of 
its energy policy as well as new laws, and improved investment conditions for an 
increasing diversification of its energy exports towards China. Its GDP of more than 
US$400bn exceeds the combined GDP of all its Central Asian neighbours. All of this 
has helped Kazakhstan to rise “as the undisputed economic and political leader of 
the region”.107
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3.1 Period Prior to Independence
Understanding Kazakhstan’s energy policies in the 1990s and 2000s is difficult 
without applying a broader historical lens. The way Kazakhstan’s energy policies 
unfolded following the country’s independence was directly linked to the path 
dependence created in, and dating back to, the Soviet times.
Up until the declaration of independence on 16th December 1991, the business 
of running the Kazakhstan Socialist Soviet Republic’s (SSR) oil and gas industry 
was governed cen tral ly from Moscow with little involvement of local authorities 
in the SSR. The horizontal rather than vertical structure of the Soviet oil industry 
itself meant that the overall oil governance was dispersed across a number of 
industries, rather than being contained within a single ministry exercising control 
over the entire process.108 The structure of the Soviet industry and the legacy of 
the horizontal governance the industry had followed made a substantial impact on 
the way early energy policy making of the independent Kazakhstan unfolded in the 
1990s.
The Kazakhstan SSR resources had been widely regarded to have been of high 
potential and treated as the ‘jewel in the crown’ by the Soviet planners, with the 
area around the Caspian Sea being arguably the most promising region in the 
country.109 The Soviet oil and gas strategy envisaged tapping these resources within 
the framework of the so-called fourth generation110 of large-scale exploration by 
the end of the 1990s. Due to a number of issues, including the oil price drop in the 
1980s, as well as the Soviet Union’s increased and wasteful energy consumption, 
development of the Kazakh and Central Asian resources slowed down. Instead of 
developing the fourth generation of ‘green-fields’ in the Caspian region, focus was 
placed on addressing energy demand by draining the production from the existing 
wells.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent 
Kazakhstan open ed up a new chapter in the country’s foreign and energy policy-
making. Due to its im port ance in the energy field, the Republic of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign and economic policies were tightly linked with the role the country played 
in Soviet energy policy. Established in July 1991, the Kazakhstan Oil and Gas 
Corporation (KOGC) was the first body to fill the vacuum in the country’s oil and gas 
governance. The KOGC changed its name in 1992 to Kazakhstanmunaigaz, becoming 
a National Oil Company (NOC) responsible for vari ous state-owned operating units 
in oil and gas exploration, development, production, trans por t ation, and refining 
throughout the country. 1992 witnessed the establishment of the Mi nis try of 
Energy and Fuel Resources, which was to be responsible for regulating oil and gas 
production and refining. Finally, the Ministry of Geology and Protection of Mineral 
Resources was established to regulate the development of Kazakhstan’s mineral 
resources.111
3.2 Europe-Oriented Partnerships and Associations of the 1990s
Kazakhstan’s relations with the EU played a very important role for the newly 
established Republic in the early 1990s due to the bloc’s international political 
status. Establishing and strengthening relations with the Western European Member 
States’ in general, and the Community in particular, were viewed in Kazakhstan as 
highly beneficial both in terms of trade and the international standing of the newly 
established state.112
Direct and formal relations between the EU and Kazakhstan began in the early 1990s 
and have largely revolved around economic and energy dimensions. In April 1992 
the Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Republic of Kazakhstan 
and the EU, paving the way for opening the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS), a process further cemented in July 1993 when the 
country was granted initially €3million to promote economic development within 
the TACIS framework.113 The TACIS initiative provided grant-financed technical 
assistance designed to facilitate the transition of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) and Mongolia towards market economies and democratic societies. Out 
of €4.22bn ($5.11bn) allocated from TACIS to all participating countries from the 
Region between 1991-1999, Kazakhstan ranked third in obtained funds, receiving 
€111.9 million ($145.1 million).
The funding provided by TACIS helped to establish energy efficiency centres in the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU), including in the then capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 
while assisting in the development of energy efficiency through the provision of 
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good-quality technical advice.114 Apart from the legal, fiscal and financial framework, 
the TACIS programme was also actively involved in upgrading the oil and gas 
extraction in Kazakhstan, as well as the processing and transportation of oil and gas 
products, including training in environmental planning. Kazakh stan’s involvement 
in the TACIS framework helped to establish a formal structure for moni tor ing the 
performance of international investor contracts and compliance with them. Finally, 
the TACIS based EU-Kazakhstan energy relations helped Astana in setting up a 
control sys tem with training for government staff on modern drilling technology, 
safety standards, and environmental impact assessments.115
Kazakhstan became the first signatory for the European Energy Charter on 17th 
December 1991 and later, to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) on 17th December 
1994. With five broad areas, the ECT is a legal framework to ensure foreign energy 
investment protection and pro mo tion, provide for WTO rule-based free trade in 
hydrocarbon energy, enable free transit of energy through pipelines and grids, as 
well as state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settle ment mechanisms, and to 
address environmental concerns through efficiency im prove ments.116 Kazakhstan 
ratified the ECT on 18th October 1998 and the international agreement entered into 
force on 16th April 1998.
The Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE) is a regional energy 
cooperation programme between the European Union and the littoral states of the 
bloc and countries of the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan has been part of the 
INOGATE platform since its inception in 1996, benefiting from 41 of the programme’s 
69 projects.117 The remit of the INOGATE programme expanded in 2000s following 
two respective ministerial conferen ces: the 2004 Baku Conference and the 2006 
Astana Conference. Kazakhstan took con structive steps towards broadening the 
scope of the INOGATE platform, which built a stron ger link in ensuring the common 
goals of Brussels and Astana in the field of energy se cu rity. Following the Astana 
Conference, INOGATE has been a platform for (a) enhancing ener gy security, (b) 
harmonizing participating countries’ energy law and markets on the basis of the 
EU energy law, (c) internalizing broad principles of sustainable develop ment, and 
(d) attracting investment in the energy sector regionally. Being the EU’s preferred 
part ner in the energy sector, Kazakhstan benefited from pragmatic EU poli cies in the 
region, helping it to strengthen its international role and increasing its stability.118
3.3 Foreign and Energy Policy Outlook
Engaging foreign investors with Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector was assumed in late 
1980s in the times of the Soviet Union. Chevron Corporation signed a preliminary 
agreement in December 1988 to carry out a work survey on the Korolevskoye 
oilfield in the North Caspian basin, east of the Tengiz field, which ‘never materialised 
due to a number of issues including difficulties at the negotiations stage as well as 
overly complex terms envisaged in the agreement’.119 The Independent Republic 
of Kazakhstan cancelled the previous Soviet-era agreement with Chevron, offering 
a brand new basis for cooperation with the American oil major. After two years of 
negotiations a new agreement with Chevron was made in April 1992 on the basis 
of ‘Operation TengizChevrOil’, a joint venture between Tengizneftegaz, a local 
enterprise established in 1985, and Chevron Overseas Petroleum.120
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has been heavily 
deter min ed by the energy factor. From the beginning of the country’s independence 
the only route to export Kazakh oil abroad was the Atyrau-Samara pipeline. It 
has made Russia the key ac tor in defining Kazakhstan’s energy and foreign policy 
prerogatives. Geopolitically, Kazakh stan’s status in Eurasia is being defined as 
a transit country for the Omsk (Russia) – Pav lo dar (Kazakhstan) – Shymkent – 
Turkmenabat (Turkmenistan) pipeline. The Central Asia-Cen ter gas pipeline system 
and the Bukhara-Urals pipelines are the main gas pipeline sys tems trans porting 
natural gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Russia, and Orenburg-Novopskov 
pipeline and Soyuz pipeline from Orenburg processing plant to Europe.121
As opposed to other post-Soviet Central Asian republics that have sought insulation 
by isolationism, Kazakhstan’s external policies focused on ensuring international 
legitimacy “as being the direct function of a collaborative international outlook.”122 
Having this in mind President Nazarbayev pursued a multi-vector foreign and 
economic policy to ensure the deve lo p ment of close ties with China, Europe, and 
the United States. At the same time, he strengthened the autonomy of Central 
Asian states from the great powers by balancing Kazakhstan’s policies towards all 
countries in the international arena.123 The foreign policy objectives of post-Soviet 
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Kazakhstan have been pursued through strict adherence to stability priorities. 
They have opened Kazakhstan to the world through integration into regional and 
global energy markets, as well as an increased active participation in multilateral 
organisations - such as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) as well as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. The long-
standing ambition of the OSCE Chairman ship was finally granted on 1st December 
2007.124
The Caspian Sea has received enormous attention from International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) since the break-up of the Soviet Union due to the Tengiz and Kashagan 
and later Karacha ga nak fields. Exploration and production of oil from the fields 
has required international co ope ration and new export outlets to deliver the oil to 
global markets. Two oil pipelines were conceived to transport the Caspian oil – the 
BTC and CPC pipelines.125 The latter offer ed a direct link between the Tengiz field 
in Kazakhstan through the Black Sea coast to Novo ros siysk in Russia. Originally 
proposed in 1992, the CPC epitomised the multi-vector foreign policy in action, 
involving the Russian and Kazakhstan governments, America’s Chevron Cor po ration, 
and a number of minority stake holding IOCs. Commissioned in 2001, the 1,510km 
long and $2.67bn costly pipeline is “the product of a fragile balance of power bet-
ween states eager to maintain control of hydrocarbon flows and private companies 
able to finance the neces sary infrastructure”.126
Since the early 1990s, Central Asian states attracted considerable attention from 
the east. China’s Prime Minister Zhou’s policy of aiding and empowering the newly-
formed Central Asian states were focused on opening trade and energy transport 
infrastructure to link China with the region and beyond.127 First proposed in 1997, 
the construction of the 2,798km Kazakh-China Oil Pipeline (KCOP) started in 2004, 
linking the two countries from Atasu in Kazakhstan to the border town of Alashankou 
in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The KCOP is a joint venture between 
the China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) and Kazakhstan’s KazTransOil and 
has a capacity of 10mt of crude oil per year.128
Throughout the 2000s Kazakhstan’s energy wealth helped to streamline the 
development of the country’s economy and achieve impressive GDP growth for over 
a decade, while providing the government with large revenues.129 On 5th October 
2005 Kazakhstan signed the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
following President Nazarbayev’s announcement on joining the strategy in February 
2005.130 Conceived by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the EITI aims to increase 
the transparency of payments that oil, gas and mining companies made to the 
government and state revenue from extractive industries.
The increasing price of oil in the mid-2000s, along with access to new export 
pipelines, significantly improved Kazakhstan’s energy security standing 
internationally, bolstered by its ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy.131 In September 2006 
Kazakhstan pledged to increase its oil and gas output over a ten-year-period to 
reach the levels of 3.5 billion barrels of oil a day, out of which 3 billion was aimed 
at exportation, and natural gas production to amount to 60-80bcm over the same 
time period. In the words of the President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan was ‘becoming a 
factor of energy security in Asia and Europe’.132
3.4 Legal Aspects and Energy Security Priorities in the 2000s
Kazakhstan’s energy policy in the 2000s was driven by the need to strengthen 
Astana’s con trol over the oil and gas sector in times of rising oil prices. To this end a 
number of legis la tive changes were introduced in three chronological phases.133 The 
first phase was charac ter ised by the state’s desire to increase tax revenues from 
subsurface users. On 1st January 2004 the Tax Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
was amended to simplify relation ships bet ween subsurface users, and “to ensure 
the observation of reasonable sovereign interests” of Ka zakh stan, in particular 
“mechanisms to guarantee the state a fixed share of profits under Pro duction-
Sharing Agreements (PSAs), irrespective of any decline in production or possible 
prob lems in contract implementation”. The Tax Code was also amended to institute 
the rent tax for oil exports viewed as a way to maximize the benefits from world oil 
prices increase.134
Phase two took place in 2005, and was characterized by “the rights that the 
government had awar ded itself to buy released stakes in oil projects and to suspend 
company’s activities in cases where investors violate contracts”.135 Marked by several 
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developments, phase two in clu ded an additional taxation increase on production 
volumes (royalty payments), as well as pay ment of royalties on gas condensate. 
Local content, defined as the “presence of Kazakh stani human resources, goods 
and services in project implementation”, was introduced in joint oil projects. A new 
law on PSAs for oil production in the Caspian Sea shelf was initiated in July 2005, 
which was “the first legislation that regulated production-sharing agree ments and 
was meant to serve as an indicator for future contracts for developing Ka zakh stan’s 
offshore reserves”. The same legislation strengthened the position of Kaz mun ai-
gas (KMG), the nation’s oil and gas company, as it guaranteed KMG the right to a 
minimum of a 50 per cent stake in the capacity of contractor in all subsequent PSAs. 
The 2005 Oil Law amend ment specified the functions of KMG as “a representative of 
the state’s interests in oil con tracts”. Integrating KMG into Samruk (the integrated 
holding company for the manage ment of state assets), the creation of the state-
owned Samruk Holding and the Kazyna Deve lop ment Fund ended up in their merging 
into the Sovereign Wealth Fund Sam ruk-Ka zy na in October 2009, strengthening the 
role of the Kazakh state in the oil and gas sector.136
In the third phase unilateral cancellation of contracts was assumed by the 
state, further con so lidating Kazakhstan’s role in the energy sector. The ‘Law on 
Subsurface Operations’ was amend ed again in November 2007 with a provision on 
the government’s exclusive right to cancel contracts unilaterally if the actions of 
subsurface users “should lead to considerable change to the economic interests of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan that pose a threat to national security, and also with 
respect to the fields of strategic importance to the country’ with the government”.137 
The latter is entitled to approve the reserves of ‘strategic importance’.
The three-phase legislative changes reflect a broader context of the Kazakhstani oil 
and gas industry in the 2000s. Positive developments in the time period included 
international partici pa tion in the sector and a sharp increase in FDI, which were both 
welcomed by Kazakhstan. Yet, the pace and implementation of these developments 
in the oil and gas sector, which was underpinned by challenges experienced by some 
of the international com pa nies operating in the country, produced dissatisfaction 
in Astana. Hence, the government’s move to strengthen its role in the sector 
became the landmark of Kazakhstan’s energy policy in the 2000s. Aiming at 
exercising a degree of pressure on IOCs (without taking full control of some key 
energy companies), the State reasserted its sovereign interest over the industry to 
strengthen its energy security, and to be dependent on revenues from petroleum 
exploration and production. The new Tax Code effective from January 2009 
reaffirmed the State’s aim by providing for “substitution of royalties with the Natural 
Resource Extraction Tax (NRET), to be calculated on the basis of a progressive 
scale, depending on the amount of recoverable reserves and world oil prices”.138
3.5 Ecology and Energy Efficiency
Kazakhstan’s commitment to energy efficiency and ecology is reflected by state 
policies and strategies. The Programme for Development of Renewable Sources in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, approved by the Minister of Energy and the Minister 
of Science in 1995, has become a constituent part of the ‘State Energy Saving 
Programme’.139 In the framework of the ‘Hydrocarbon Initiative’, initiated in 1997 
by the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources together with the Ministry of 
Energy, Industry and Trade with a view to reduce the Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
(GHGE) into the atmosphere, energy saving entered the list of priority directions for 
the implement a tion of this initiative.140 The Ministry of Energy, Industry and Trade 
adopted in 1999 the ‘Energy Sector Development Program’ until 2030. Rehabili ta tion 
and energy effici en cy im prove ment of existing power plants are the main strategy 
for the development of the energy sector in the period 2000-2030.141
Since 2005 the Kazakhstani Government has ordered oil companies to avoid 
gas flaring. In his 2011 address to the nation, President Nazarbayev assigned 
Kazakhstan’s Government to prepare a comprehensive plan to increase energy 
efficiency and ensure 10 percent reduction of energy intensity by 2015.142
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4. Russia and China as Major Powers 
in CACR and Kazakhstan
4.1 Russia’s Strategic Interests in CACR
      4.1.1 Russia’s Central Asia and Integration Policies
Using instruments of ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’, Russia seeks to ensure 
Kazakhstan and CACR stays in the centre of Russia’s ‘cultural and civilizational’ 
sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. The soft power of cultural and linguistic 
links is crucial in this con text as Rus sian is the dominant language of communication 
in the region. In Kazakhstan the pro cess of reviving the nation-state has been 
unfolding with both the Turkic-Kazakh and Sla vic-Russian cultural trajectories, and 
is accompanied by Kazakhstan’s ‘multi-vector’ for eign policy opening up to Western 
(Anglo-Saxon) and non-Western (Asian) countries.
Nonetheless, the Kazakh-Russian cultural trajectories are dominant. Kazakhstan was 
a country with the largest Russian-speaking population following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union143 and one of the most ethnically diverse regions of the former Soviet 
Union. It is also a country where Islam is the most commonly practiced religion. 
Kazakhstan’s multi-ethnic composition has shaped the country’s widespread culture 
of religious tolerance. Yet, the growth of political Islam coupled with challenges 
posed by insecurity in poor countries of the region poses numerous security 
challenges to Kazakhstan and the Russian state. Russia’s growing economy in the 
2000s, largely driven by its energy revenues, attracted an influx of immigrants 
from the poorer, predominantly Muslim countries of Central Asia. Real or per ceived 
security threats linked with immigration is one of the weakest links of Russian 
policies and a possible challenge for its societal security.144
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union it has been the Northern Caucasus that is 
‘tradi tio nal ly’ viewed as a potential source of Islamic terrorism in Russia. Yet, the 
military intervention in Afgha nistan and porous, remote borders between post-
Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan has been another major spot of vulnerability. 
Russia has long ignored the risks associated with the flow of radicals across borders. 
With the current Russian military inter vention in Syria, a new challenge is looming. 
Reports on Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz Central Asian workers in Russia being radicalized 
and recruited to fight in Syria may be harbingers of a threat Moscow is yet to reckon 
with.145
While for a long time the ‘people factor’ of Central Asian demography may have 
been neglected, Russia’s involvement in Central Asia can be increasingly seen as 
being about addres sing security. The challenge of increased terrorist activities of 
extremist groups along with the desta bi li zation of borders in Central Asia has been 
discussed within the Russia-led Col lec tive Secu ri ty Treaty Organization (CSTO) at 
the group’s Dushanbe summit.146 While the organization pro vides Russia with a solid 
standing as the leading security provided in the post-Soviet space, CSTO is yet 
to live up to its posture to become recognized as a multi la te ral, regional security 
organization.147 The Customs Union/Eurasian Union composition mir rors that of 
CSTO’s yet “mutually agreed exclusion of security matters leaves the CSTO with out 
any useful guidelines, so reform of this institution is ineffectual”’.148 For instance, 
due to its ener gy interest in Azerbaijan and Georgia, Kazakhstan’s neutrality in 
the Armenian-Azer baijan conflict remains a strict line. In absence of a greater 
integration of post-Soviet states of CACR (Uzbekistan’s departure, Armenia’s stance 
towards the se cu ri ty bloc) in addition to Russia, the CSTO relies on Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. The authoritarian nature of politics in the latter two results in a risk 
of selective participation within the Organi za tion and, thus, is a main challenge to 
Russia.149
Since Yeltsin’s presidency, Russia has always sought to prevent the U.S. and 
other powers from asserting themselves in the CACR by playing a balancing and 
‘divide-and-rule’ game in order to maintain or expand its geopolitical as well as 
geo-economic influence in its oil and gas export monopoly from the region.150 
Thus Russia has often used energy dependencies and its gas export policy as an 
instrument not just of its economic and energy strategies, but also of its foreign, 
security policies and geopolitical interests. As Nadejda Makarova Victor stated in her 
Gazprom study of 2008: “Where Gazprom as a company ends and Gazprom as a tool 
of the state begins is purely a rhetorical question”.151
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But as the result of its zero-sum thinking, Russia has regarded the EU’s Central 
Asia strategy of June 2007 and its new neighboring policy as a threat to its own 
geopolitical and energy inter ests in the region. After the March summit of 2007, 
Russia has intensified energy coopera tion and pipeline projects with individual 
EU and CACR states, alongside its bilateral military and multilateral security 
cooperation.152 Although the EU does not perceive a growing Russian role through 
a zero-sum prism, it has threatened the EU’s strategy for diversification and 
cooperation with Central Asia.153
Until 2009, Russia became increasingly dependent on gas imports from CACR in 
order to satisfy domestic gas consumption and maintain high-price gas exports 
to Europe. At that time, one third of all European gas imports from Russia were 
supposed to come from Central Asia. While Russia’s ‘Energy Strategy for the Period 
to 2030’ of 2009 envisaged annual gas im ports alone from Turkmenistan up to 70-
80bcm from 2009 onwards, and 88-94bcm in the mid-term perspective, they never 
climbed up and, instead, even declined to under 12bcm in 2009.154 In 2008, over 80 
per cent of the Caspian gas exports had been sent to Russia. The share of Caspian 
exports to Russia had been reduced to around 55 per cent. Russia increasingly lost 
its Central Asia gas export monopoly to China due to the 40bcm Chinese-Turkmen 
gas pipeline. When Russia’s export monopoly of Caspian gas to Europe was still 
existing, the com missioning of the China-Turkmenistan pipeline in 2009 marked a 
major strategic shift with far-reaching geo-economic and geopolitical implications for 
Russia and the region.
In the Kremlin’s and Gazprom’s view, the most dangerous EU-project threatening 
Russia’s pipeline monopoly from CACR to Europe was the Nabucco gas pipeline as 
the major ‘Southern Gas Corridor’ project of the EU.155 Turkmenistan’s interests 
in diversification of its gas exports are also explained by its own experiences with 
Russia and Gazprom. In 2003-2005, Russia used its gas pipeline monopoly for 
paying just US$44 per 1,000cm, while Russia sold its gas to Europe for US$250. 
Since January 2006, however, Turkmenistan was able to negotiate higher gas 
prices of US$150 for the second half of 2008, but still under the European prices for 
Russian gas (US$350). But with new large gas fields coming into production in 2009, 
Gazprom finally offered ‘European prices’ for Central Asian gas in 2009 in the range 
of US$-200-300 per 1,000cm as part of a strategy to persuade CACR countries 
not to agree to any new pipeline routes circumventing Russia and going directly to 
Europe.156
Russia has faced not just a loss of its gas export monopoly in CACR, but also a 
growing com pe tition with CACR gas exporters. Following a reduction of 90 per cent 
of Russia’s gas im ports from Turkmenistan without prior warning from Moscow, and 
an explosion of its main gas import pipeline from Turkmenistan a day later in April 
2009, the exports were stopped im me diately. Turkmenistan’s government declared 
that this was not a technical matter, whereas Russia made the resumption of gas 
deliveries dependent on renegotiation of volumes and prices, costing Turkmenistan 
about US$1bn a month. Since the following Russian-Turk men diplomatic ‘gas war’, 
Turkmenistan’s government has sought more than ever new alter native gas export 
routes157, following Kazakhstan’s ‘multi-vectored’ energy exports and energy foreign 
policies.158 
In addition, the new rapprochement and the markedly improved bilateral 
relationship between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan is not in Russia’s interest. 
Although both countries could not solve their bilateral conflict over the division of 
the Caspian Sea and the legal status of the oil fields in the area, both sides have a 
strategic interest to normalize their relationship and to initiate joint energy projects. 
In this light, Turkmenistan’s pipeline plans included not just its Turkmen-Uzbekistan-
Kazakhstan-China pipeline, but also its newly in January 2010 inaugurated 
Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran gas pipeline to Iran with an annual final capacity of 
12bcm in its second stage. It is complementing another 8bcm gas pipeline to Iran 
and the newly constructed East-West gas pipeline to China, with up to 40bcm a year 
from the country’s eastern gas fields to its Caspian Sea shore.159 
The Russian-Georgian war August 2008 has raised new questions for the EU’s 
ambition for closer energy cooperation with CACR by highlighting the vulnerability of 
Western-funded and built Caspian export pipelines, which are avoiding both Russia 
and Iranian territory.160 Even before the outbreak of the bilateral war, the intention 
of the Kremlin was to discredit Georgia’s role as an important transit state and 
a lasting competitor for European and Western oil, and in particular gas supplies 
from CACR, in order to maintain Russia’s pipeline and export monopolies. Although 
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Russian President Medvedev claimed a ‘privileged sphere of influence’ in the world in 
general and in CACR in particular161, the overall knock-on effect of Russia’s military 
intervention on any future Western investments, pipeline plans or the ‘multi-
vectored’ foreign (energy) policies of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan or 
Turkey’s for crossing Geor gia as an increasingly important transit state was largely 
short-lived.162 Like the energy crisis before 2006, the Russian-Georgian war pushed 
forward the EU’s common energy and ener gy foreign policy by decreasing its gas 
import dependence on Russia. In CACR itself, Russia was hoping to get support 
from its allies in the SCO and the CSTO. But neither China nor the regional states of 
CACR declared their official sup port for Russia’s military intervention and recognized 
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.163 At the end, Russia was diplo-
ma ti cally largely isolated. The only remaining key allies have been big Euro pean 
companies with their large stakes in the expanding consumer markets in Russia.164
Following the 2008 Georgian War and the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, policy makers and 
interna tio nal affairs specialists have been forced to acknowledge the possibility of 
Putin’s Russia seek ing to re-organize its foreign and domestic policy with a single 
objective of establishing “a new kind of union comprised of former Soviet republics 
and headed by Russia itself”.165 Reminiscent of the widely cited statement Russia’s 
President made in 2005 calling the col lapse of the Soviet Union “the greatest 
geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century166 only strengthen ed the assumption 
the Georgian War could be part of a larger strategy. In the after math of the 2008 
August war, the question of the oil and gas pipelines, the BTC and the BTE, have 
been widely cited as a key implication for energy security, with Georgia perceived 
as a vulnerable spot in the transit of Caspian energy.167 Yet, despite rolling back of 
some of Presi dent Saakashvili’s reforms to improve relations with Russia, Georgia 
remained on track with its pro-Western aspirations. Tbilisi did not join the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) and, in stead, signed the EU association agreement.168 The 
two westwards oil and gas pipelines, le gacy of the early deal between Russian and 
American oil majors, remained operational. Since then, despite a strong rationale for 
economic relations with Russia, Geor gia’s govern ments have weighted their options 
and have seemed to distance Georgia from the EEU.169
The EU policies in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ through the ‘European Partnership (EaP)’ 
strategy have been viewed in Moscow as competitive to its own vision of the ‘near 
abroad’.170 Russia has viewed the EaP as unacceptable and as an EU tool to draw 
Eastern Europe away from Russia.171 As Russia sought to undermine the EU’s 
Nabucco project and any new EU gas imports from CACR such as from Kazahkstan, 
the Kremlin invited the head of the KAZENERGY association of oil and gas companies 
and son-in-law of the President, Timur Kulibayev, to join the board of directors of 
Gazprom in order to prevent any closer Kazakh energy policy rapprochement with 
the EU.172
The impact of China’s economic policies in Central Asia has been remarkably 
increased during the last decade. China’s investments in infrastructure, including 
in long-distance pipe lines, is changing the face and the depth of its involvement 
in the region. Russia has been wary of this, and has built policy platforms of its 
own that would counter-balance the institu tio nal strength of the China-led SCO by 
focusing on the CSTO and the Eurasian Union plat forms. Increas ing the profile of 
CSTO and seeking to gain international recognition for the pro jects from partners 
such as NATO and SCO has been limited owing to Chinese reser vations and NATO’s 
reluctance to enter into contracts with CSTO.173 The Russian-Chinese agreement to 
con struct the epic ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline has been a major development and a 
move to diversify Russia’s gas exports. While the economics of the pipeline have 
been considered as questionable if constructed174, it will be a major development in 
piped-gas trade, providing a com petitive benchmark for the Turkmeni stan-China gas 
pipeline as well as the EU-destined ex ports of natural gas from Russia.
Russia’s policies towards Central Asia are mainly security oriented – explicitly 
through the CSTO and indirectly through the EEU. But Russia’s strategic objectives 
of an EEU are large ly of a political and geopolitical nature. The objectives have been 
leaning towards regaining Mos cow’s status as a great power (hard security), and 
being the cultural centre of gravity for the region (soft power), and the sole security 
provider for CACR. It has been difficult for the Krem lin to achieve these goals due 
to the challenges of divergent security interests of the CSTO’s core, comprised of 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Divergence of policy objectives of the core members of the 
military bloc has impacted Russia’s ability to use CSTO effectively.
The latter – the cultural and linguistic attractiveness of Russia’s led Eurasianist 
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project – may be currently taking a new turn. With internal terrorist threat levels 
high, Russia might be now facing the new challenge of radicalisation of its immigrant 
community in the wake of the Syrian inter vention. The rise of non-traditional 
insecurity, including radicalisation and Islamic terror ism, is likely to potentially steer 
Russia’s CSTO to focus on military.
4.1.2 Russia’s Geopolitical Concept of an Eurasian (Economic) Union
The key question following the collapse of the Soviet Union has been how to 
accommodate the post-Soviet space, and what organisational measures could and 
should be made to integrate the post-Soviet space anew under new institutional 
frameworks. Owing to its economic, cultural and political influence in the region, 
Russia has dominated the process and integration efforts since 1990s. These 
integration attempts include the Union State of Russia and Belarus in the 1990s, the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) unveiled in 2000, as well as the organization 
of GUAM (grouping Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) launched 
in 1997. Out of the three projects, the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, and its further expansion into Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), has been 
viewed as the one most likely to come to fruition.175
The regional organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
comprised of all the former Soviet republics save the Baltic states, was established 
on 8th December 1991 by Belarus, Russian Federation and Ukraine, with eight 
further post-Soviet Republics, including Kazakhstan, joining later that month 
through the Alma-Ata protocol. The CIS was envisaged as a transitional grouping to 
absorb possible shockwaves of the Soviet Union’s dis in tegration process. Owing to 
the path dependence created by the structure of the Soviet Union, the CIS platform 
nominally included the economic and energy dimension. Neverthe less, origins of a 
more concrete and functional economic organization in the post-Soviet space can be 
traced back to Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev’s 1994 speech at Moscow when 
he proposed creating a regional trading block stretching across Eurasia.176 President 
Nazar ba yev’s call to think ‘Eurasianist’ reflected geopolitical, economic and socio-
political develop ments in the CIS at that time. Emerging trading blocks of the EU to 
the west and emerging eco nomies to the east opened up an economic opportunity 
for the CIS countries, in parti cular Russia and Kazakhstan, to form a broader 
regional organisation that would, at the same time, be well placed geopolitically. 
Nazarbayev’s idea served a socio-political purpose, too. Calling for a ‘Eurasian 
Union’, he sought to accommodate the substantial size of the Russian minority in 
Kazakhstan by calling for an overarching Eurasianist identity at the time of growing 
national awareness of peoples in Central Asia.177
From its inception the idea of regional integration has taken a number of shapes 
including eco nomic, political and cultural elements at various degrees of strengths. 
Owing to its geo graphy, history and custom, Russia has been the dominant player in 
the process of build ing supra national institutions in the region.178 Ukraine – viewed 
as a key element of Russia’s inte gra tionist policies in the post-Soviet space – has 
proved to be a serious stumbling block in Moscow’s Eurasian strategy, breaking 
out from its supposed role as the link and bridge between Russia and Central Asian 
countries.
Aiming at an economic union, on 24th September 1993 state leaders of the former 
Soviet Republics signed the treaty ‘On Economic Union’. Following this further 
treaties were signed including the Free Trade Zone on 14th April 1994, the Payment 
Union on 21st October 1994 and the Customs Union on 20th January 1995. Despite 
the legal framework in place - that nominally provided a platform for economic 
relations between the former Soviet countries until 1999 – progress in shaping the 
Customs Union was made only in 2000-2006. In 2000 Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan also founded the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), a strongly 
institutionalised framework which became the platform for three of the five states 
– Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – to later create the Eurasian Customs Union 
(ECU). The Treaty establishing the Customs Union was signed on 6th October 2007 
and the Customs Code of the EEU took effect in July 2011 when border controls were 
lifted.179
Both the Custom Union and the EEU aim to expand markets and resurrect some 
production chains that operated in Soviet times.180 Hence, the Eurasian Union has 
been presented as an attempt to reinvigorate the financial markets of the post-
Soviet region and has often been seen as a geopolitical project strongly backed by 
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.181 Yet, the full scale of the economic dimension of 
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the project needs still to be realised. While being enthusiastic about the Eurasian 
project domestically, the Kazakh leadership has empha sized the importance of the 
economic benefits the projects carries to its existing members in interactions with 
the project’s partners.182 By contrast, reintegration of the former Soviet space has 
been viewed as a key foreign policy objective of Putin’s administration, with signi-
ficant financial endowment assigned towards the project. It also enjoys significant 
political and societal support in the Russian domestic audience.183 Eurasia has also 
been viewed as a form of macro-regional integration akin to that epitomised by the 
BRIC concept.184
The geopolitical ‘Eurasian Union’ project, which also is playing the role of a platform 
of in tegration between Russia and the region, equips Russia with a degree of control 
over neigh bouring countries.185 The political and societal support granted by the 
Russian domestic au dience towards the idea of a ‘Eurasian Union’ does not have a 
single rationale. Some of the strongest supporters of the Eurasian Union value the 
project as a tool of Russia’s resur gence as an assertive great power. Yet, a large 
part of the project supporters are various sec tions of Russian society, which could 
be labelled as ‘liberal imperialists‘, who see the pro ject as a regional pole of an 
emerging multi-polar order. Irrespective of the nature of control, the Russian-led 
Eurasian Union project is aimed at managing the geopolitical space – cha rac ter ised 
by weak institutionalisation and a strong role of leaders of the respective members 
of the project – ensuring the political domination of Moscow.186 It also explains why 
Kazakh stan is supporting the EEU, but not its further integration into a real Eurasian 
Union, which would constrain the country’s sovereignty over its foreign, security, 
economic, and energy policies.
But as many Russian foreign policy experts have repeatedly admitted and 
criticized, Russia is confronted with a constantly declining geopolitical influence as 
the result of its waning soft power, including using energy dependencies and its 
traditional instruments of pipeline diploma cies, as well as pushing long-term energy 
contracts.187 On all these fronts Russia is facing major challenges as the result of 
global energy market developments and European and CACR countries seeking 
to reduce their energy dependence on Russia – leaving the Kremlin only its hard 
military power and other coercive instruments in place to remain a leading power in 
CACR.188 Beyond regional security cooperation and Kazakhstan’s more supportive 
stance, Russia’s EEU has been rather unpopular in CACR as China and the EU have 
econo mi cally and financially much more to offer. Only those regional states have 
become members, which were confronted with open Russian pressure and perceived 
to have no other choice for the time being.189
4.2 China’s Geopolitical Interests in Central Asia
       4.2.1 China’s Energy Foreign Policy in CACR
As the world’s most populous country with a fast-growing economy, China is already 
the largest energy producer, consumer, and oil importer.190 China has to cope with a 
dual challenge: an energy demand projected to rise by another 44 per cent by 2040 
(consuming about 80% more than the U.S.) and at the same time, shifting its energy 
mix from coal to gas, as well as non-fossil fuels (nuclear power and RES). But even 
in the most optimistic scenario, China will be unable to shift its energy completely to 
RES by 2040/50 as it is considered too expensive and unrealistic.191
Its surging energy demand has already transformed global energy markets, and 
has created long-term geopolitical and geo-economic implications for the U.S., 
Russia and Europe, as well as the global energy and other resource markets. 
Energy security has always been seen in China a core national interest since Mao 
Zhedong’s rule and its traditional self-suffi cien cy policy.192 Hence, China’s definition 
of energy security is closely linked with domestic sta bi li ty and Beijing’s foreign and 
security policies.193 Due to its energy demand and rising import demand, China has 
significantly expanded its energy foreign policy and co ope ra tion with the Middle 
East, Africa, and even Latin America during the last decade.
Given the global energy demand and the potential vulnerability of shipping routes 
through the Indian Ocean to the U.S. Navy, CACR has gained particular importance 
for Beijing as a strategic land bridge between the Middle East, the Persian Gulf 
and China – both in regard to its se curity policy perceptions and for its energy 
imports.194 Around 90 per cent of China’s seaborne oil imports are coming from the 
Middle East and Africa. This land bridge offers China the prospect of not becoming 
too dependent on oil and gas imports from the Middle East via vulnerable Sea-Lines 
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of Communications (SLOCS), as well as from Russia. It mitigates its maritime energy 
imports and dependence on unstable SLOCs and its critical Choke points, such as 
the Malacca-Strait where 90 per cent of its oil transports run. Moreover, a stable 
western flank enables China “to maintain its current eastward focused military 
posture, priori tise the development of power-projection capabilities and enhance 
China’s position in the western Pacific and South China Sea”.195
However even in the mid-term perspective of 2020 and beyond, China’s ambitious 
expansion of oil and gas pipelines might be some kind of ‘pipe dream’ as they 
will diversify and mitigate the seaborne vulnerabilities of its maritime energy 
imports only to a limited extent, as its projected increase of oil and gas imports 
may overwhelm the planned oil and gas pipeline capacities. The latter are also 
comparatively much more expensive than maritime energy trans ports, and may 
even be more vulnerable to supply disruptions.196
In regard to its security concerns, Beijing has exercised its increasing influence in 
the region not just by expanding bilateral relationships, but also through the SCO 
acting as a regional security organisation since 2001. China has been concerned 
in particular about Uyghur ‘separatism’ and terrorist threats from Islamic forces. 
Given China’s increased economic and po litical leverage in the SCO, Russia has 
also deepened and expanded its security cooperation with the regional partners 
through its Russian-led CSTO. CACR together with Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region offers China an ethnic buffer zone and a bulwark against Uighur and pan-
Turkic nationalism and separatism. But it is also a bridgehead for projecting Chinese 
in fluence into CACR by expanding energy-economic cooperation with CACR - which, 
simultaneously, also prevents an ‘encirclement’ by the United States.
Chinese experts have identified four strategic interests for expanding its ties to the 
CACR countries: (1) maintaining stable and peaceful borders with Russia and CACR 
states; (2) preventing international linkages between separatist forces in Xinjiang 
and outside Islamic extremist forces; (3) the increasing need to secure access to 
CACR energy resources and raw materials; and (4) extending its economic-political 
influence beyond the region to bolster China’s worldwide geopolitical position.197
In the view of the CACR countries, China not only offers a diversification source 
for its energy exports; it also reduces their energy export dependence on Russia, 
and its oil and gas infrastructures. China is also seen as a partner refraining from 
criticizing their internal power politics, in contrast to the EU, its member states and 
the U.S. Furthermore, Beijing has used its increasing financial power to support 
expensive energy and other economic projects within much shorter time frames.
Given China’s growing energy and security ties in Central Asia, Russia fears that 
Central Asia’s small population, its underdeveloped economy, and the declining 
strength of its own mili tary presence since the mid-1990s have made Central Asia 
vulnerable to a rising Chinese hegemony in its backyard. But both sides still see 
counteracting U.S. hegemony in the region a priority. Russia also hopes to benefit 
from China’s economic and financial investments in CACR, and its own cooperation 
with China, as its geopolitical influence is declining in the region. China has also tried 
to counterbalance the negative impacts of its increasing energy ties to CACR by 
cooperating with Russia in the SCO, other regional organisations, and bilaterally with 
Moscow.198 But Putin’s idea of an ‘Energy Commonwealth of the SCO’ to combine the 
rising demand of China, India, and Pakistan with the abundant oil and gas resources 
of Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has been opposed by China and other regional 
countries.199 They have feared a Russian led cartel, which would also constrain their 
‘multivector’ foreign policies and a diversification of exports. From Moscow, Russian 
experts can hardly over look China’s increasing energy and foreign policy ties to the 
region, in particular with Kazakhstan. After the third and last section of the Sino-
Kazakh Atyrau-Alashan kou oil pipeline has been completed, it will have secured 
about 5 per cent of the total oil imports of China. Although Russia still wields 
considerable influence in the production of Kazakh oil, China has quietly managed 
about half of the Kazakh energy market, secured 49 per cent stake in the Kazakh 
MangistauMunaiGaz company, around 24 per cent of Kazakh’s present oil production, 
and has covered more than a quarter of Kazakh exports in less than a decade.200 In 
2013, their bilateral trade amounted to US$22.53bn.201
China has also negotiated increasing uranium imports from Kazakhstan and has 
exploited its hydroelectric potential. In April 2008, both sides agreed to develop 
more than 40 projects with a focus on natural resources.202 In April 2008, China 
Guangdong Nuclear Power Co announced it would develop a uranium deposit 
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in Kazakhstan, with reserves of 40,000 tonnes together with Kazakh state firm 
Kazatomprom. Between 2008 and 2012, China had planned to import a total of 
24,200 tonnes of Kazakh uranium.
At the same time, Turkmenistan became the most important gas partner for 
China. The world’s longest and expensive gas pipeline – at 2,238km in length and 
costing US$7bn, starting in Turkmenistan, crossing Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
and extending to Xinjiang with an ini tial capacity of 10bcm annually - became 
operational at the end of 2009. But it has been ex panded to 55bcm, becoming 
operable in 2016.203 In mid-2009, China gave Turkmenistan a US$4bn loan to 
develop its largest gas field South Iolotan, and both sides expanded its cooperation 
into telecommunications, tourism and transportation sectors.204 In September 2013, 
the bilateral energy cooperation increased by agreeing to build the fourth (Line D) 
China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CACG), also being fuelled by Uzbek gas, which will 
increase the total Central Asia gas supplies to China up to 80bcm beyond 2020. In 
2013, Turkmenistan provided almost 23bcm of gas supplies to China and, therewith, 
covered around 44 per cent of China’s total gas imports.
China’s costly investments and projects in CACR have not been based just on short-
term economic calculations, but even more on long-term strategic and geopolitical 
objectives.205 Thus Chinese experts expect that the Indian engagement and energy 
cooperation with CACR countries will increase in the upcoming decades “… in the 
backdrop of this increasing Chinese penetration, and declining Russian presence”.206
4.2.2 China’s New Silk Road Concept of ‘One Belt, One Road’
China’s rise to being a global economic power would not have been possible without 
mas sive investments into its domestic transport and energy infrastructures. 
Between 1992 and 2011, China spent 8.5 per cent of its GDP on infrastructure 
modernization and expansion. That was much more than the average of 2-4 per cent 
in other developing countries in that time frame. From 1992 to 2007, Beijing spent 
US$120bn alone on building 35,000km of highways.207
When China’s President Xi Jinping launched its ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative 
in a ‘historic’ speech at the Nazarbaev University In September 2013208, its wide-
ranging geo-economic and geopolitical implications were rather overlooked in the 
West  - despite the U.S.’ own Silk Road Initiative of July 2011 and the EU’s TRACECA, 
as well as RETRACK concepts.209  Initially, the OBOR initiative had been perceived in 
the West rather in continuity of Beijing’s traditional ‘March West’ policy.
The new foreign policy concept has made China’s direct neighborhood the ‘top 
strategic prio ri ty for the first time’. Like centuries ago, China views itself as the 
‘Middle Kingdom’ geo graphi cally and geopolitically.210 Its new pro-active engagement 
strategy of OBOR envisages de velop ing China’s bilateral relations with its neighbors 
into more of a regional block, with China being the leader. This new regional 
diplomacy is underpinned and bolstered by mul tiple strategic initiatives, including 
those of CACR itself.211 The previous ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR) had been merged into the new grand design Silk 
Road concept of OBOR.212
The Chinese government views its OBOR initiative as an instrument to solve its 
presently increas ing economic problems. It has officially connected its OBOR 
initiative with its domes tic economic development strategy and considers the new 
Silk Road concept as a driver of its future economic growth. But it is also a vehicle to 
strengthen the central govern ment’s control over China’s economy as part of a more 
conservative economic policy.213  
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Figure 9: China‘s ’One Belt, One Road’-Initiative
Source: Stratfor.com (Courtesy of Stratfor).
The present investment strategy is focusing on six regions - especially Xinjiang and 
Fujian (whilst Jiangsu is being left out up to now) - in the shipping, construction, 
energy, commerce, tourism, and comparative advantage manufacturing sectors. 
These investments are also considered to safeguard social stability and lasting 
political order in China and its neighboring regions.214 China’s provinces such as 
Xinjiang and Fujian will have to play a major role in the OBOR strategy. But they 
will try to follow their own specific interests and further increase their influence on 
China’s foreign economic and foreign policies.215
China’s OBOR strategy also seeks to use and benefit from the advantage of 
economic com ple men tarities between China and its regional neighbors in CACR, 
South Asia, South east-Asia and East Asia, and has stretched the initiative to Europe. 
It is based on the common inter ests between China and its neighboring countries 
to upgrade regional produc tion, trans por tation, ports, highways, fibre optic cables, 
airports, energy infrastruc tures and value chains. It also envisages significantly 
expanding the overland trans-continental con tainer trade, as 90 per cent of the 
global container trade still travels by shipping via oceans. Along side new transport 
infrastructures, massive investments in energy projects are expected.
Since its announcement, OBOR has attracted widespread interest from China’s 
neighbors in strategic partnerships with the OBOR initiatives. Around 65 countries 
are involved and have begun with Beijing to coordinate their economic and regional 
policies, connecting facilities, and enhancing their integration of trade and finance 
with China. It envisions six corridors across Eurasia, which has often combined 
overland and maritime infrastructures. But the strength of its complex initiative 
with so many projects, involving around 65 states and 4.4bn people in this strategic 
regional initiative can also be its weak ness as it needs a much closer cooperation 
between multiple stakeholders: governments, enterprises, NGOs, and the general 
public, both at home and abroad to support various smaller initiatives and projects.
Whether China’s OBOR initiative and its transport infrastructure plans outside the 
country have military implications is unclear - officially of course it is denied. But the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively debating how the OBOR concept can be 
used to promote China’s military power.216
Some observers have already seen in the interlocking developments linked with 
China’s OBOR initiative a geopolitical tectonic shift in Eurasia, which is being 
overlooked by the American and European media, even though it may upset the 
international order.217 In China, the EU’s failing response has been perceived and 
evaluated as largely being ‘ignored’, ‘lukewarm’, ‘disappointing’ and ‘tepid to non-
existent’, as if Brussels had simply ‘turned away’.218 The EU is only slowly awakening 
and responding by recognizing the ‘win-win-model of cooperation’ in light of its own 
Eurasian transport networks designs. But a large number of European countries, 
including 14 EU-members, have joined the Asian Infra struc ture Investment Bank 
(AIIB), which is seen as a major vehicle for China’s future investments in the 
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targeted countries of its OBOR initiative. China has also increased its cooperation 
with CSEE countries by institutionalizing a regular cooperation through its so-called 
‘16+1’-frame work countries, and in order to increase Europe’s support of the OBOR 
initiative.219
The other three most important actors in the Asia-Pacific region - the U.S, Japan and 
Australia - have not supported China’s AIIB proposal. While China has accumulated 
endless volumes of U.S. Treasury and other government bonds, Beijing now prefers 
more direct over seas investment to bolster its future economic growth, and to 
oppose U.S dominance in global financial institutions, and geopolitically in Asia. 
China has also used the opportunity of the European economic and financial crisis 
to expand its investments to more than US$60bn in shares of European companies, 
including in critical infrastructures such as ports and telecommunication companies.
Since 2014, Chinese investments have focused on CSEE countries, which have 
re ceived al most US$7bn mainly for energy and infrastructure projects.220 At an 
EU-China work shop in volv ing five Chinese banks, including the world’s largest bank 
- the Industrial and Com mer cial Bank of China -, both sides have sought cooperation 
and Chinese contributions to the Juncker Investment Plan. It aims to mobi lize public 
and private investments in the Euro pean economy of at least €315bn from 2015-
2017. China in particular is interested in an EU-China investment treaty. The scale of 
bilateral investment was merely US$20bn in 2014.221
As the world’s largest economy and biggest global manufacturer, as well as exporter 
of goods, China presently also accounts for between one-quarter and one-third of 
manu fac tur ing imports in Japan, the EU, and the United States. It is expected that 
China will become the world’s largest overseas investor by 2020 with global offshore 
assets tripling presently from US$6.4tn to almost US$20tn by 2020.222 China’s 
Ministry of Commerce has already announced in 2012 that it aims with Chinese 
investors to make Overseas Direct Investments (ODI) worth US$390bn, while the 
global stock of Chinese ODI were around US$170bn at that time. Its official ODI rose 
twentyfold in just eight years from US$2.85bn to US$68.8bn in 2010, by preferring 
to upgrade the Chinese economy through strategic asset-seeking ODI.223
One of the most important instruments for China’s investments of various transport, 
energy and other infrastructure projects as part of Beijing’s OBOR grand design 
initiative is China’s newly created AIIB in 2013. The bank will officially be launched 
at the end of 2015 with a capital of US$100bn, with 75 per cent being provided by 
Asian countries.224 In June 2015, the United Arab Emirates also became an official 
founding member of the AIIB. The ADB itself has estimated that the developing 
Asian economies will need alone to invest US$8tn from 2010-2020 in order to cope 
with infrastructural needs. The existing banks, however, are not able to increase 
their financial support for new infrastructure projects significantly because of the 
political constraints on expanding their financial forms. The 2008 global financial 
crisis has diminished the lending capabilities of Western financial institutions.225 
For Western investors, however, many questions in regard to the AIIB are still 
unanswered.226
In addition to the AIIB, the BRICs nations - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa, who contribute some 20 per cent of global GDP - have created their New 
Development Bank (NDB). The NDB was officially launched with just US$50bn, but 
might be increased to US$100bn ca pi talization - China: US$41 bn, Russia, India, 
Brazil: each US$18 bn and South Africa: US$ 5bn - in the coming years. It might 
even be capable of collecting as much as US$400bn in capital in the mid- and long-
term future.227  Both the AIIB and NDB have their headquarters in China, but will 
cooperate with each other’s initiatives and projects.
Furthermore, China has already invested more than US$50bn in CACR infra-
struc ture and has established another US$40bn Silk Road Fund to finance future 
infrastructures and transportation networks as part of its OBOR initiative. In 
addition, Russia’s foreign in vest ment instrument, the ‘Russian Direct Investment 
Fund’ (RDIF) will also cooperate with the Chinese and BRICs initiatives and new 
banks.
Beyond rail, road, and maritime transport projects, the AIIB and NDB will in 
particular finance energy infrastructure projects. But these investments are also 
important for regional security reasons. While the new system of mega-transport 
infrastructure projects also help and support China’s future energy imports of oil, 
gas and coal, it is not the primary objective of the OBOR initiative. It is intended to 
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increase the export of excess capacity in its domestic industries hurt by its recent 
economic slowdown and crisis. The OBOR initiative is also aimed at enhancing 
China’s state-owned energy companies for international mergers and acqui si tions 
after the on-going anti-corruption campaign.228
However, the new economic crisis in China may also constrain China’s future 
investment plans and capabilities. Furthermore, in the BRIC’s block exists not just 
common interests, but also competing ones, and neither Russia nor Brazil are in the 
economic position to con tri bute more heavily to the NDB.229
Moreover, the OBOR initiative and future Chinese investments in the OBOR regions 
are highly dependent on a stable and politically safe neighbourhood. But neither 
Central and South Asia nor China’s own bordering province of Xinjiang in its western 
region, or Tibet in China’s southwest, are politically stable regions.230 As the result 
of its new Silk Road grand strategy, China might be forced to increase its domestic 
security presence in Xinjiang, Tibet and other non-Han border regions. Beijing 
might also use the OBOR initiative to increase its influence over the Tibetan exile 
community and the Islamic minority of Uighurs in Xinjiang.
Beijing’s primary security concerns are directed towards Afghanistan and its 
peace process. China has become more pro-actively engaged as a supporter of 
reconciliation negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. China 
has become more engaged for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan as Beijing 
perceives its neighbour as a safe haven for Uighur militants. The Muslim Uighur 
population in Xinjiang is still growing and local tension in Xinjiang has increased 
after worsening terrorist attacks during the last few years.231
China’s OBOR initiative also depends on whether it can improve its bilateral relations 
with India.232 Indian and Chinese interests have already clashed in regard to the 
planned Iran-Pakistan pipeline (IP) with a capacity of around 31bcm. In April 2015, 
China signed an agreement with Pakistan to construct the pipeline through a US$2bn 
loan (covering 85% of the construction cost) from Pakis tan’s Chinese built Gwadar 
port233 to Nawabshah, where it can be linked to Pakistan’s domestic gas distribution 
network.234 For Beijing it is another geopolitically important mega-project, 
advancing its OBOR initiative. The pipeline is also part of the US$46bn infrastructure 
package to establish the ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC). It extends 
from the Gwadar port on Pakistan’s Indian Ocean coast to China’s westernmost 
city Kashgar (Kashi) in Xinjiang.235 But the pipeline’s operation will be dependent 
on an unstable security environ ment, as it passes through Balochistan, which is in 
conflict with Pakis tan’s central govern ment. Neither terrorist attacks on the pipeline 
nor kidnapping of Chinese workers can be avoided as Pakistan’s security forces are 
underfunded and overstretched throughout the country. Reportedly, Pakistan has 
promised China to create a new, armed division of 7,000-10,000 troops to protect 
Chinese engineers and workers, but that won’t stop terrorist attacks.236
As China needs a stable security environment to implement its new grand design 
Silk Road con cept, regional security policies may remain the most challenging task 
for China due to the geo political rivalries and competing strategic interests between 
China, India, Russia, Japan and the U.S.237 Despite Russia’s official welcome of 
China’s OBOR initiative, which is also direc ted against U.S. influence in the region, 
it runs counter to Moscow’s protectionist stra te gy for its EEU. But as Russia has 
become more dependent on China in order to bolster its own claim to great power 
status, Russia cannot afford to be in the periphery of China’s OBOR initiative.238
In this context, Kazakhstan has become the centre of the geopolitical and 
energy rivalry between Russia and China.239 Both have strengthened their energy 
cooperation with Kazakhstan. Since January 2014, Russia has transported 7mt of oil 
per year via the Priir tyshsk-Atasu-Alahankou pipeline, whose section’s capacity from 
Atasu to Alahankou has been expanded from 12 to 20mt of oil per year. China has 
also strengthened its oil and gas co operation with Kazakhstan, and has increased its 
stake in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas in dus try to 22-24 per cent. Despite some concerns 
in Kazakhstan about a future overde pen dence on China, both sides are interested 
in strengthening their cooperation in the logistics, communi ca tions, and aviation 
sectors. As China is expanding its nuclear power generation, China has in creased its 
imports of uranium from Kazakhstan and has pushed joint ventures in Kazakh stan’s 
mining industry. Furthermore, as part of its global expansion, China’s nuclear power 
companies have also declared their interest in building at least one nuclear power 
station in Kazakhstan, opening a new round of competition between Russia and 
China. Kazakhstan’s uranium mines and nuclear sector have become a ‘cold conflict’ 
of competing interests between Russia and China in Kazakhstan.240
Figure 11: EU-Energy Package 
and Its Five Dimensions
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5. The EU on the Way to an 
Energy Union and its Oil and Gas 
Diversification Efforts
5.1 The EU’s Energy Union Concept versus Re-Nationalization Trends
In February 2015, the European Commission published its strategy for an Energy 
Union. It has proposed a package of gas and electricity infrastructure projects to 
fasten the comple tion of an internal energy market, with the original December 
2014 deadline having already passed by. In the words of the European Commission’s 
new President Jean-Claude Juncker to the European Parliament after his election in 
July 2014: ‘We need to pool our sources, combine our infrastructures and unit our 
negotiating power vis-à-vis third countries’.241
The EU’s idea of and discussions on an Energy Union go back to the proposals in 
March and April 2014 of the previous Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, now the 
newly appointed President of the European Council. He wanted to create an Energy 
Union to ensure stable gas supplies and fair market-based gas prices as a more 
effective mechanism for gas solidarity of the EU-28 towards Moscow. His idea of 
an Energy Union included a contro ver sial joint purchasing body that would seek to 
secure gas supplies on behalf of all 28 EU mem ber states.242 A following ‘non-paper’ 
further detailed the Polish proposals for a compre hen sive Energy Union.243 Politically, 
the principle idea of an Energy Union was based on poli ti cal solidarity and common 
economic interests.244
These ideas ahead of the Commission’s in-depth study on the EU’s energy security 
chal len ges and further diversification efforts have been controversial with the EU-
28.245 Some coun tries such as the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic have 
favoured a less ambitious in te gration policy with discussions on national energy 
plans to be conducted informally and bi laterally between member states and the 
Commission. In contrast to Germany, which favour ed only RES, many other EU 
member states supported all low carbon technologies (includ ing advanced nuclear 
and CCS), and did not want to discriminate one or prefer specific low car bon 
technologies.246 Most of the criticism has highlighted the fact of a lack of political 
soli da rity in the European energy policy. Many EU member states still put their own, 
often short-sighted defined national energy security above and at the expense of the 
entire EU-28 block.
At the beginning of 2015, the Commission took a pragmatic stance, as it favoured 
the idea of a joint purchasing body on a voluntary basis, or in the event of a market 
failure or supply crisis, as part of the EU’s efforts to reduce Russia’s negotiating 
power on the European gas market.247 The official ‘Energy Union Framework 
Strategy’ of February 2015 is based on the traditional EU-energy objectives of 
a “sustainable, low-carbon and climate-friendly economy” and “five mutually-
reinforcing and closely interrelated dimensions” to en hance energy security, 
sustainability and competitiveness.248
The ‘Energy Union Framework Strategy’ has also defined fifteen ‘action points’ 
for imple ment ing a real Energy Union (see next figure).249 While the Energy Union 
concept has been de fined rather as an inward-looking project, the framework 
strategy has also highlighted its role and in ter dependence of global energy markets, 
and the need to engage constructively with its ener gy partners to their mutual 
benefit, as part of the EU’s energy foreign policy. It called to use all of its foreign 
policy instruments to establish strategic energy partnerships with im por tant 
producing and transit countries or regions. Although neither Kazakhstan nor Central 
Asia has been mentioned explicitly, the countries being named includes Azerbaijan 
as the main gas supplier for TANAP and TAP from the Caspian region, and Turk-
menis tan.250
Since spring 2015 and the official adoption and confirmation of the Energy Union 
con cept, the EU’s internal discussions have highlighted again that the individual 
member states are still following different strategic objectives of the Energy Union 
concept as Europe is still dominated by national energy markets and supported by 
national energy policies, strategies and objectives. But what becomes equally clear 
is that the Energy Union must be more than the sum of its individual parts and that 
it needs a holistic concept. Over time, integration of gas markets and electricity 
networks will inevitably lead to more common policies, strategic and defined 
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common objectives, and a conversion of national interests.251
In November 2015, the European Commission presented a first review of the Energy 
Union framework strategy and its defined five dimensions by identifying ‘key building 
blocks for an implementation mechanism’, and the progress and non-progress that 
has been made since 2014, and the definition of new energy and climate goals. For 
a fully integrated internal energy market, the Commission has also reviewed its 
infrastructure plans and the list of the Projects of Common Interests (PCIs). The 
list has been shortened from 249 to 195 projects – par tly because thirteen projects 
have been finalized and implemented and another 62 projects are ex pected to be 
completed by the end of 2017. More than 100 PCIs are in the permitting phase, and 
more than a quarter face delays. While the Commission has encouraged in creas-
ing investments in these PCIs, it simultaneously has warned that those investments 
in re silient infrastructures need to take into account the rapidly changing political 
environment and international energy markets in order to avoid these new 
infrastructures becoming stranded assets.252 Furthermore, the internal controversies 
and conflicts towards the Nord Stream-2 pipeline253, the EU’s ambitious climate 
objectives and the failing strategy and path for the binding 27 per cent of the EU’s 
renewable target, highlights the long road the EU has to go before it becomes a 
real Energy Union. In addition, the EU-28 still imports 42 per cent of its external 
gas supplies from Gazprom as a single supplier. Several members are still de pend-
ent on Gazprom as their single supplier. But some progress of the creation of the 
EU’s Southern Gas Corridor and its links to Central Asia, including the ‘Declaration 
on ener gy cooperation between Turkmenistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan and the European 
Commis sion’ on 1st May 2015254 as well as the establishment of the Southern Gas 
Corridor Advisory Council set up on 1st February 2015, have been identified.255
5.2 The Impact of the Ukraine Conflict on the EU’s Energy Security Strategy, 
Energy Mix and Energy Foreign Policies
In 2010, thirteen European countries still relied on Russia for more than 80 per cent 
of their total gas consumption; and a total of seventeen countries were dependent 
for more than 80 per cent of their gas imports on Russia.256 In total, 35 per cent of 
EU-27 gas imports depended on Rus sia.257 In addition, most of the CSEE countries 
have been locked into contracts for over priced Russian gas, which is significantly 
more expensive than Russian gas supplies for Ger many and other western EU-
member states, despite the fact of a considerably longer trans port distance. 
Before 2010, Russia’s global and regional position as the world’s largest gas pro-
ducer looked to become ever stronger: the IEA projected in 2011 its gas pro duc tion 
between 2009 and 2035, accounting for 17 per cent of the worldwide gas supply 
in crease.258
But even in 2010, it had been overlooked that Russia’s share of EU gas imports had 
already fallen from almost 50 per cent in 2000 to 34 per cent in 2010, and in Europe 
from 45.1 per cent in 2003 to 31.8 per cent in 2010.259 Equally, the share of EU 
based revenues in Russia’s total gas sales revenue dropped from 60 per cent to 40 
per cent within the last decade.260 In 2012, Russian gas exports to Europe decreased 
from 160bcm in 2010 to 138.8bcm, repre sent ing just 25 per cent of Europe’s total 
imports.261 Despite the declining German gas im ports from Russia until 2013, 
Gazprom’s insistence on oil-indexed prices resulted in sky rocket ing costs of its gas 
exports to Europe. German wholesale gas prices increased from US$270 per 1,000 
cubic meters (cm) in 2010 to US$353 per 1,000cm in 2012.262
In order to strengthen its future energy security, the European Commission’s energy 
demand manage ment strategy has emphasized the broadest possible energy mix, 
diversification of energy supply and imports, promotion of renewable energies, and 
a neutral policy towards the nuclear option. Its 20-20-20 per cent formula in its 
Energy Action Plan (EAP) of March 2007, aims to reduce GHGE, to raise the share of 
RES, as well as to improve energy effi cien cy and conservation. If the EU is able to 
implement and achieve its March 2007 aims by 2020, the EU could be using 13 per 
cent less energy than today, which is equivalent to a saving of more than €100bn.263 
According to some estimates, the EU’s new energy security strategy and agreed 
efficiency and energy conservation efforts agreed in 2014 will further lower its gas 
import demand from Russia by another 12 per cent by 2030.264
Since 2010, Europe’s gas consumption and import demands have dramatically 
decreased. In 2013, Europe’s gas consumption already decreased to a historical 
record low since 1990.265 In 2014, gas consumption declined by another 11.6 per 
cent to 387 bcm, compared with 502 bcm in 2010, and EU net imports by 8 per 
cent (also 11.6% fall from Russian pipeline gas) compared with 2013. Russia’s 
Figure 12: Action Points for an 
EU-Energy Union
1. Full implementation and strict 
enforcement of existing energy 
and related legislation is the first 
priority to establish the Energy 
Union;
2. The EU needs to diversify its 
supply of gas and make it more 
resilient to supply disruptions;
3. Intergovernmental agreements 
should comply fully with 
EU legislation and be more 
transparent;
4. The right infrastructure is a 
precondition for completing 
the energy market, integrating 
renewables and security of 
supply;
5. Creating a seamless internal 
energy market that benefits 
citizens, ensuring security of 
supply, integrating renewables 
in the market and remedying 
the currently uncoordinated 
development of capacity 
mechanisms in Member States 
call for a review of the current 
market design;
6. The regulatory framework set-
up by the 3rd Internal Energy 
Market Package has to be further 
developed to deliver a seamless 
internal energy market to citizens 
and companies;
7. Regional approaches to market 
integration are an important 
part of the move towards a 
fully integrated EU-wide energy 
market;
8. Greater transparency on energy 
costs and prices as well as on 
the level of public support will 
enhance market integration and 
identify actions that distort the 
internal market;
9. The EU has set itself the target 
of reaching at least 27% energy 
savings by 2030;
10. Buildings have huge potential 
for energy efficiency gains. 
Retrofitting existing buildings to 
make them energy efficient and 
making full use of sustainable 
space heating and cooling will 
reduce the EU’s energy import 
bills, reinforce energy security 
and cut energy costs for 
households and businesses;
11. The EU needs to speed up energy 
efficiency and decarbonisation 
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share of total EU imports only slightly declined from 43 per cent in 2013 to 42 per 
cent in 2014.266 But the EU’s import dependency remains a strategic concern as the 
combined gas production of the EU-28 member states fell by 34.6 per cent between 
2003 and 2013, and may decline by another 35 per cent within the next decade.267
Figure 13: EU – Natural Gas Consumption and Production 2010-2014
Source: Dr. F. Umbach based on BP, ‘Statistical Review of World Energy’, June 2015.
Instead of a projected need of an import rise from around 300bcm in 2010 to more 
than 500bcm in 2030 as forecasted by the IEA and the European gas industry 
before 2010, Europe’s gas consumption may decrease further, and not return to 
the demand level of 2010 by 2040. Until recently, at least a rising, but on a much 
lower scale, import demand has been forecasted, after it had already been revised 
downwards during the last few years. But the EU’s new energy security strategy 
envisages a lower import demand by 2030 than in 2012, in contrast to the IEA and 
the European gas industry, which still anticipate a significant import demand rise by 
2035/40.268 But in contrast to the U.S., Europe is still con fronted with rising oil and 
import dependency from politically unstable or other problematic suppliers. Further-
more, the EU-28 spent more than €500bn on energy imports in 2012 – seven times 
more than in 1999, and amounting to more than 4 per cent of GDP.
The newly reduced EU gas consumption and import demand have significant 
strategic impli ca tions for both Russia’s gas export strategy as well as for the EU’s 
gas strategy and its SGC-project. In addition, all regional pipeline plans and LNG-
terminal expansion plans are hampered by the drastic decline of oil and gas prices. 
Equally, Europe does not need as much Russian gas as previously projected. A 
smaller European gas market will further in ten sify the competition between various 
import projects and supply options.
Furthermore, the unconventional gas revolution in the US and the ensuing gas glut 
have not just led to the delinking of gas prices from the oil price. They have also 
destroyed the old Euro pean gas market structure, based on bilateral long term 
contracts and controversial take-or-pay clauses between a limited number of large 
suppliers and buyers that are required to pay for volumes they may not need. In 
2011, only around 56 per cent of oil-indexed long term contracts in Europe were still 
indexed, a share continuously decreasing from 69 per cent in 2009 to 59 per cent in 
2010.269 At the same time, the share of spot market gas contracts increased from 27 
per cent in 2009 to 37 per cent in 2010, and to more than 40 per cent in 2011.24 In 
the view of its European gas partners, Russia and Gazprom do not just jeo pardize 
their own gas market share in Europe, but the commercial viability of the gas power 
generation in Europe, due to its insistence on non-competitive oil-indexed gas 
prices.270
Even without U.S. LNG exports to Europe, the EU’s gas supply security has signi-
fi cant ly im proved since 2009. This is due to the latest Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis 
inter con nec tors bet ween the member states have been built, and the Southern 
Gas Corridor project has been im plemented, with the TANAP and TAP pipelines 
importing Azerbaijan gas. The expan sion of LNG-terminal capacities, and new gas 
Source: Dr. F.Umbach basierend auf 
European Commission, ‘In-Depth Study 
of European Energy Security. Commission 
Staff Working Document. Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament,  COM(2014) 330 
final, Brussels, 28 May 2014 SWD(2014) 
330 final, Part 1/5.
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Net Imports 145 193 258 276 286 265 260 250










Natural Gas Projections until 2030




















 Gas Consumption  Gas Production   Linear (Gas Consumption)
in the transport sector, its 
progressive switch to alternative 
fuels and the integration of the 
energy and transport systems;
12. The EU agreed a climate and 
energy framework for 2030 at the 
October European Council. This 
now needs to be implemented. 
The EU will provide an ambitious 
contribution to the international 
climate negotiations;
13. The EU has agreed the target 
of at least 27% at EU level for 
renewable energy by 2030;
14. The EU needs to develop a 
forward-looking, energy and 
climate-related R&I strategy to 
maintain European technological 
leadership and expand export 
opportunities; and
15. The EU will use all external 
policy instruments to ensure 
that a strong, united EU engages 
constructively with its partners 
and speaks with one voice on 
energy and climate.
Source: European Commission, 
‘Energy Union Package. A Framework 
Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union 
with a Forward-Looking Climate 
Change Policy.’ Communication from 
the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions and the 
European Investment Bank, Brussels, 
25 February 2015 COM(2015) 80 final.
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regulations and institutions to control and overview the EU’s reform policies by 
the Gas Coordination Group and ENTSOG-Gas, have all contri but ed to creating a 
united internal gas market. Those reform efforts have been further strengthen ed 
by the present Ukraine conflict, which has resulted in a new energy security stra-
tegy favouring to reduce further future EU gas consumption. This has been done 
through enhancing energy efficiency and conservation, as well as expanding other 
energy sour ces, notably RES, and to diversify its gas supplies through indigenous 
unconventional reserves.271
The EU intends to diversify its gas supplies and expand its LNG imports, including 
from the U.S, starting in 2015-2016. The major problem is not a lack of LNG import 
capacities, but rather its related costs. At present, the EU has 22 LNG import 
terminals with a total capacity of 196bcm per year. Six additional LNG terminals are 
under construction with a capacity of 32bcm. The EU can import much more LNG 
from conventional and unconventional gas re ser ves worldwide as its terminals have 
not used 73 per cent of its regasification capa ci ty in 2013. Even limited exports 
may have some significant implications on national or even Euro pean energy supply 
security in combination with a reduction of its gas consump tion and im ports, as 
well as new import options in the forthcoming years. Given new global liquefaction 
capacity becoming active in the next years from Australia, Africa and Southeast 
Asia, any other US-LNG export projects may have a disproportionately large impact 
on reducing global gas prices and the general tightness in the LNG market.272 The 
IEA has forecasted that Euro pean LNG imports might double between 2014 and 
2020 and then surpassing 90bcm – cover ing 65 per cent of Europe’s gas import 
demand.273 In its new list of PCIs in November 2015, the European Commission has 
already reduced the num ber of supported LNG-projects from previously 21 to just 
eight by taking the smaller gas de mand and a reduced rise of future gas imports, as 
well as other changing conditions into account.274
5.3 Lessons to Learn and Experiences to Share: The EU’s and Germany’s 
Energy Transformation and Decarbonization Strategies
In order to strengthen its future energy security, the European Commission’s energy 
demand management strategy has emphasized the broadest possible energy mix, 
diversification of energy supply and imports, promotion of RES, and a neutral policy 
towards the nuclear option. Its 20-20-20 per cent formula in its Energy Action Plan 
(EAP) of March 2007 aims to re duce GHGE, to raise the share of RES, and to improve 
energy efficiency and conservation. At the same time, the EAP has promoted a 
liberalized internal market for gas and electricity, en hanced measures for security of 
supply, and a common approach to an external energy po licy with a global dimen-
sion.275 Thereby, the EU’s energy policy aims at a careful balance bet ween all three 
parameters: security of supply, competitiveness, and environmental sustainability.
According to the Commission, its 2007 EAP and the present energy and climate 
policies have made significant progress to achieve its 20-20-20 targets.
At the same time, several other targets and strategic objectives may not be 
achieved:
Figure 16: Review of Failing Progress of the EU’s Energy Strategy since 
2007
Review of Progress of the EU’s Energy Strategy since 2007:
• The fulfilment of the 20 per cent target for enhancing energy efficiency remains 
unrealistic.
• Despite the achievements towards the EU’s targeted 20 per cent reduction 
in emissions, those emissions have also grown in several EU member states 
– including in Germany in 2012 and 2013 because of higher and cheaper coal 
imports and coal consumption.
• Even the 20 per cent target for renewables has become questionable given 
disparate levels of implementation across member states.278
• The European Commission like the World Economic Forum have repeatedly 
criticised the ‘suboptimal deployment’ of RES, which has cost the EU 
approximately US$100bn more than if each country in the EU had invested in 
the most efficient capacity according to their natural resource advantages – 
wind and/or solar power.279
Figure 15: Review of (Positive) 
Progress of the EU’s Energy 
Strategy since 2007
Review of Progress of the EU’s 
Energy Strategy since 2007:
• By 2012, GHGE had already decreased 
by 19.2 per cent in comparison with 
1990 levels, and they are expected 
to reach a 24 and 32 per cent drop in 
2020 and 2030, respectively.
• The share of RES has grown from 
8.7 per cent in 2005 to 14.4 per cent 
in 2012 and was originally expected 
to increase further to 21 per cent 
by 2020 and 27 per cent in 2030 – 
agreed to in October 2014. At the 
same time, the EU’s consumption 
of solid fossil fuels – coal and coal 
products – decreased by 37.1 per 
cent.[276]
• The EU is – together with China – 
the largest investor in RES. Of the 
US$100 billion of worldwide subsidies 
for RES, more than 50 per cent are in 
Europe.
• It has created various eco-industries, 
employing more than 4.2 million 
people, and has become a job motor 
even during the EU’s economic 
recession.
• At the end of 2012, the EU had 
installed about 44 per cent of 
the global renewable electricity 
production - excluding hydro.
• Between 1995 and 2011, the energy 
intensity of the EU economy was 
reduced by 24 per cent and even 30 
per cent in its industry, though its 
economy has grown by around 45 per 
cent in real terms since 1990.
• Subsidies for generation from RES 
reached €52bn (US$65bn) in 2013 
within the EU-28.
• The EU’s energy consumption level 
had fallen to a 20-year low in 2013, 
returning to 1990s levels; from its 
peak in 2006, energy consumption 
decreased by more than 9 per cent in 
2013 and 0.2 per cent between 1990 
and 2013.[277]
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On 22nd January 2014, the European Commission unveiled a new energy strategy 
for 2030 with different headline targets. The Commission has proposed a binding 
carbon dioxide emis sions reduction of 40 per cent by 2030, which doubles the 
2020 target. In addition, it also adopted a binding 27 per cent share of renewable 
energies in energy consumption at the EU-level. This expansion of RES serves not 
only the EU’s climate policies, but also its com mon energy security, as it will change 
the energy mix and decrease the EU’s overall energy consumption, including its 
gas demand.280 In October 2014, the EU officially adopted these targets. It also 
confirmed an energy efficiency target of 27 per cent by 2030 (only indicative), which 
could be raised to 30 per cent following a review in 2020.281
The EU’s targets also have a geopolitical and energy security angle. The EU 
hopes that the two 27 per cent targets for increasing energy efficiency and RES 
– incidentally binding at the EU level, but non-binding at the national level – will 
reduce the EU’s gas imports from Russia in the twelve most vulnerable EU member 
states by around 20 per cent.282 Other analyses point out that a 25 per cent 
efficiency target could reduce EU gas imports by 9 per cent, while a 35 per cent 
target may decrease the EU’s gas imports by 33 per cent by 2030.283
But as the world’s largest energy importer, there are persistent doubts about 
Europe’s future economic competitiveness and energy supply security. In 2012, 
the EU reached a new energy spending record of €548bn – 4.2 per cent of the EU’s 
GDP, against 1.5 per cent in 2002 – compared to just €180bn on average during 
the timeframe of 1990-2011.284 By contrast, the U.S. import bill for fossil fuels had 
already decreased that year to US$340bn by maximizing its own indigenous fossil-
fuel resources.285 The record EU import bill is ex pect ed to stay at around €500bn by 
2035, which will draw away much needed financial power from industrial innovation, 
research and development programmes, infrastructure and others.
Its energy conservation and efficiency efforts notwithstanding, the EU’s energy 
costs are expected to rise further by 2030 to a level of 14 per cent of GDP compared 
with 12.8 per cent in 2010. The Commission reckons that its electricity costs will 
further rise from 2011 to 2030 by another 31 per cent – before inflation – and, 
thereby, consume a further increasing share of the EU’s GDP. During the last 
decade, the EU’s industry share of GDP has already de clined from 20 per cent in 
2000 to 15.1 per cent by 2012, pointing to an alarming de-indus tri a li zation trend.286 
Consequently, the EU declared a fourth 20 per cent objective in 2012: to push the 
industrial share of its GDP to that level by 2020. At the end of 2013, however, this 
share was still stuck at 15.1 per cent.
Figure 17: The EU’s Energy Import Bill for Oil, Gas and Coal, 2002-2013
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013























The gap between EU and U.S. energy prices has been widening and keeps growing. 
Indus trial gas prices in the United States have dropped by 66 per cent since 2005, 
while gas prices in the EU have increased by 35 per cent. Worse yet, gas prices in 
the EU are now three to four times higher than in the United States, Russia and 
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Figure 18: Major Problems 
and Challenges of the German 
Energiewende – A Lesson for 
other Countries
Major Problems and Challenges 
of the German Energiewende:
• Its total costs have grown faster 
and greater than anticipated. 
Since 2002, the ballooning costs 
of subsidizing feed-in tariffs 
under Germany’s EEG renewable 
law have increased to more than 
€120bn by the end of 2013. By 
2022, German consumers will have 
to pay more than €100bn for RES 
that have already been installed.
• Germany’s electricity costs have 
increased faster than elsewhere in 
Europe and are now twice the level 
of those in the U.S. Germany’s 
electricity is 40% more costly for 
private consumers and 20% more 
expensive for industrial users than 
the EU average.
• Germany has to cope with the 
third-highest electricity prices 
in the EU due to its EEG feed-in 
tariff system. The subsidy system 
is fifteen years old, and has been 
copied around the world and 
helped Germany turn into Europe’s 
biggest green energy market. 
But in 2013, total annual costs of 
Germany’s EEG rose from €14.1b 
in 2012 to a staggering €23bn in 
2014. By 2020, costs may reach 
€35bn to €40bn, absent of a major 
reform.
• Germany’s subsidies for installed 
solar panels are, in particular, cost 
inefficient. Its already installed 
solar panels will ultimately cost 
taxpayers US$130bn over the 
next 20 years through the heavily 
subsidized feed-in-tariff contracts, 
compared to US$15bn for building 
a state-of-the-art nuclear reactor 
that will generate more than 
50 per cent of the electricity of 
Germany’s entire solar fleet over a 
similar 20-year period. Worse still, 
despite these heavy subsidies, 
German solar companies have 
experienced a wave of insolvencies 
and a market developing away 
from Germany since 2012.
• Wind and solar power do provide 
more than 60 per cent of 
Germany’s electricity production 
– but only for few short moments 
when the weather is windy and 
India, as well as 12 per cent higher than in China. The IEA expects this gas price 
disparity will last for at least another 20 years. Correspondingly, this comparative 
energy cost advantage has boosted foreign investment in the United States and a 
revival of its manufacturing industry.287
The experience of the German ‘Energiewende’ as the world’s most ambitious energy 
trans for ma tion is equally ambivalent. After the Fukushi ma catastrophe in March 
2011, the German government adopted unilaterally and with limited prior notice, the 
challenging task of trans form ing its entire energy system. Berlin decided to phase 
out nuclear power by 2022, to break its dependence on fossil fuels and to expand 
wind, solar and other renewable energies to 50 per cent of all electricity by 2030 and 
80 per cent by 2050.
As of 2014, Germany presents a mixed record in electricity generation: while RES 
have con stant ly expanded, the share of coal was still more than 43 per cent.288 Even 
less impressive is the fact that the share of RES in the even more important entire 
Primary Energy Con sump tion has expanded much less and accounted for just 11.1 
per cent in 2014.289 Even so, after in creasing in 2013, Germany’s GHGE decreased to 
301m tonnes in 2014, reaching the lowest level since 2009. Germany also remains 
Europe’s largest electricity producer of solar panels with more than 35TWh. The 
wholesale price for power on the Leipzig power exchange fell to a record low of 33 
EuroMWh – compared with €38 in 2013.290
While expanding RES has been singled out as Germany’s success story291, its 
total costs are often ignored. Cost estimates of the entire policy have constantly 
increased since 2011 and are due to reach €1tn over the next 25 years. The feed-in 
tariff programme has cost more than €348bn, and may further increase to €680bn 
by 2022.292 Until now, Germany is on track to meeting only one of its three major 
targets – one third of renewables in energy generation. Meanwhile, it appears to be 
failing to meet its second goal; to cut energy consumption by a fifth by 2020, which 
will in turn make it difficult to reach the third target; a 40 per cent cut in emissions 
compared to 1990.293 More importantly, it is increasing Germany’s dependence on 
energy imports. In 2012, it imported 61 per cent of its overall energy consumption – 
higher than the EU-28 average of 53 per cent.294
Rising energy prices are challenging the future of Germany’s economic strength.295 
Germany’s feed-in tariff system – the EEG – has made Germany the world’s largest, 
but also the most subsidized, solar market. Experts have in creasing ly warned that 
only a drastic policy shift will prevent the ‘Energiewende’ reform from threatening 
the very inter na tio nal com pe titiveness of the German economy. In this context, 
Germany’s industry has called for the abolition of feed-in tariffs for new wind and 
solar instal lations, as well as for a ‘strategic reserve’ of fossil fuels in order to 
ensure the base-load supply of reliable gas and coal-fired power stations for the 
stability of the national grid.296 While some reform steps have been made in the right 
direction in 2015, many experts doubt whether they are sufficient for reducing the 
expected cost increases.
Ultimately, the transformation of the entire German energy system has led to two 
parallel existing and operating energy systems: RES and fossil fuel power plants. 
The main lesson is that not just RES, but also the traditional fossil fuel power plant 
sector need to be heavily subsi dized. But subsidizing two parallel energy systems 
is very expensive. Whilst Germany is able and willing to carry these huge costs for 
a temporary period of transition, many other European and other countries are not 
politically willing or are financially able to shoulder these transformation costs.297
In the light of the recent Paris global climate summit and its declared, but unbinding, 
ambi ti ous goals, the question of whether Germany’s ‘Energiewende’ can be a 
blueprint for Kazakh stan and other countries is indeed not so much questioning 
the long-term strategic objective of de car bonizing Europe’s and the world’s energy 
system based primarily on RES in the future. It is rather a question of finding an 
adequate strategy and the right instruments to ba lance the transition without 
overburdening countries and societies with too high costs and, thereby, undermining 
their energy supply security and overall economic competitive ness.
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sunny enough, as a few hours later 
this proportion can drop to only 
20-40%. In early December 2013, 
Germany’s solar and wind power 
production of more than 23,000 wind 
turbines came to an almost complete 
standstill. For a whole week, coal, 
nuclear and gas power plants had 
to generate an estimated 95% of 
Germany’s electricity supply.
• The grid has to maintain voltage 
balances by matching supply and 
demand within about 5% of each 
other or risk electricity blackouts. 
Nevertheless, Germany has far too 
little storage capacity to serve as a 
buffer against the fluctuating supply 
of wind and solar energy. As a result, 
even larger electricity blackouts 
cannot be excluded.
• Germany’s preference for renewables 
and its EEG is ensuring that favour 
is given to green energy to feed in 
ahead of any electricity generated by 
fossil and nuclear fuels. As a con-
sequence, fossil fuel and nuclear 
plants frequently have to shut 
down to avoid overloading the grid, 
which reduces their revenues while 
increasing costs. Utilities are forced 
to shut down even most modern 
fossil plants, as they are unable to 
recover operating costs even though 
these plants are needed to ensure 
the stability of energy generation, the 
grid, and base-load capacity.
• The disregard for the need to expand 
and modernize the grid network by 
focusing just on the expansion of 
heavily subsidized RES-production 
has led to an overproduction of 
RES-based electricity generation 
that cannot be transported to the 
consumers. Thus, German taxpayers 
are paying for heavily subsidized 
electricity generation that cannot be 
supplied to and used by consumers.
• An underlying assumption of the 
German Energiewende of 2011 was 
that it could be implemented without 
taking European and global energy 
developments into account. But 
Germany has increasingly been forced 
to export unplanned electricity loop 
flows to neighbouring countries to 
prevent electricity blackouts, which 
then often destabilizes their own grid 
and electricity supply.
6. New Regional Energy 
Cooperation Perspectives for CACR
      6.1 A New Strategic Axis Between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan?
On 1st May 2015, the EU, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Azerbaijan adopted a joint 
declaration to “welcome the completion of the preliminary environmental study on 
the Trans-Caspian Pipeline”, with the financial support of the European Union and 
the World Bank, which was originally scheduled to be published before the end of 
2015.298 They agreed to establish a joint working group on a TCP project by including 
the deputy energy ministers and foreign ministry experts.299 In the same month, 
Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdy muk ham edov stated at his official visit 
in Austria that the possibility of supplying Turkmen gas supp lies to Europe would be 
seriously considered.300 The EU hopes that it may start receiv ing Turkmen gas by 
2019.301 Reportedly, Berdymukhamedov has also criticized his own indus try for not 
working enough to diversify routes for delivery of natural gas and new gas pipe line 
projects.302 Turkmenistan has also enhanced its bilateral relations with Georgia due 
to its interest in a strategic transit corridor involving TCP.303
The construction of a TCP would allow the EU to expand TANAP and TAP from 
its present ca pa city of 10bcm to 30bcm beyond 2020. The first Azerbaijani gas, 
supplied by its huge Shah Deniz-2 offshore gas field in the Black Sea, is projected 
to flow to European markets by 2019. Theoretically, gas supplies can feed TANAP 
additionally from Ka zakh stan and Uzbekistan via TCP, which would be in the EU’s 
strategic interest in order to diversify its gas imports from CACR.304 But Russia has 
already prevented the option of Kazakhstan exporting oil from its giant Kashagan 
field via a Trans-Caspian oil pipeline to Ba ku, and then using the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey. Russia’s harsh opposition has forced 
Kazakhstan to increase its oil transports via tankers to Baku.305
Discussions of Turkmen gas exports to Europe are not new and had previously been 
under way in context of building the original Nabucco pipeline from Turkey to Europe. 
Despite EU sup port, the gas pipeline project from eastern Turkey to Greece via 
Southeastern Europe to Baum garten (Austria) failed in the summer of 2013. But the 
Ukraine conflict and the potential lifting of Western sanctions on Iran have changed 
the dynamics of the energy (foreign) poli cies on almost all sides, as the distrust 
towards Russia has increased in the EU, as well as in Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey.306 These new dynamics have already changed some of the 
geopolitical patterns and EU-energy foreign policies in CACR:
(1)    At the beginning of 2015, Russia announced to further decrease its gas 
imports from Turkmenistan from 45bcm in 2008 to just 4bcm in 2015.307 Russia 
is dissatisfied with the Turkmen gas price and is currently coping with its own gas 
crisis, having a potential production oversupply of up to 100bcm not finding any 
markets.308 Gazprom’s reduction of gas imports from Turkmenistan has angered the 
government in Ashgabat, which already has to cope with a currency devaluation of 
19 per cent against the US-dollar, as the result of the Ukrainian conflict and Western 
sanctions towards Russia.309 It has criticized Gazprom as an “unreliable partner”, 
as it would violate bilateral agreements at the interstate, intergovernmental and 
interdepartmental level.310 Russia has largely given up importing greater volumes 
of gas from Central Asia, and rather competes with CACR countries in the European 
and Chinese gas markets.311




• 2015:  4bcm
Source: F.Umbach based on various sources.
Turkmenistan’s bilateral relationship with Russia has eroded since 2009 after 
an explosion of its gas pipeline, in the midst of increasing difficulties in bilateral 
negotiati ons over the gas price and capacity volumes of Turkmen gas supplies to 
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Russia. Ash ga bat believed and claimed to have evidence that Russia deliberately 
exploded the pipe line to pressure Turkmenistan. It has also not chosen to join the 
Russia-led CSTO and has only a ‘guest’ status within the SCO.312 With a population 
of 5.2 million, it is much smaller than Kazakhstan (<18 million) and Uzbekistan 
(30 million), but consum ing 36.7 per cent of its gas produced, in comparison to 
Kazakhstan that consumes 24 per cent. Therefore, Turkmenistan needs to balance 
its ‘multivector’ foreign policy by taking Russian countermoves into account.313
(2)    As Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth-largest total proven gas reserves 
with 17.5tcm - 9.3 per cent share of the global gas reserves - and having a small 
population, the ratio of its gas reserves versus production is more than 100 years, 
which is more than the U.S. with 13.4 years and even Russia with 56.4 years.314  
With its Galkynysh gas field, together with its nearby gas field of Yashlar, its 
reserves may even increase up to 26.2tcm. It has already become the largest 
regional gas exporter to China. Turkmenistan plans to enhance its total gas 
production from about 76bcm in 2014 to 230bcm by 2030, and its gas exports to 
180bcm by 2030. Turkmenistan will now start the third phase of development of the 
Galkynysh gas field with an overall production rising to 95bcm in 2016.315 Reportedly, 
Turkmenistan’s President called the TCP project in 2014 the most important tasks 
for the country’s energy diversification.316
(3)    Since the proclamation of the EU’s new energy security strategy in May 2014 
and its increased efforts for gas import diversification, the EU and Turkmenistan 
have restarted and intensified their discussion on Turkmen gas exports to Europe 
by building a TCP between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.317 Gas exports from 
Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field with its 1.2tcm reserves to Turkey already started 
in 2007 through the Baku-Tbilisi-Er zu rum (BTE) gas pipeline (also known as the 
South Caucasus Pipeline/SCP). Turkey is the world’s ninth largest gas importer, 
importing 45bcm in 2014. At the same time, Turkmenistan’s total gas exports have 
grown from 40.1bcm in 2013 to around 46.8bcm in 2014, and are aimed to expand 
further to 48bcm in 2015. Gas from Turkmenistan, Kurdistan and Iran could be 
transported via the TANAP-TAP network, whose capacity can be increased up to 
60bcm with new compressor stations.318
(4)    At the same time, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have intensified 
both their individual bilateral and trilateral energy cooperation (see the following 
figure). They have reopened new perspectives and discussions about building a TCP 
with a capacity of 10-30bcm from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, ahead of the next 
summit between the Caspian heads of states in Astana next year. Even Uzbekistan’s 
President Islam Karimov has discussed with Berdymuk hame dov a ‘Central Asian 
Nabucco pipeline’ construc tion project to circumvent Russia at his trip to Ashgabat 
at the end of October 2014.319
(5)    While Russia seems to have no interest in any short-term solution of the 
status of the Caspian Sea, other regional states have moved ahead in their bilateral 
cooperation. In June 2015, for instance, Kazakhstan ratified an agreement on the 
delineation of the Caspian Sea boundaries between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.321
6.2 Turkmenistan’s Growing Gas Export (Over)Dependence on China
As part of its ‘multivector’ foreign and gas export policy, in 2007 Turkmenistan had 
already signed an agreement with China to supply 30bcm per year via a new gas 
pipeline from its gas fields to China. The pipeline was launched in 2009, but the 
contracted volumes had only reached 25.9bcm in 2014. In 2015, Chinese imports 
of Turkmen gas had grown to 40bcm and a total of Central Asian gas to 55bcm via 
its East-West-pipeline.322 Between 2009 and August 2015, Turk menistan delivered a 
total of 125bcm of natural gas to China.323
This Central Asia-China gas pipeline (via Uzbekistan) has commissioned its third line 
C in 2014 with a length of 1,830km, starting at the Turkmen-Uzbek border, running 
through Kazakh stan and ending in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, 
and connects there with China’s West-East gas pipeline. It will be added by another 
line D from Turk menis tan via Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to China, 
increasing the overall transport capa city to 65bcm by 2020 and 85bcm after 2020.324 
Uzbekistan is expected to deliver 10bcm per year in addition to Turkmenistan’s 
30bcm. The remaining 40bcm per year to China by 2020 will also be supplied by 
Turkmenistan’s new and currently developing giant gas field South Elotan, according 
to a new gas agreement with China signed at the beginning of September 2013325, 
and smaller gas supplies by Kazakhstan.
Figure 20: Turkmenistan’s Gas 
Sector in 2014
• Gas Production: 76bcm (rising to 
85bcm in 2015);
• Gas Consumption: 29.2bcm
• Exports: 46.8bcm (rising up to 48bcm 
in 2015).
Source: F.Umbach based on BP, 
‘Statistical Review of World Energy 
of June 2015 and ‘Milestone Year for 
Turkmen Gas Export to China’, www.
naturalgasasia.com, 10 February 2015.
Figure 21: Bilateral and Trilateral 
Energy Meetings between Turkey, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan 
2014-2015
• April 2014: at a meeting of 
Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly 
Berdymuk hame dov with the head of 
the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan 
(SOCAR), Rovnag Abdullayev, they 
agreed to build transit pipelines for 
diversification of gas supplies in both 
countries.
• July 2014: meeting of the Turkish 
and Turkmen presidents in Ankara 
where they agreed that Turkey would 
deliver Turkmen gas to European 
markets. Both countries rejected 
any objections of Russia and Iran, as 
their joint projects affects only the 
interests of the two littoral states 
and hence can be resolved and 
implemented on a bilateral basis.
• In November 2014: Turkey and 
Turkmenistan signed a bilateral 
‘framework agreement’ for 
diversifying gas exports via TANAP 
and other pipeline projects to world 
markets, but did not disclose the 
terms of their bilateral agreement.
• January 2015: meeting of the 
foreign ministers, when Turkey and 
Azerbaijan invited Turkmenistan to 
join TANAP and made progress to 
resolve their border demarcation 
issues.
• In March 2015: all three countries 
agreed to establish a trilateral 
mechanism on energy issues, and to 
transport Turkmen gas via the TANAP-
TAP projects to Europe.
• September 2015: all three coun tries 
discussed the TCP construction.
Sources: Dr. F.Umbach, based on 
various sources.[320]
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China has financed the huge South Elotan project with direct-credit, and controls 
the field’s develop ment through Chinese subcontractors. This is not really in 
Turkmenistan’s long-term stra tegic interest as it has always sought to main -
tain direct control over its projects. Thus it has continued its strategy of gas 
sales at its Western border for the TCP, but has not directly engaged by building 
a TCP.326 Moreover, Turkmenistan is still a rather diffi cult partner for IOCs. Few 
IOCs are currently operating in Turkmenistan. But while the EU was still dis cus-
sing Turkmen gas supplies via a TCP to Europe, China had already imple ment ed 
gas supply contracts and were building gas pipelines (up to 80bcm beyond 2020) 
from Turk menistan to China. There with, Russia has lost its gas export monopoly in 
Turk menistan and the region. But Turkmenistan does not want to become over-
dependent on China, and, therefore, is interested in further developing its other gas 
export projects – in parti cular TAPI.
6.3 The TAPI-Gas Pipeline Project
When the EU’s Nabucco project and building the TCP failed in 2013, Ashgabat 
intensified another gas export project by diversifying its gas export routes via a 
new pipeline from Turk menis tan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI). But 
this 1,814 km long gas pipeline with an annual capacity of 33bcm, first conceived 
in the 1990s, is facing a big challenge with its trans fer route of 1,735 km via very 
politically unstable countries such as Afghanistan (735km) and Pakistan (800km). 
Its original time schedule for the construction starting this year has already become 
questionable. But the political will on all sides to imple ment the gas project has 
grown during the last few years.327
A meeting on March 15th in Kabul of TAPI’s steering committee finally achieved a 
break through regarding financing the US$10bn Central Asia-South Asia gas pipeline, 
due to the Turk men government’s new determination to diversify the markets of its 
natural gas supp lies. For the first time, Turkmenistan has offered the international 
oil company Total – to gether with its state-owned company TurkmenGaz - a 
sufficient profit share as a consor tium leader for the pipeline construction 
(potentially also with Russia’s Rostec and China’s CNPC), whilst Ashgabat will retain 
legal ownership of the land.328 But TurkmenGaz as the consortium leader would 
have a majority stake with 51 per cent, whereas India’s GAIL-company would not 
receive more than 10 percent equity in TAPI.329 For the time being, Turk meni stan 
has agreed to contribute 85 per cent of the US$10bn pipeline costs, Pakistan and 
India each 5 per cent (2 x US$500m) and Afghanistan 3 per cent (US$300m). The 
rest will be covered by the ADB. The presently established consortium of Turk men -
Gaz, Afghan Gas Transit, Pakistani Inter State Gas Systems and Indian GAIL needs 
only to raise about 30 per cent of the US$10bn pipeline investment to begin TAPI’s 
construction.330
While many Indian and international energy experts are still skeptical about TAPI’s 
chances for realization331, Indian experts consider TAPI a major confidence building 
measure, not just with Turkmenistan, but also with its rival Pakistan. It is also 
expected that Japanese com panies will become involved332, albeit dependent on 
whether Turkmenistan will ease its in vest ment rules and being able to develop a 
credible legal institutional and organi za tional in fra structural framework for the 
pipeline project.333 In the past, Ashgabat refused to sign any pro duc tion-shar ing 
agreements with foreign companies for its major onshore gas fields, and instead 
has only offered service contracts. Meanwhile last November, Dragon Oil - a Dubai-
based oil and gas com pany and the sole operator of two Caspian offshore oil and gas 
fields in Turkmenistan - has almost finalized its investment in the TAPI project.334 
This highlights the fact that Turkmenis tan has offered more attractive investment 
conditions335, which may pave the way for other international investors in TAPI and 
other Turkmen gas projects.336 Given the declared interest to involve Turkmenistan 
in the TANAP-project, a Turkish par tici pa tion and investment in TAPI has already 
been discussed. In the view of Turkish experts, it would allow Turkey to increase its 
influence in Central Asia, as well as to strengthen its position in the regional energy 
sector.337
On December 12th-13th, the groundbreaking ceremony for building the 1,800 km 
TAPI pipe line finally took place with all four countries being involved, including 
India. All sides have pro mised and shown some confidence that the looming security 
challenges can be solved and overcome.338 But despite India’s increasing energy 
demand and strategic interest to balance China’s growing geopolitical influence in 
CACR, Turkmen gas will be unlikely to reach India before 2020.339
47 | KAZAKHSTAN ENERGY STUDY
6.4 Will TCP and Turkmen Gas Supplies to Europe Become Reality?
In addition to its mega gas fields on land, Turkmenistan also has in the nation’s 
Caspian Sea shelf more than 6tcm of gas and 12bn tonnes of oil.340 By 2030, 
Turkmenistan plans to increase its natural gas production to 230bcm, and 
gas exports up to 180bcm per year.341 For Turkmenistan, finding a solution for 
transporting its gas to Europe has become more urgent, as it has completed its 
own domestic US$2bn East-West Gas pipeline (EWP) to ship gas from its giant 
fields to the Caspian Sea by the end of 2015. It connects its big gas fields and gas 
compressor stations ‘Shatlik’ in its Mariysk region in the East with ‘Belek’ in its 
Western Balkan province and the Caspian Sea coast.342 Turkmenistan started to 
build its 773km gas pipeline with a capacity of 30bcm in 2010 with the EU promise to 
build its Nabucco gas pipeline and the TCP.343
Despite the interests of the EU, Turkey and Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan’s declared 
support of the TCP appear ed more uncertain till 2014. Azerbaijan had discovered 
new gas fields in ad di tion to Shah-Deniz 2 as the main gas source for feeding the 
TANAP-TAP pipelines with an nual supplies of 16bcm by 2019. Turkey has contracted 
a supply of 6bcm, and the other 10bcm of Azerbaijan’s gas will be transported to 
Europe. But given the huge invest ments of TANAP and TAP, the hitherto contracted 
16bcm might not be sufficient to cover the total in vest ments. Thus Baku has a 
strategic interest to increase its gas supplies to Europe and Turkey to at least 30bcm 
by providing another 14-16bcm after 2020 from its new gas fields.
Azerbaijan’s position towards TCP depends very much on the availability of 
future export routes for its increasing gas production. Given its own financial 
commitments to TANAP, with its overall costs of more than US$20bn, it will certainly 
not be the locomotive for building the TCP with its estimated costs of more than 
€2bn. However, Azerbaijan is interested and de pend ent on enhancing its regional 
cooperation with Turkey and Turkmenistan for its overall national security, as all 
three countries have become more suspicious of Russia’s regio nal foreign and 
energy policies. At the same time, Azerbaijan fears that Russia can always fuel 
the ‘frozen conflict’ of Nagorny-Karabakh and other latent instabilities around its 
country.
The prospect for additional Azerbaijani or Turkmen gas supplies to Europe is also 
complicat ed by the fact that European gas consumption has continuously declined 
since 2010. While Europe’s own gas production in the North Sea is decreasing and is 
presently facing addi ti onal problems with gas production in its Groningen field in the 
Netherlands, it does not neces sarily mean that Europe’s gas imports will definitely 
increase. As new forecasts by the EU and others suggest as the result of the 
expansion of RES and agreed energy efficiency measures, Europe’s imports by 2030 
and beyond could be even lower than those of 2010.344
Furthermore, in contrast to the 2009 gas crisis, Europe has many more alternatives 
for pipe line gas and LNG imports, such as from Israel, U.S., Africa, and by exploring 
its own conven tio nal and unconventional gas resources, including in the Black Sea 
offshore areas (Roma nia, Bulgaria), and in the Adriatic Sea (Croatia, Greece). In 
addition, Russia has not given up its plan (despite the present shelving of the project 
due to the Russian-Turkish diplomatic crisis) to build the Turkish Stream gas pipeline 
to Turkey and Europe with a capacity of up to 63bcm. Russia also announced last 
summer to build two additional strings of Nord Stream with an added capacity of 
55bcm, despite the fact that it only uses its existing Nord Stream capacity to just 
56 per cent. In 2014, its pipeline gas exports to the EU-28 fell by more than 11 per 
cent from 2013 to just 119bcm. It reflects, like Lithuania’s opening of a floating LNG 
terminal in January 2015, Gazprom’s declining ability to leverage its gas supplies as 
a strategic instrument of Russia’s foreign policy.
But the real challenge for building a 300km TCP under the Caspian Sea, also 
supported by the U.S., are the opposing strategic interests of Russia and Iran, which 
have no interest in finding a compromise for the unresolved status of the Caspian 
Sea. Russia in particular has a strong interest in preventing Turkmenistan exporting 
gas to Europe, as it would be another economic competitor and would undermine 
Russia’s geopolitical influence in Europe. Hardly surprising, Russia has become 
increasingly concerned about the increasing cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan, as well as of the EU’s renewed interest to push the TCP project 
bilaterally with Turkmenistan.345
Russia has always been a strategic interest in the control and resale of Turkmen 
Figure 22: Azerbaijan’s Gas 
Reserves of Its New Gas Fields
Source: Dr. F.Umbach based on IHS 
CERA 2013 and other sources.
Azerbaijan Gas Reserves for Potential Exports
Name Gas Reserves (in bcm)
Condensate 
(mt)
Shafag - Asiman 500 bcm 65 mt
Absheron 350 bcm 45 mt (of oil)
Nakhichevan 300 bcm 38 mt
Umid 200 bcm 40 mt
Babek 400 bcm 80 mt
Azeri - Chi-
rag - Guneshli 







Total >1.75 tcm 268 mt
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Figure 23: EU Energy and Gas 
Consumption in 2014
EU-Energy and Gas Consumption 
in 2014:
• Total energy consumption: -3.9% 
from 2013;
• Gas consumption: -11.6% (biggest 
annual decline on record) from 
2013;
• Gas Production: -9.8% from 2013;
• Net Gas imports: -8% from 2013;
• Russian gas pipeline exports to 
EU-28: -11.6% from 2013.
Source: Dr. F.Umbach based on 
various sources.
gas. During the last decade, Russia has lost more influence as its gas imports from 
Turkmeni stan de clined dramatically and its wider ability to leverage its pipeline 
diplomacy as an instru ment of its foreign policy increasingly diminished.346 Hence, it 
is insisting that any decision can only be made by the consensus of all five Caspian 
littoral states. Therefore Russia has strongly pro tested against any ‘EU intervention’ 
in TCP discussions and that such issues should be resolved between the coastal 
nations rather than in Brussels.347 At the last summit of all five Caspian countries in 
the autumn of 2014, despite finding bilateral solutions on Caspian Sea conflicts, no 
multilateral compromise involving all littoral states could be achieved.348
Figure 24: Trans-Caspian Pipeline Route from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan
Source: www.interfaxenergy.com
Both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have become increasingly interested to involve 
the EU and the US in the implementation of their energy projects, as they are based 
on common interests.349 This is even important as Russia’s stated pre-condition to 
resolve the status of the Caspian has neither constrained its own pipeline projects 
in the region, nor Russia’s increased militarization of the Caspian Sea.350 But the 
Kremlin needs to balance its open opposition and assertive foreign policies in CACR 
with its other pipeline projects (i.e. Turkish Stream) and its overall relationship with 
Turkey, Kazakhstan and other regional countries.351
Turkmenistan has still not explicitly declared whether the agreed trilateral energy 
cooperation will lead to the construction of the TCP. But it has changed significantly 
some of the main parameters of its gas policies by overtaking financial obligations 
and risks, becoming the consortium leader of the entire TAPI project, and has 
undertaken responsibilities not just for building the pipeline sections on its own 
territory, but also beyond its borders. However, it is still uncertain whether 
international companies are willing to take larger financial risks in building a TCP 
and other larger mega projects in the wake of the present gas oversupply and 
declining gas prices on the world markets. While the EU is willing to promote 
the TCP, it remains unclear whether it will create an international consortium 
consisting of leading European companies, and directly support the financing as 
well as control the implementation process of the TCP project. Moreover, both the 
EU and Turkmenistan have not answered the strategic question of whether they 
will shoulder the risks and related security obligations for building a TCP against 
Russia’s will in the midst of the Ukraine conflict. As long as these questions remain 
unanswered, a TCP appears rather unrealistic until 2019. But a much smaller pipeline 
connection to Azerbaijan might be possible between an offshore Turk men gas field 
in the Caspian Sea, developed by the Malaysian company Petronas. It has extracted 
10bcm from its field much closer to Baku, but has presently no option to ship and 
sell it.352
6.5 Turkmen Gas Exports via Iran to Europe
Turkmenistan is not solely dependent on Azerbaijan in regard to its potential gas 
exports to Europe. It theoretically can also export its gas to Europe via Iran as an 
alternative gas transit route to Europe.353 In the past, Iran has also expressed its 
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own interest to act as a transit state or regional gas hub for Turk meni stan. Although 
Iran has the world’s largest proven gas reserves, it has been a net importer of gas 
since 1997. Turkmenistan has become an impor tant gas supplier for Iran. In 2012, 
Turkmenistan ex port ed 9bcm to Iran, but this declined to 6.5bcm in 2014. But 
during the last few years, Iran had problems paying for its Turkmen gas im ports 
and, therefore, has favored barter deals by exchanging Turkmen gas for Iranian 
manu facturing goods. That however, is not in Turkmenistan’s long-term strategic 
interest.
Any larger Turkmen gas exports via Iran to Turkey and Europe faces three problems: 
(1) Turk menistan’s pipeline network with its present spare capacity of 10bcm is 
mostly discon nect ed from Iran’s central gas transportation trunk-lines.354 It severely 
limits Turkmeni stan’s abi lity to expand its gas exports to Iran, and to use Iran 
as a transit state for its potential gas ex ports to Europe. (2) With the prospect of 
lifting Western sanctions, Iran wants to expand its own gas production rapidly, 
and is looking for new export options for its own gas reserves via new pipelines to 
neighboring countries, and LNG-exports to more distant markets before lending 
assistance to Turkmenistan. But given the need for huge foreign investments in its 
oil and gas sectors, Iran may only be able to become a larger gas exporter after 
2020. (3) Iran recently declared it would not export gas via pipelines to Turkey due 
to commercial dis agree ments between both sides.355
However, at the beginning of June 2015, Iran proposed to Turkmenistan a gas-for-
food deal totaling US$30bn. Iran would import US$2-3bn of Turkmen gas annually as 
part of a ten year contract with Ashgabat, and to export US$2-3bn of Iranian goods, 
tech nologies and services per year.356 While that deal could open new perspec-
tives for Turkmen gas supplies to Eu rope, the alternative Iranian transport route for 
larger Turkmen exports also appears rather un like ly in the short-term. But without 
a much wanted Euro pean export route for its gas supplies, Turkmenistan will remain 
dependent on China. Due to this, TAPI has become an even more geopolitically 
important project for Ashgabat’s gas export diversification policies.
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7. Kazakhstan’s Energy Policies 
and Strategic Perspectives for an 
Enhanced EU-Kazakhstan Energy 
Cooperation
“The lack of well-developed institutions, frequent changes to the structure of 
government and ministerial appointments and the lack of a clear decision-making 
and accountability within government provide ample opportunity for frustration and 
delay in obtaining regulatory consents for activities covered by existing contracts. 
This problem is more apparent in Kazakhstan on account of its more decentralized 
political structures.”357
The EU has defined the energy cooperation in its overall relationship with Central 
Asia as one of the most important cooperative relationships for both sides, because: 
(1)    The EU has a strategic interest in diversi fy ing its future oil and gas imports, 
including from CACR;
(2)    Energy is a crucial area of eco no mic growth for CACR countries;
(3)    The EU can support the regional development of a sustain able energy policy, 
which also relies more on energy efficiency, conser va tion, and the expansion of 
renewables in changing and enhancing the demand side manage ment;
(4)    EU assistance for a convergence of energy markets, governance, regulatory 
frame works and stand ards will benefit Kazakhstan;
(5)    The EU can facilitate investments, modernization and technology trans fers 
to CACR. But despite this common strategic interest to enhance the mutual energy 
coope ra ti on, it did not play a major role in the concrete cooperation programmes.358
Even so, both sides co ope rate in INOGATE programmes such as the Covenant of 
Mayors, in which eight Kazakh cites are com mitted to reduce their CO2-emissions, 
and the EU provides technology transfers to increase energy effi cien cy, and offers 
best practices in managing as well as transforming Kazakhstan’s energy system.359
Only recently have both sides expressed their interest to strengthen their 
cooperation in the field of energy efficiency and RES, as Kazakhstan’s new energy 
policy is paying much more attention to a diversification of the energy mix and a 
modernization of its energy system for a sustainable green transformation. It is 
also constructing a unified energy system across its three times zones to fully meet 
the country’s electricity demand in order to become less dependent on Russia. As a 
legacy of the Soviet Union central planning system, Russia still supplies Kazakhstan 
with electricity and is a major source of imports of finished petroleum products and 
raw materials, accounting for 40 per cent of Kazakhstan’s total needs.360
7.1 Kazakhstan’s Fossil Fuel Sector in Crisis
Around 25 per cent of Kazakhstan’s coal production is exported - mostly to Russia. 
Kazakh stan is a net-exporter of coal, natural gas, oil and electricity. Its primary 
domestic energy con sump tion still depends heavily on coal. Although it is the 
world’s twelfth largest coal producer, it is a relatively small contributor to global 
coal volumes. In January 2013, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian country 
to establish an economy-wide carbon emission sys tem to curb GHGE in its coal, oil 
and gas extraction sectors, alongside its ‘Energy Efficiency 2020 Programme’. Its 
heavy dependence on coal also explains why Kazakhstan is interested in Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS) projects, which are a key technology for the future 
worldwide decarbonization efforts.361 As its coal resources have predominantly a 
high ash share, and most of its thermal power plants are still not refitted with sulfur 
and nitrogen oxide flue gas scrubbers, Kazakhstan needs to enhance the energy 
efficiency of its coal plants, and to modernize them by refitting them with clean 
coal technologies to curb GHGE and air polluting emissions. Thus CCS and other 
clean coal technologies could be another important topic for the bilateral EU-Kazakh 
energy cooperation agenda, but it is presently hampered by a lack of progress on 
CCS projects on the European side.362
Kazak hstan produced 1.7mb/d of oil and 19.3bcm of conventional gas in 2014.363 Its 
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oil pro duc tion has increased by 24 per cent since 2005.364 Almost 40 percent of its 
oil and gas pro duc tion comes from just two large fields in Tengiz and Karachaganak. 
Both were launched by major Western energy companies during the last two 
decades. Its third large field of Kasha gan has not developed as scheduled due 
to rising costs (by exploding from US$10bn to US$46bn, and could even exceed 
US$60bn) and conflicts between its consortium mem bers.365 But its forecasted oil 
production based on its new mega-fields would allow Kazakh stan to export 80-
100mt of oil annually over the next 40-50 years.366 Since the international oil prices 
declined, oil exports to Europe (i.e. Italy) have increased. Kazakh’s oil exports to 
Italy are still three times greater than those piped to China.367
A major reform in its oil sector is directed to create more effective state regulation 
of the oil refining industry and the petroleum market in Kazakhstan. It is aimed to 
make them more com petitive towards its Russian rivals as the present vulnerabilities 
of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industries as well as dependence on Russia may 
undermine its future energy security.368
As a land-locked, but littoral Caspian Sea country, it has - like other CACR countries 
– no access to open oceans and many foreign markets. It is still dependent on old 
Soviet oil and gas pipelines, controlled by Russia beyond its borders, despite the fact 
it could have consider ably expanded its oil production and exports since the 1990s. 
More than 75 per cent of its crude ex ports are trans ported to Europe and around 16 
per cent to China via the Atyrau-Alashan kou oil pipe line to Xinjiang. In late 2013, 
Kazakhstan has increased its diver sification of oil exports via tankers through the 
Caspian Sea, amounting to 4mt, of which 3mt are transported from the Kazakh 
port of Aqtau to the Azerbaijani port of Baku, and then piped via the BTC-pipeline 
to Turkey. Another 1mt of oil is being transported by railway to the Geor gian Lulevi 
terminal on the Black Sea. Both oil produc tion and exports will increase in the near 
future when oil production begins at Kashagan, and then later at Tengiz and Karach-
aganak.369
Figure 26: Kazakhstan’s Major Energy Projects and its Consortium Members
Source: Strafor.com (Courtesy of Stratfor).
Despite having some 1.5tcm of proven gas reserves at the end of 2014, its gas 
consumption of around 5.6bcm in 2014 has remained rather low. It is the result of a 
lack of expensive gas infrastructure, as its gas fields in the country’s western region 
are too far away to connect them to the widely dispersed population and its main 
consumption centres in the south of Kazakhstan. Gas has mostly been produced 
as associated gas to its oil production, and is then used for re-injection in order to 
boost its oil production.
Figure 25: Primary Energy 
Consumption of Kazakhstan in 2012
Kazakhstan’s energy consumption by 
fuel, 2012
Source: Dr. F.Umbach based on 
Energy Information Administration 
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Figure 27: Kazakhstan’s Gas Production and Consumption 2003-2012
billion cubic feet








Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Washington D.C. 2015 (https://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Kazakhstan/
kazakhstan.pdf).
But since 2007, Kazakhstan has increasingly exported natural gas. Its imports have 
de creas ed by almost 50 per cent between 2002 and 2012. In 2013, it had supplied 
net exports of 10.2bcm.370 After ending its gas re-injection, Astana might be able to 
increase its gas ex ports to 30-40bcm by 2030.371 Ukraine has also negotiated with 
Astana about future Ka zakh gas ex ports. But it is not possible without agreement 
from Russia, which is unwilling to do so be cause of its aggressive Ukraine policies. 
Russia still retains a 50 per cent stake in the Tsen tral noye and Imashevskoye gas 
fields. Kazakhstan’s gas is also still processed at Gaz prom’s Orenburg plant in 
Russia before it is sent back for Kazakhstan’s domestic con sump tion.
Kazakhstan is also very much interested in exploring its shale gas reserves. It is 
currently undertaking geological analyses to determine the potential resources.372 
Furthermore, it is expanding its domestic gas pipeline network to increase the share 
of its population having access to gas in their homes from 42 per cent in 2014 to 56 
per cent by 2030.373
Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel sector and its energy revenues still generate 40 per cent of 
the govern ment’s annual budget. Its remarkable GDP growth of 6 per cent annually 
since 2000 (with the exception of the years 2008-2009) is directly linked with its 
oil exports and high glo bal oil prices. But since the two years following the oil price 
fall, Kazakhstan’s fossil fuel sec tor and its entire economy is increasingly suffering. 
It is confronted with the new situation wherein profits have declined by about 75 
per cent, whereas expenses are rising. Many old Soviet-era oil fields are reportedly 
only profitable with international oil prices above US$60 per barrel.374 In this light, 
Kazakhstan’s GDP growth has just grown by less than 1 per cent in 2014. As the oil 
sector is more capital than labour intensive, Kazakhstan’s unemployment rate and 
poverty could increase again and has already caused social unrest.375
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www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Kazakhstan/
kazakhstan.pdf).
For 2016, the government hopes that some GDP growth of 2 per cent can be 
achieved if the international oil prices remain at about US$40 per barrel, and if 
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hardly benefit by making any profits from their investments in the years to come, 
Kazakhstan’s government might already be able to make billions in taxes and other 
financial obligations each year. It also hopes to expand the oil production of its 
Tengiz field to feed the oil pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consor tium, which will 
have doubled its capacity to 1.4mb/d in the next year. Moreover, Astana hopes to 
launch its Eurasia Project with Russia, which involves shar ing tech no lo gy to drill 
deeper into its aging Soviet-era fields, which may double Kazakh stan’s drilling 
capabilities.376
Figure 29: Kazakhstan’s Gas Imports and Exports as well as Liquid 
Production
Source: www.interfaxenergy.com
7.2 Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Sector: Increasing Sino-Russian Competition
Although Kazakhstan has the world’s second largest uranium reserves after 
Australia, with around 1.5mt (or nearly 15% of the explored global reserves), and is 
globally the largest uranium producer since 2009 with around 22,500t in 2013 (38% 
of global production), it had only one nuclear reactor, which it decommissioned in 
2001. Hence all produced uranium goes to exports. But Kazakhstan still has plans to 
build two new 1,500MW nuclear power plants in southeast Kazakhstan, and another 
one in Kurchatov in the East Ka zakh stan Pro vince (northeast of the country). An 
intergovernmental agreement was signed in September 2014. The Balkash-project 
with a modern reactor design is under review by the U.S. com pany Westinghouse. 
Both projects largely depend on Kazakh stan’s electricity demand rise, but the final 
decision has repeatedly been postponed.377
At present, both Russia and China have increased their nuclear cooperation with 
Kazakh stan, and seek to raise their share and influence in uranium mining and 
the building of two nuc lear power stations in Kazakhstan. It has become the most 
heated conflict of competing stra tegic interests between Russia and China, both 
in their bilateral relations with Kazakh stan, as well as in their wider CACR regional 
energy foreign policies.378
In August 2015, Kazakhstan and the IAEA signed an agreement to create the first 
worldwide low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel bank in Kazakhstan to make highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) available to fuel nuclear power plants. Countries being 
interested in supplying uranium to other countries for the peaceful use of nuclear 
power have now an opportunity to supply uranium to this bank under the auspices 
of the IAEA to prevent any military use of HEU of potential user countries. Those 
interested countries do not have to create costly and inter na tionally de stabilizing 
enrichment programs by themselves. At present, 66 new worldwide nuclear power 
plants are under construction, 186 are newly planned and another 322 nuclear 
power stations have been proposed.379
7.3 On the Way to a Sustainable Green Energy Future?
The IEA has also recently highlighted the long-term benefits if the CACR countries 
would trans form their energy systems to a non-fossil fuel future. Kazakhstan itself 
has already re cog nized the need and aims for a 50 per cent renew able energy 
supply by 2050.380 But like in other countries, those efforts and large-scale growth of 
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existing energy infra struc ture, and a lack of political and public awareness of the 
long-term benefits of increas ing decarboni za tion.381
In its ‘Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy’, aimed at catapulting the country into the ranks of 
the world’s 30 most developed countries by 2050, Astana has recognized the need 
for moderni za tion and fundamental reforms.382 It has huge opportunities for the 
development of RES such as wind, solar and hydropower.383 At present, hydropower 
accounts for around 13 per cent of Kazakhstan’s electricity generation. In May 
2013, a ‘Concept for Transition of Ka zakh stan to a Green Economy’ was adopted. 
Its primary goal is that the expansion of RES shall cover 50 per cent of its overall 
energy consumption by 2050, and to reduce the energy in tensity of its economy.384 
Its ‘Law on Supporting the Use of Renewable Energy Sources’ was approved in the 
same year, which envisages establishing feed-in tariffs for wind and solar energy. It 
went into force in 2014 and provides alongside another law, a comprehensive legal, 
regulatory, and institutional framework for energy efficiency measures. According 
to these plans, Kazakhstan intends to expand the share of RES in its electricity 
generation from 3 per cent in 2020, to 10 per cent in 2030 and to 50 per cent by 
2050.
In this context, Kazakhstan is the preferred moderni za tion leader in CACR for 
the EU. Astana’s RES-Action Plan has proposed 31 RES projects with a ca pacity 
of 1,040MW, in clud ing a wind farm of 13-793W capacity, solar photovoltaic (PV) 
installations of 77MW and a 170MW hydropower plant.385 The first wind plant has 
been built in the Yerementau region.386 Kazakhstan has also initiated the ‘Green 
Bridges Partnership Programme’, which aims to im prove access to green technology 
and investment, as well as to transfer best practices of manage ment experiences to 
interested countries and organizations in the region. As it will host the world Expo 
2017 under the title ‘Future Energy’, it will offer another possibility for closer energy 
cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU.
Figure 30: Renewable Energy as a Percentage of Total Primary Energy 























































 Hydro  Biofuels and waste  Solar*  Geothermal*  Wind*
*Negligible
Source: © OECD/IEA (2015), ‘Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia‘, Energy 
Policies Beyond IEA Countries, Paris: IEA Publishing. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c/
termsandconditions/.
By adopting more far-reaching reforms (including new privatization efforts387), it 
has formulated – in contrast to many other regional CACR-countries – ambitious 
mid- and long-term goals and energy strategies. In this context, Kazakhstan 
offers the EU the best prospects for an enhanced energy partnership, which can 
support Kazakhstan’s efforts for a sustain able transformation of its energy system. 
It can also help to stabilize the regional energy relationships, and even offer 
more prospects for regional integration and cooperation by sharing its own EU 
experiences, and lessons learned since the creation of a common integrated energy 
and climate policy in 2007 and the German ‘Energiewende’ of 2011.
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8. Summary and Strategic 
Perspectives
By adopting a new Central Asia strategy in June 2007, the EU has intensified its 
energy and wider political-economic cooperation with CACR. But the EU has to 
compete in particular with Russia and China for the region’s energy resources, 
raw materials and geopolitical in fluence. While Azerbaijan has become the most 
important gas partner of the EU in the Cas pian region, Kazakhstan is the most 
important energy partner (i.e. oil supplier) in Central Asia: it is already the third-
largest non-OPEC-supplier of energy to the EU (behind Russia and Norway). Three-
quarters of its oil exports are currently supplied to the EU-28. In the years ahead, 
Kazakhstan may even become the second largest non-OPEC supplier to global oil 
markets by 2020. Its well-balanced, multi-vector foreign policy has strengthened 
its role in CACR, as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Asia as well as beyond. For the 
EU, as well as for Russia and China, Kazakhstan’s regional economic and strategic 
importance has grown beyond its geographic location, as its GDP exceeds those of 
the other four Central Asian states combined and its business environment is the 
most attractive in the region.
As the EU has become Kazakhstan’s most important trading partner, both sides 
have ini tia ted a new ‘Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ in January 
2015. But the ‘ener gy field’ has not explicitly been defined as one of the ‘main areas 
of cooperation’, albeit As tana has explicitly expressed its interest and intention to 
deepen its energy relationship with Europe. For Kazakhstan, its energy cooperation 
and ‘modernisation partnership’ with the EU becomes even more important in the 
near and mid-term future, as it seeks to diversify its oil and gas exports, as well as 
its energy mix, by expanding the share of RES up to 50 per cent by 2050.
During the last decade, Kazakhstan has made progress by developing a relatively 
strong and robust energy security and energy equity ranking compared with many 
other countries in the world. It has reduced transmission and distribution losses, 
enhanced energy efficiency in the power sector, reduced energy and emission 
intensity, and diversified its electricity generation portfolio away from fossil fuels 
to include more hydropower and RES, which also decreased CO2-emissions. Its 
inclusion of RES in the electricity generation may have reached 1bn kWh in 2014 
– almost three times 2009 levels. But Kazakhstan performs rather poorly on 
environ men tal sustainability compared with many other countries. It also needs 
to introduce cutting-edge technologies to enhance domestic supply security and 
a modern grid system that would en able electricity exports to the markets of its 
neighbouring countries. While Kazakhstan en joyed robust macroeconomic stability 
until 2014, it lost 21 positions in the last international ‘2015 Energy Trilemma Index’ 
of the World Energy Council, falling from the rank 56 to 77, due to many determining 
conditions of its traditional political, societal and economic strength, which have all 
declined across the board.388
For Kazakhstan, Europe also constitutes an interesting and viable alternative to its 
eastward looking energy policy of the last few years, despite the growing energy 
demand in China and Beijing’s pressure for more intense energy cooperation with 
Astana. Kazakhstan seeks to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, and does 
not want to become over-dependent on China. During the last decade, the regional 
states of CACR have not only widened and deepen ed their energy ties to Russia 
and the EU, but have also diversified their energy ex ports as well as energy foreign 
policies to China and other energy partners. At the same time, CACR itself has 
become increasingly fractured, as the regional states have developed their natio nal 
energy, econo mic and foreign policies with contrasting and often competing stra-
tegic per spec tives.
Given its geographical location in the heart of Central Asia and entire Eurasia, 
Kazakhstan will also play a fundamental role in new transcontinental transport 
routes such as the ‘Wes tern-Europe-Western China Transport Corridor’, which will 
cut delivery time by half compared with seaborne transport, and the EU’s Transport 
Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia. It could also become one of the most 
important partners for critical raw material supply, which will become an ever more 
important political issue on the EU’s security of supply agenda, by expanding RES 
and new storage options for electricity - which all need critical raw materials, such 
as rare earths, lithium, platinum and others.
KAZAKHSTAN ENERGY STUDY | 56
The Ukraine conflict has intensified discussions on new supply options of EU energy 
import diversification. Theoretically Kazakhstan can also be connected to the EU’s 
Southern Gas Corridor, but a TCP appears only realistic with the agreement of 
Russia – a project the EU, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan want to implement 
by 2019, but which Russia strongly opposes for both commercial and geopolitical 
reasons.
This highlights the geopolitical fact that any enhanced energy partnership between 
the EU and Kazakhstan is not only dependent on the political will and strategic 
vision on both sides, but also on third parties such as Russia and China. Recently, 
however, both Russia and China’s energy foreign policies in CACR have become 
more assertive. On Russia’s side in particular, these policies are not really proof 
of its great power status and geopolitical in fluence, but rather the opposite: since 
the 1990s, its geo-economic and geopolitical influence has deteriorated, as Russian 
foreign, security and energy experts have often confirmed. Although they have 
perceived the EU’s Central Asia strategy from its beginnings in 2007 as a potential 
threat in its ‘zero-sum-thinking’, it was China who broke Russia’s oil and gas export 
monopoly in Central Asia (i.e. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). China much more 
than the EU or the U.S. is challenging Russia’s traditional influence and energy 
interests in CACR.
Against this rapidly changing energy foreign policy environment in CACR, an 
enhanced ener gy relationship between the EU and Kazakhstan needs to take into 
account the potential im pacts and implications of their energy foreign policies on 
their relevant security strategies in the region. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, for 
instance, have rejected the objections of Russia and Iran against a TCP by pointing 
out that the project affects the interests of only two littoral states, and hence can 
be implemented on a bilateral basis. The EU does not consider the ab sence of a 
decision on the status of the Caspian Sea an obstacle to the implementation of the 
project. But if the EU and regional states in CACR want to go ahead by building a 
TCP, they must address the hard security consequences they may come up against 
with the build ing of the TCP. Otherwise, the EU has to take into account the advice 
of the former director of Azerbaijan’s Center for Strategic Studies (SAM), Elkhan 
Nuriyev, who stated in September 2015:
‘The EU must be realistic about its energy interests and capabilities in the Caspian 
basin. The EU has thus far declined to be a relevant security actor in this region, 
since Brussels is not able to engage in hard security approaches and to compete 
with Moscow and Beijing in geopolitical terms on energy matters. And yet, the EU 
needs to formulate an integrated energy policy on the basis of a new comprehensive 
strategic vision. New EU initiatives need bilateral and trilateral tracks. The EU 
should support the integration of partner countries in a common energy networks 
governed by EU rules. Furthermore, creating a kind of new format of multilateral 
dialogue between the EU and the five Caspian littoral states … would probably make 
it possible to remove current differences on important strategic issues in relation to 
future gas exports onto the European market. The establishment of an EU-Caspian 
multilateral structure, in which Russia’s participation is vital, could be a starting 
point for decreasing competition over energy resources in the wider Black Sea-
Caspian basin.’389
An increased EU gas diversification with CACR supplies and an enhanced EU energy 
coope ra tion, which could even include future Kazakh gas supplies to Europe, might 
be more com pli cated given Russia’s commercial and geopolitical objections. Instead, 
Kazakhstan’s ‘green energy concept’ for the expansion of RES and increasing energy 
efficiency appears less chal leng ing for Russia and offers new opportunities for the 
EU to engage in CACR, and to sup port Kazakhstan’s energy transformation for a 
sustainable future. In this regard, Kazakh stan may also benefit by sharing the EU’s 
and Germany’s positive yet painful experiences and lessons, with their ambivalent 
decarbonization and transformation strate gies. Germany is facing particular 
challenges as the result of the German ‘Energie wen de’. The ‘Energie wende’ finds 
itself at a crossroad: its inefficiently organized and mismanaged energy market as 
well as incoherent and imbalanced Energiewende strategy have caused spiraling 
costs for both private consumers and the industry. It is threatening its future 
national competitiveness on the global markets and puts the economy at increasing 
risk. Its over-subsidized expansion of RES have turned electricity prices - being 
among the highest in Europe - into a rising political problem and economic liability. 
Kazakhstan and many other countries will only be able to afford and be politically 
willing to implement those transformation strategies and find a sustainable path 
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to a green energy future, if they are willing to learn from European ex perien-
ces. Simultaneously, the EU must be really willing to discuss both the positive 
and rather negative lessons and failures by sharing their experiences of their own 
transformation strategies with their energy partners.
Initially, it appears that the EU’s energy partnership by focusing on expanding RES, 
enhancing energy efficiency and conservation, and supporting the decarbonization 
of Kazakhstan to a sustainable new ‘green energy system’, would be much less 
problematic for Russia - compared with energy cooperation on future gas supplies 
from CACR. However, those European and German views overlook the most recent 
experiences of Russia and Gazprom with the shrinking European gas market and 
the German ‘Energie wende’: by diversifying the energy mix away from fossil-fuels, 
enhancing energy efficiency and reducing the overall energy consumption, all the 
previous forecasts of the European gas market in regard to its overall consumption 
and imports have proved wrong and too optimistic. Instead, the European energy 
and gas consumption has dramatically fallen, and the competition on the largest 
gas market in the world has significantly increased. This has led to a gas glut and 
considerable price declines, alongside manifold new dynamics resulting from the 
U.S. shale gas and shale oil revolution. Thus, even in the short-term, an enhanced 
EU energy cooperation focusing on RES with Kazakhstan and other CACR countries 
is really not in Russia’s strategic and geopolitical interest because: (1) it would free 
more gas resources in the CACR countries for exports on the shrinking or stagnating 
European and Asian (i.e. Chinese) gas markets, particularly at a time when oil prices 
have fallen up to 60 per cent between the summer 2014 and 2015; and (2) it would 
further decrease the energy dependence of CACR countries on Russia, and hinder its 
own energy cooperation with the Eurasian region.
But ultimately, the EU cannot avoid neither to clearly define its strategic and 
geopolitical interests, as well as needed instruments in CACR, nor to address the 
hard security questions with all relevant actors, including Russia and China.
This is even more true when the enduring dilemma for the EU, Kazakhstan and 
other CACR countries is considered: EU energy cooperation with Kazakhstan and 
other CACR coun tries is and will remain on both sides largely the result of their own 
ambivalent and con tra dictory energy relationship with Russia, and their political 
will to define their own strategic ener gy policy agendas and interests. They also 
need the political will to clarify to which ex tent Russian positions and interests, 
as presently defined by the Kremlin, can and will be taken into account without 
negating their own strategic interests and those of the smaller regional countries. 
Otherwise, the EU and Kazakhstan may lose the credibility and reputation of their 
energy and foreign policies inside and outside their countries.
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